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INTRODUCTION
Since the dawn of radio, broadcasters have
been regarded as "public trustees:" in return for a
free, exclusive license to exploit a valuable public
resource, the broadcaster becomes a public trus-
tee, obligated to serve the interests of the commu-
nity through its broadcasts.1 Defining and enforc-
ing this duty to the public is a fundamental part of
broadcast regulation and has been subject to con-
stant policy debates and First Amendment chal-
lenges.
The transition to digital television has reinvigo-
rated the entire debate over the public interest
obligations owed by television broadcasters. As
FCC Commissioner Gloria Tristani put it: "The
public interest standard-the bedrock obligation
of those who broadcast over the public airwaves-
has fallen into an unfortunate state of disrepair
over the years. It's time to put up the scaffolding
and get the restoration underway. ' 2 Former
Chairman Reed Hundt similarly stressed the im-
plications of digital television for the public inter-
est debate: "Now, as the Commission considers va-
rious critical issues relating to the new spectrum
set aside for digital broadcast television, we have a
rare opportunity. We have a second chance to get
television regulation right, to put real meaning
into the public interest."
3
While these and other observers look to digital
television as a reason to expand the public inter-
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est obligations of broadcasters-to get something
in return for the free use of public spectrum-
others argue that digital television undermines
the very constitutionality of public interest regula-
tion. The notion that government should define
or influence programming content "necessarily
invites reference to First Amendment principles."4
Yet the courts have historically justified content-
specific public interest regulation under the First
Amendment by relying on the principle of "scar-
city"-the idea that the electromagnetic spectrum
is incapable of supporting every broadcaster who
would like to use it:
A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no
constitutional right . . . to monopolize a radio fre-
quency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is
nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the
Government from requiring a licensee to share his fre-
quency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy
or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and
voices which are representative of his community and
which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the
airwaves.
5
Throughout the public interest debate trig-
gered by the transition to digital television, broad-
casters have argued that digital technology, partic-
ularly the potential for the transmission of more
television programming, undermines the consti-
tutional basis for public interest regulation. Par-
ticularly, Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth
warned:
The primary rationale for broadcasters' public interest
2 See In re Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast
Licensees, Notice ofInquiry, 14 F.C.C. Rcd. 21660 (1999) Sepa-
rate Statement of Commissioner Gloria Tristani [hereinafter
1999 NOI].
3 Reed Hundt, A New Paradigm for Broadcast Regulation,
Address at the Conference for the Second Century of the
University of Pittsburgh School of Law (Sept. 21, 1995), in 15
J.L. & CoM. 527, 529 (1996) [hereinafter Hundt, A New Para-
dig'm].
4 CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,122
(1973).
5 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1967).
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obligations has been the theory that broadcast spec-
trum is a peculiarly scarce resource. Absent spectrum
scarcity, however, the justification for according broad-
casters less First Amendment protection than persons
engaged in other modes of communication becomes
difficult to discern. . .I believe that the Commission
must review the empirical basis of "spectrum scar-
city" ... Should we conclude ... that spectrum scarcity
is no longer viable as a factual matter, then the instant
effort to engage in additional regulation will be highly
problematic in constitutional terms.
6
This article responds to the concerns of Com-
missioners Hundt, Tristani, and Furchtgott-Roth
and discusses both the policy and constitutional
issues implicated by public interest regulation of
digital television. The article proceeds in three
parts. Part I reviews the transition to digital televi-
sion, highlighting important congressional and
administrative policy decisions. Part II discusses
the policy debate over public interest regulation of
digital television. Specifically, it addresses the
popular sentiment that digital television presents
an opportunity to redefine broadcasters' public
interest obligations. This article then discusses
the technical question of how public interest obli-
gations will be applied to the multiple program-
ming services that digital broadcasters are able to
transmit and the specific capabilities of digital
broadcast technologies that will influence public
interest regulation. Part III analyzes the constitu-
tional issues raised by digital television and the
continued validity of the scarcity doctrine, as well
as alternative constitutional foundations for pub-
lic interest regulation.
The article concludes that public interest regu-
lation is not in constitutional jeopardy as a result
of the advent of digital technology. Broadcast li-
censes remain scarce, and the scarcity doctrine re-
mains good law. The article also concludes, how-
ever, that digital television is not the milestone for
public interest regulation that Commissioners
Hundt and Tristani hope it to be. To a large de-
gree, their arguments are driven by popular senti-
ment that digital television represents a substan-
tial windfall for broadcasters and thus requires an
6 1999 NOI, supra note 2, at 21655, Separate Statement
of Commissioner Harold Furchgott-Roth, concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
7 See In re Advanced Television Sys. and Their Impact on
the Existing Television Broad. Serv., Notice of Inquiry, 2 F.C.C.
Rcd. 5125, 1 5 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 NOI].
, See id. 92.
9 See id. 11 5, 92; In re Advanced Television Sys. and
Their Impact on the Existing Television Broad. Serv., Fourth
Retport and Order, II FCC Rcd. 17771, 1 41 (1996) [hereinaf-
expansion of their duties to the public. As a re-
sult, advocates of greater public interest obliga-
tions have failed to ask whether and how the tech-
nology of digital television should impact broad-
casters' duty to serve the public interest. Instead,
both sides have simply repeated arguments from
the public interest debates over analog television.
As this article will show, despite the vast possibili-
ties of digital television, there is little reason to al-
ter the current public interest regulation regime.
THE TRANSITION TO DIGITAL TELEVISION
For over sixty years, American television has
been broadcast using essentially the same trans-
mission standard. In 1941, the FCC officially
adopted a technical standard proposed by the Na-
tional Television System Committee, and issued
its first commercial television licenses based on
this standard, commonly referred to as "NTSC."
7
Subsequently, the Commission improved televi-
sion technology in 1953 when it approved the
NTSC color standard. The new color standard,
however, was still receivable by older, black-and-
white televisions, albeit without color.8 Only a few
minor improvements (most notably, the addition
of stereo audio in 1986) were made in the ensu-
ing half-century, none of which required the re-
placement of existing receivers. 9
In 1987, fifty-eight broadcasting organizations
and companies petitioned the FCC to initiate a
proceeding to explore advanced television tech-
nologies and their possible impact on the televi-
sion broadcasting service.' 0 The broadcasters
were nominally concerned that alternative media
would deliver advanced television to the viewing
public, thus placing over-the-air broadcasting at a
severe disadvantage. New transmission systems
were in fact already being developed for Direct
Broadcast Satellite ("DBS") and other media.'' A
more immediate concern, however, was a pend-
ing proceeding to allot unused UHF spectrum for
ter Fourth Report and Order]; ADVISORY COMM. ON AD-
VANCED TELEVISION SERV., FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N,
ATV SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION § 3.2 (1993) [hereinafter
1993 REPORIT].
10 See 1987 NOI, supra note 7, 2.
i See ADVISORY COMM. ON ADVANCED TELEVISION SERV.,
FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, ADVISORY COMMISSION FINAL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION §1 (1995); see also 1987 NOI,
supra note 7, 1 2; see also 1993 REPORT, supra note 9, § 3.3.
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use by two-way, or "land mobile," radio communi-
cations. 12 Suddenly faced with the prospect of los-
ing valuable "beachfront property," broadcasters
argued that UHF spectrum was not lying fallow,
but instead was earmarked for future television
services.
The FCC responded by dropping its land mo-
bile deliberations' 3 and initiating a proceeding to
consider the technical and public policy issues of
advanced television. 14 The Commission has since
made a number of key decisions concerning the
transition to digital broadcasting, but has yet to
resolve the question of digital broadcasters' pub-
lic interest obligations. Many of the FCC's early
regulatory decisions, however, shape and drive
the current debate over public interest regulation.
This Part discusses the technology of digital televi-
sion and explores the short history of digital
broadcasting regulation, identifying the signifi-
cant regulatory decisions that influence and
shape the current debate over public interest obli-
gations. 1
5
A. A Few Words on Terminology
"Advanced television," or "ATV," broadly refers
to television technologies developed to replace
the current analog NTSC standard. "Digital tele-
vision," or "DTV," refers to digitally transmitted
television signals, and is not necessarily advanced
TV. For example, several current services, such as
12 See 1987 NOI, supra note 7, 7 41 n.29, 102; In Re Ad-
vanced Television Sys. and Their Impact on the Existing Tel-
evision Broad. Serv., Tentative Decision and Further Notice of In-
quiry, 3 F.C.C. Rcd. 6520, 7 (1988) [hereinafter Tentative
Decision]; see alsoJoEL BRINKLEY, DEFINING VISION: THE BAT-
TLE FOR THE FUTURE OF TELEVISION 7-10 (1997) [hereinafter
BRINKLEY].
13 See In re Further Sharing of UHF Television Band by
Private Land Mobile Radio Serv., Order, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 6441,
8 (1987); Tentative Decision, supra note 12, 7 7, 96.
14 See Tentative Decision, supra note 12, 8. The self-
serving nature of broadcaster's HDTV claims did not go un-
noticed at the time. But the initial suggestion of HDTV set
off a nationalist firestorm in Washington because, at the
time, the only working HDTV system was Japanese. HDTV at
once offered the possibility of revitalizing the American con-
sumer electronics industry or illustrating its complete inade-
quacy. See BRINKLEY, supra note 12, at 28-30, 36-46.
15 There are really two stories about the history of digital
television, one dealing with governmental policy decisions
and their nominal explanations and another dealing with the
actual political maneuvering that set the stage for these deci-
sions. This Article tells the former story, primarily through
records of the FCC's DTV proceedings. See generally BRINKLEY,
supra note 12 (describing the second and far more entertain-
DBS, transmit digitally but then convert the signal
to the NTSC analog standard for display on home
televisions.16 When the Commission opened its
advanced television inquiry in 1987, it resolved to
consider a variety of advanced systems, both digi-
tal and analog.' 7 By 1993, however, the Advisory
Committee had decided to focus exclusively on
digital systems because of their greater capacity
and quality.' 8 For practical purposes, then, the
FCC and the broadcasting industry use the terms
ATV and DTV interchangeably to refer to ad-
vanced television. 19
"High-definition television," or "HDTV" refers
to a particular type of advanced television. Like
ATV, HDTV for all practical purposes will be digi-
tal so as to take advantage of the capacity of digi-
tal technology, though it is technically capable of
displaying analog transmissions.20 HDTV offers
approximately twice the vertical and horizontal
resolution of current NTSC analog broadcasting,
which is a picture quality approaching 35-millime-
ter film, and has sound quality approaching that
of a compact disc.21 HDTV stands in contrast with
several other ATV systems, namely, extended-defi-
nition television ("EDTV"), which refers to any
number of improvements on the NTSC standard
short of HDTV, but which are all NTSC-compati-
ble, 22  and standard-definition television
("SDTV"), which is a digital television system in
which picture quality is approximately equivalent
to the current NTSC television system.
23
ing story about the history of digital television)
16 In reAdvanced Television Sys. and Their Impact Upon
the Existing Television Broad. Serv., Fifth Report and Order, 12
F.C.C. Rcd. 12809, 3 (1988) [hereinafter Fifth Report and
Order].
17 See 1987 NOI, supra note 7, 1 19.
18 See 1993 REPORT, supra note 9, § 1.
19 See Fourth Report and Order, supra note 9, 4 ("As
the proceeding progressed, all-digital advanced television sys-
tems were developed and we began to refer to advanced tele-
vision as digital television ("DTV") in recognition that, with
the development of the technology, it was decided any ATV
system was certain to be digital.").
20 See BRINKLEY, supra note 12, at 121-23; see also 1993 RE-
PORT, supra note 9, § 3.3.
21 See In re Advanced Television Sys. and Their Impact
Upon the Existing Television Broad. Serv., Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 6 F.C.C. Rcd. 7024, 1 n.1 (1991) [hereinafter
NPRM].
22 See In re Advanced Television Sys. and Their Impact on
the Existing Television Broad. Serv., First Report and Order, 5
F.C.C. Rcd. 5627, 1 n.2 (1990) [hereinafter First Report
and Order].
23 See In re Advanced Television Sys. and Their Impact
Upon the Existing Television Broad. Serv., Fourth Further No-
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B. The Public Interest in DTV: Pretty Pictures
and the Future of the Broadcast Industry
The fundamental policy driving the transition
to digital television is the determination that over-
the-air broadcast of DTV is in the public interest.
The Commission determined at the outset that
the public would benefit from "programs with sig-
nificantly improved video and audio quality."2 4
But while other media, such as cable and DBS,
were available to provide advanced television, the
FCC decided early on to rely on over-the-air
broadcast television to deliver ATV to American
households.2 5 The Commission based this deci-
sion on two predictions. First, broadcast televi-
sion was in the best position to make the transi-
tion to ATV. For example, although cable reaches
nearly two-thirds of American households and is
available to all but five percent of them, 26 broad-
cast television has achieved even greater penetra-
tion, reaching nearly 99% of American house-
holds.2 7 Second, in order to preserve the benefits
of free, over-the-air television, broadcasters would
tice of Proposed Rulemaking and Third Notice of Inquiby, 10 F.C.C.
Rcd. 10540, 4 n.4 (1995) [hereinafter Fourth NPRM].
24 See Tentative Decision, supra note 12, 1. The FCC
noted several deficiencies in the NTSC transmission stan-
dard. For one, there are "interlace/color defects" which de-
tract from the picture. For example, the NTSC standard's
interlaced scanning process causes "interline flicker," a flick-
ering effect around the horizontal borders of objects on TV,
and "line crawl," an illusion that a line is moving up or down
the screen at a constant motion. See 1987 NOI, supra note 7,
77 9-10. "Cross color," where a detailed pattern (a striped
shirt or a tweed jacket) appears as a bizarre color pattern, is
caused by the mixture of high luminance and chrominance
information by the NTSC signal, and "dot crawl," where a dot
pattern appears to crawl up the edges of color areas, is
caused by the leaking of color information into the lumi-
nance signal. See id. 15-16. More generally, NTSC suffers
from several "quality defects" such as a loss of realism and
depth because the display is narrowed to fit a square set and
because of limits on the sharpness and brightness of the pic-
ture and an inability to exploit compact-disc quality audio.
See id. 17 ("[P]sychophysical research has demonstrated
that viewers obtain a greater sense of realism and involve-
ment, as well as an illusion of depth, from a display widened
to correspond more closely to the dimension of human field
of vision as well as with sharper and brighter picture.").
25 See Tentative Decision, supra note 12, 4, 38.
26 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 197
(1997); ROBERT W. CRANDALL & HAROLD FURCHTGOi-r-ROTHi,
CABLE TV: REGULATION OR COMPETITION 1 (1996).
27 The Commission reasoned that:
[B]ecause over-the-air broadcasting reaches more than
98 percent of U.S. households, an ATV terrestrial broad-
cast system is the medium most likely to bring this tech-
nological advance to virtually all Americans. Conse-
quently, it is the medium most likely to result in rapid
have to be allowed to offer ATV if they were to
compete with alternative media:
28
[W]e conclude that broadcast stations provide services
unique in the array of entertainment and non-en-
tertainment programs freely available to the American
public. Unlike many other countries, the United States
has a strong and independent system of privately-
owned and operated broadcast stations that transmit lo-
cal and regional news, information, and entertainment
as well as national and international programs. There-
fore, initiating an advanced television system within the
existing framework of local broadcasting will uniquely
benefit the public and may be necessary to preserve the
benefits of the existing system. Also, we believe that the
benefits of these new technological developments will
be made available to the public in the quickest and
most efficacious manner if existing broadcasters are
permitted to implement ATV. We emphasize that this
decision does not foreclose provision of ATV services by
other means, both those that use spectrum and those
that do not.
29
From the beginning, then, the transition to dig-
ital television has been about more than better
picture and audio. Hand in hand with the desire
to improve America's television experience has
penetration of ATV receivers and, hence, to contribute
to higher sales volumes and eventually lower costs for
these receivers.
In re Advanced Television Sys. and Their Impact Upon the
Existing Television Broad. Serv., Second Report and Order, 7
F.C.C. Rcd. 3340, 4 (1992) [hereinafter Second Report and
Order].
28 The FCC's Advisory Committee found that "to remain
competitive, broadcasters must have the opportunity to de-
liver HDTV-quality signals to their audiences, and that, there-
fore, efforts should be focused on establishing an HDTV
standard for terrestrial broadcasting." Tentative Decision,
supra note 12, 10; see also Fifth Report and Order, supra
note 16, 3 ("Broadcasters have long recognized that they
must make the switch to digital technology.").
29 Tentative Decision, supra note 12, 39.
Our objective is not to launch a new and separate video
service .... Rather, our goal is to encourage beneficial
technical change in the existing terrestrial broadcast ser-
vice by allowing broadcasters to assimilate ATV technol-
ogy. Thus our intent is to preserve and improve the ex-
isting broadcast service and the benefits that this service
delivers to the public. In addition, given the risks inher-
ent in ATV, it appears to us that rapid development of
ATV broadcasting can be realized best by assigning suita-
ble additional spectrum to existing licensees and appli-
cants because of the considerable resources and exper-
tise that licensees already have invested in the broadcast
television system, and the possibility that additional spec-
trum could be used only by them.
Id. 136.
"At least initially it is our view that nothing in the public
interest standard of the Act requires or suggests that transi-
tion to an improved broadcast service must, or should, be
accompanied by major changes in the industry's ownership
structure." Id. 137.
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been a concern for the competitiveness of free,
broadcast television.
The Commission went further and chose to
limit initial DTV applications to existing broad-
casters.3 0 The Commission based its decision on
several reasons. First, existing broadcasters had
"invested considerable resources and expertise" in
the NTSC system and "represent[ed] a large pool
of experienced talent."3 ' Second, the FCC be-
lieved that a change in the ownership structure of
the broadcasting industry would increase the po-
tential for disruption to the viewing public.3 2 This
decision was ratified by Congress in the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996 ("96 Act"). 33
C. Simulcasting and the Transition to DTV
The Commission decided early on that it would
go to great lengths to ensure a seamless transition
from NTSC to DTV, one that would cause as little
disruption to viewers as possible. 34 As research
progressed, however, it became evident that
NTSC-compatible systems would never equal the
picture quality and spectrum-efficiency of emerg-
ing non-NTSC technologies. 35 Accordingly, the
Commission made a key decision in 1990 to aban-
30 See Tentative Decision, supra note 12, 1 4; see also
NPRM, supra note 21, 1 5-6 (affirming the tentative decision
in 1991); see also Second Report and Order, supra note 27, 1
4 (reaffirming the tentative decision in 1992).
31 NPRM, supra note 21, 1 6. Broadcasters had helped to
"create and support the Advanced Television Test Center, in-
vesting resources and developing expertise in this new tech-
nology." Second Report and Order, supra note 27, 1 6.
32 See NPRM, supra note 21, 1 6. Additionally, the Com-
mission believed that restricting initial eligibility would facili-
tate licensing by avoiding the delay of comparative hearings
required by Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327,
329-30 (1945). See Fourth NPRM, supra note 23, 1 26.
33 47 U.S.C. § 336(a)(1) (Supp. V 1999). The FCC de-
cided that once allotments for existing broadcasters were
made, it would permit any qualified party to obtain a DTV
license if technically feasible. See Second Report and Order,
supra note 27,1 7; NPRM, supra note 21, 1 10. In particular,
low-power and small, minority-owned stations objected to
their exclusion from initial DTV eligibility. See Fifth Report
and Order, supra note 16, 1 15-16.
34 See Tentative Decision, supra note 12, 1 4 ("We find
that existing service to viewers utilizing NTSC receivers must
be continued irrespective of the actual manner in which ATV
services are delivered, at least during a transition period.
This can be accomplished either by transmitting ATV signals
that can be received directly by NTSC receivers or by simul-
casting NTSC and incompatible ATV signals on separate
channels."); see also 1987 NOI, supra note 7, 11 83-88 (dis-
cussing transition policy options).
35 See First Report and Order, supra note 22, 1 7, 9. The
FCC earlier had "strong predisposition to require NTSC re-
don the pursuit of an NTSC-compatible system,
requiring that broadcasters and viewers invest in
entirely new equipment to facilitate the transi-
tion. 3
6
As an alternative to backwards-compatibility
with NTSC sets, the Commission provided for the
gradual phasing-in of the new digital signal (and
the simultaneous phasing-out of the NTSC sig-
nal). The FCC determined that broadcasters
would "simulcast"-or simultaneous broadcast-
NTSC and DTV signals on two different chan-
nels. 37  NTSC broadcasts would continue, and
broadcasters would be given a second 6MHz chan-
nel to introduce DTV. The idea was that during
the transition period, viewers would retain the
ability to receive NTSC broadcasts while more
DTV programming became available and more
DTV receivers went on the market. At the end of
the transition period-when DTV had become
the prevalent medium-broadcasters would re-
turn the 6MHz channel used for NTSC, retaining
the other channel only for DTV broadcasting.
3
This dual license regime was codified by Congress
in the '96 Act.39 Congress later set a December
31, 2006 deadline for the termination of NTSC
broadcasts, but allowed the FCC to extend the
ceiver compatibility." Tentative Decision, supra note 12, 1 5.
In addition to poorer video resolution, NTSC-compatible sys-
tems required the allocation of additional spectrum adjacent
to the 6MHz licenses already issued. See First Report and Or-
der, supra note 22, 1 9. There simply was not enough availa-
ble spectrum to provide each broadcaster with augmentation
spectrum contiguous to their current channel, and the cost
of technologies to broadcast on noncontiguous spectrum
were greater than those associated with using a separate DTV
signal. See id. 1 10. On the other hand, advances in technol-
ogy had produced proposals that would deliver HDTV pro-
gramming with a 6MHz license. See id. 1 6; see also Tentative
Decision, supra note 12, 1 82 (declining to consider non-
NTSC-compatible systems that would require more than
6MHz). Although the FCC decided to provide an additional
6MHz channel for DTV, it ultimately planned to recover the
spectrum used for the NTSC channel. See NPRM, supra note
21, 11 6, 13, 34-35; infra note 38.
36 First Report and Order, supra note 22, 11 1, 9. Addi-
tionally, the FCC reasoned that "going from the existing
NTSC system to an [DTV] system in one step will minimize
the investment required of broadcasters, avoid the need for
interim standards for transitional systems and the costs of re-
quiring later systems to be compatible with those systems and
speed [DTV] implementation." Id. 1 8.
37 See First Report and Order, supra note 22, 1 8 & n.1.
The Commission reasoned that simulcasting would
"minimiz[e] broadcaster and consumer reliance on the ATV
channel as a separately programmed service." Second Re-
port and Order, supra note 27, 1 59.
38 See NPRM, supra note 21, 11 6, 13, 34-35.
39 See 47 U.S.C. § 336(c) (Supp. V 1999).
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deadline if fewer than 85% of the station's viewers
can receive the broadcaster's digital service either
off-air or through satellite or cable television.4 0
Under the statute, the returned spectrum will ulti-
mately be auctioned, providing a financial incen-
tive for the government to facilitate the transition
to complete market penetration.
41
D. Multicasting, Ancillary Use, and the
Evolution of the Public Interest in DTV
As research on advanced television progressed,
ATV began to promise a dramatically different
media experience from NTSC broadcasts-far
more than enhanced picture and audio quality.
The Commission began to refer to digital televi-
sion as "a quantum leap in the benefits that may
be derived from television service." 42 This is due
in large part to the ability to "multicast," or send
multiple, simultaneous broadcast streams. Digital
technology made it evident that multiple, high-
resolution television signals could be broadcast
within a 6MHz channel, with the possibility of ad-
40 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14) (Supp. V 1999). The FCC had
earlier stated that it would set a firm deadline for broadcast-
ers to surrender their NTSC spectrum. See Second Report
and Order, supra note 27, 2, 50, 53 ("Although... there is
a benefit to affording the public a choice between ATV and
NTSC programming during the transition years, suggesting
that such a choice will remain permanently available would
undoubtedly inhibit the growth of ATV."). The '96 Act ex-
pressly required the Commission to condition the grant of a
digital license on the recovery of one 6MHz license from
each licensee. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(c) (Supp. V 1999).
41 See 47 U.S.C. § 309(c) (Supp. V 1999); see also 47
U.S.C. 309(j) (14); see also Second Report and Order, supra
note 27, 66 ("The more swiftly ATV receiver penetration
increases, the more rapidly we will be able to reclaim one 6
MHz channel."); Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, 6
(identifying as one of the Commission's two principle goals
to "promote spectrum efficiency and rapid recovery of spec-
trum.").
42 Fourth NPRM, supra note 23, 11.
43 Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, 7 20, 27;
Fourth Report and Order, supra note 9, 5 (footnotes omit-
ted); Fourth NPRM, supra note 23, 7 4, 19, 23; BRINKLEY,
supra note 12, at 207.
In addition to being able to broadcast one, and under
some circumstances two, [HDTV] programs, [DTV] al-
lows for multiple streams, or "multicasting," of [SDTV]
programming at a visual quality better than the current
analog signal. Utilizing [DTV], broadcasters can trans-
mit three, four, five, or more such program streams si-
multaneously. [DTV] allows for the broadcast of literally
dozens of CD-quality audio signals. It permits the rapid
delivery of large amounts of data; an entire edition of
the local daily newspaper could be sent, for example, in
less than two seconds. Other material, whether it be
telephone directories, sports information, stock market
ditional spectrum remaining available for other
uses such as CD-quality audio signals, computer
software distribution, interactive education mater-
ials, and "data casting": broadcasting data such as
telephone directories, sports statistics, stock mar-
ket updates, and information concerning com-
mercial products.
43
Under the dual license arrangement discussed
above, the FCC originally required that licensees
should simulcast on their NTSC channel a certain
amount of the programming provided on their
ATV channel. 44 This decision was motivated by
the FCC's concern for an uninterrupted transi-
tion to ATV; it did not want to immediately rele-
gate NTSC viewers to inferior programming or
postpone the surrender of one of the 6MHz li-
censes.4 5 Because the ability of digital broadcast-
ers to multicast could not be replicated on their
NTSC channels, however, the simulcasting re-
quirement became a restriction on DTV service.
46
Accordingly, in 1997 the Commission reversed
course and allowed broadcasters the discretion to
offer programming on their ATV channel that dif-
updates, information requested concerning certain
products featured in commercials, computer software
distribution, interactive education materials, or virtually
any other type of information access can also be pro-
vided. It allows broadcasters to send, video, voice and
data simultaneously and to provide a range of services
dynamically, switching easily and quickly from one type
of service to another. For example, a broadcaster could
transmit a news program consisting of four separate, si-
multaneous SDTV program streams for local news, na-
tional news, weather and sports; then transmit an HDTV
commercial with embedded data about the product;
then transmit a motion picture in an HDTV format si-
multaneously with unrelated data.
Fourth Report and Order, supra note 9, 5 (footnotes omit-
ted).
44 See Second Report and Order, supra note 27, 77 2, 58
(tentatively deciding on 100% simulcasting).
45 See NPRM, supra note 21, 7 45. The Commission, rec-
ognizing that "some number of consumers, unaware of the
transition to digital television or unable to afford replace-
ment equipment, may continue viewing analog television
throughout the transition period," feared a Hobson's choice
"of either terminating analog service, causing such viewers to
lose their only source of free broadcast service, or, alterna-
tively, allowing analog broadcasting to continue, thereby de-
priving the broad general public of the benefits that we be-
lieve are to be found from the recovery of one of the chan-
nels." See Fourth NPRM, supra note 23, 41. The Commis-
sion also believed that its ability to reclaim one of the 6MHz
licenses would be threatened if the two channels carried sep-
arately programmed services. See Second Report and Order,
supra note 27, 7 12.
46 See Fourth NPRM, supra note 23, 37-39; Fifth Re-
port and Order, supra note 16, 1 51.
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fered from that broadcast on their NTSC chan-
nel.47 One of the main reasons for the change
was the Commission's determination that the abil-
ity to offer multiple simultaneous programming
services would make DTV far more attractive to
consumers and would therefore expedite the
transition from NTSC to DTV.
48
The ability to multicast different services raised
the possibility that DTV licenses might be used to
broadcast non-television signals. In 1997, the
Commission extended to DTV licensees its prac-
tice of allowing broadcasters to use a portion of
their spectrum for ancillary or supplemental uses
that do not interfere with the primary broadcast
signal. 49 The FCC's hope was that allowing broad-
casters to "experiment with innovative offerings
and different service packages" would facilitate
the transition to DTV, especially at the early stages
when DTV penetration was low. 50 It also believed
that ancillary revenues "would increase the ability
of broadcasters to compete in an increasingly
competitive marketplace." 51 To recoup some of
the value of spectrum used for ancillary purposes,
the FCC requires that broadcasters pay the gov-
ernment a fee of 5% of gross revenues received
47 See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, 1 55.
48 See id. (noting that "many consumers' decisions to in-
vest in DTV receivers will depend on the programs, en-
hanced features, and services that are not available on the
NTSC service"). The FCC, however, did not entirely aban-
don its simulcasting order. Simulcasting was still necessary in
order to ensure that the final switch from NTSC to DTV did
not result in the loss of NTSC programming to which the
public was accustomed. See id. 56. Instead, it simply de-
ferred its operation until later in the transition process, with
the requirement phasing in gradually towards a 100% re-
quirement by 2005, and only required stations to simulcast
NTSC content on DTV channels, and not the other way
around. See id. 11 51, 54.
49 Id. 21. The Commission had explicit authority to
allow ancillary use of DTV license under the '96 Act. See 47
U.S.C. § 336(a) (2) (Supp. V 1999). Moreover, the Commis-
sion believed that ancillary use furthered congressional in-
tent "[t]o promote competition and reduce regulation in or-
der to secure lower prices and higher quality services for
American telecommunications consumers and encourage
the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technolo-
gies." Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, 1 31 (quoting
pmbl., 110 Stat. at 56). The Commission had considered
supplemental use of DTV spectrum before the ability to mul-
ticast became evident. In its 1988 Tentative Decision, the
FCC expressed concern that the complexities of DTV would
cause licensees to transition to DTV at varying paces and that
spectrum would go unused while the transition proceeded:
"Therefore we are considering allowing supplemental spec-
trum to be used for non- ATV purposes for some interim pe-
riod." Tentative Decision, supra note 12, 1 152.
50 Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, 1 7, See id. 11
from spectrum use additional to the free pro-
gramming service.
52
At the same time that the Commission opened
new revenue-generating opportunities for digital
broadcasters, it narrowed the scope of required
services. Although the Commission had originally
expected that broadcasters would "take full advan-
tage of ATV technical capabilities," 53 i.e., high-def-
inition television, the FCC later decided only to
require that licensees offer one "free digital video
programming service the resolution of which is
comparable to or better than that of today's ser-
vice."'54 The Commission declined to impose a
minimum amount of HDTV programming, but
instead left this decision to the discretion of licen-
sees.
5 5
The decision not to mandate a certain amount
of high definition broadcasting illustrates the
evolution of the relationship between DTV and
the public interest. In 1987, the Commissionjus-
tified its inquiry into the future of television by
finding that the public would benefit from "pro-
grams with significantly improved video and au-
dio quality."5 6 By 1997, however, the benefit to
the public was not "pretty pictures," but the po-
6, 33 ("By permitting broadcasters to assemble packages of
services that consumers desire, we will promote the swift ac-
ceptance of DTV and the penetration of DTV receivers and
converters."); Fourth NPRM, supra note 23, 1 23; Third Re-
port and Order, Advanced Television Systems and Their Im-
pact on the Existing Television Broadcast Service, 7 F.C.C.R.
6924, 77 (1992) [hereinafter Third Report and Order].
The Commission previously allowed ancillary use of a fre-
quency to initiate the development of DBS. See United States
Satellite Broad. Co., Inc., 1 F.C.C. Rcd. 977, 977 (1986).
51 Fourth NPRM, supra note 23, 1 23; see Fifth Report
and Order, supra note 16, 11 3, 5, 7, 29 (reasoning that ancil-
lary use "will help broadcast television to remain a strong
presence in the video programming market that will, in turn,
help support a free programming service.").
52 In re Fees for Ancillary or Supplementary Use of Digi-
tal Television Spectrum, MM Docket No. 97-247, Report and
Order (adopted Nov. 19, 1998; released Nov. 19, 1998) [here-
inafter Ancillary Use Order]. The '96 Act required the FCC
to levy such a fee to recover some of the value that would
have been received had ancillary services been licensed
through auctions. 47 U.S.C. § 336(e)(2) (Supp. V 1999).
53 Second Report and Order, supra note 27, 1 65.
54 Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, 1 28.
55 See id. 1 41.
56 See Tentative Decision, supra note 12, 1 1. The FCC's
advanced television proceedings had begun to explore "new
television technologies designed to improve significantly
upon television picture." 1987 NOI, supra note 7, 1 1. Al-
though the Commission had avoided a premature definition
of ATV programming, see Third Report and Order, supra
note 50, 1 76, improved video and audio continued to pro-
vide the basis for the FCC's early DTV decisions. For exam-
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tential role that digital television would play in the
nation's evolving information infrastructure.
57
During its deliberations on a DTV transmission
standard, the FCC began to insist on compatibility
with computer applications in order to ensure
"seamless, interactive, user driven access to the
widest range of information," particularly video-
rich applications. 58 Additionally, because the gov-
ernment plans to auction off NTSC channels at
the end of the transition, the FCC believes that
the public has a monetary interest in the success
of DTV.
59
One theme has remained constant throughout
the FCC's DTV proceedings. The Commission
has held to the belief that DTV is necessary to en-
able broadcasters to compete in a converging in-
formation marketplace, and has viewed emerging
capabilities such as multicasting and ancillary use
ple, the FCC's decision to abandon proposals for an NTSC-
compatible signal was based on the capabilities of HDTV. See
First Report and Order, supra note 22, at 7-8; BRINKLEY,
supra note 12, at 114-16. Moreover, in declining to reduce
the bandwidth available to broadcasters, the FCC relied on
the fact the full benefits of DTV, including HDTV, required a
6MHz license. See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16,
12. Similarly, the Commission reasoned in 1992:
We are awarding broadcasters a second 6 MHz channel
on an interim basis to permit them to make a transition
to ATV. We see no reason to permit use of the second
channel for non-ATV programs that differ from those
broadcast on the associated NTSC channel. Thus, in the
event we adopt a phased-in simulcast requirement, we
would nonetheless expect programming on the ATV
channel to take full advantage of the technical capabili-
ties of the ATV mode.
Second Report and Order, supra note 27, 65.
57 See Fourth NPRM, supra note 23, 18; Certainly broad-
casters did not want to tie their hands with HDTV. They had
realized from the beginning that enhanced picture alone
would likely provide little or no additional revenue to offset
the investment needed to upgrade equipment. See BRINKLEY,
supra note 12, at 64-68, 204-09. The ability to offer subscrip-
tion services, on the other hand, promised a variety of reve-
nue streams. The disingenuity of avoiding re-allotment of
UHF spectrum by preaching the virtue of HDTV while escap-
ing any commitment to HDTV programming did not go un-
noticed. See id. at 289-93, 308-11, 315-16. But political winds
in Washington had shifted. Although the consumer elec-
tronics industry had invested millions of dollars in an HDTV
system in the hopes of capturing the receiver market, the In-
ternet had exploded across America and its future was any-
one's guess. Moreover, Vice President Gore, along with
newly appointed Chairman Reed Hundt, was far more con-
cerned with integrating digital television into the National
Information Infrastructure than he was in "pretty pictures."
See id. at 288-89, 298-304, 327-28, 354-55.
We do not know what consumers may demand and sup-
port. Since broadcasters have incentives to discover the
preferences of consumers and adapt their service offer-
ings accordingly, we believe it is prudent to leave the
as additional means to this end.60
PUBLIC INTEREST REGULATION IN THE
DIGITAL AGE
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 expressly
provides that DTV broadcasters will be subject to
public interest obligations:
[N]othing in this section shall be construed as relieving
a television broadcasting station from its obligation to
serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity. In
the Commission's review of any application for renewal
of a broadcast license for a television station that pro-
vides ancillary or supplementary services, the television
licensee shall establish that all of its program services
on the existing or advanced television spectrum are in
the public interest.
6 1
Prior to the '96 Act, the Commission's DTV
proceedings "reflect[ed] the assumption that pub-
choice up to broadcasters so that they may respond to
the demands of the marketplace. A requirement now
could stifle innovation as it would rest on a priori as-
sumptions as to what services viewers would prefer.
Broadcasters can best stimulate consumers' interest in
digital services if able to offer the most attractive pro-
grams, whatever form those may take, and it is by at-
tracting consumers to digital, away from analog, that the
spectrum can be freed for additional uses. Further, al-
lowing broadcasters flexibility as to the services they pro-
vide will allow them to offer a mix of services that can
promote increased consumer acceptance of digital tele-
vision, which, in turn, will increase broadcasters' profits,
which, in turn, will increase incentives to proceed faster
with the transition.
Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, 42.
Although the transition to DTV proceeded without any
commitment to HDTV, the lack of emphasis on HDTV cre-
ated a backlash in Congress during deliberations on the '96
Act. Representatives were considerably less inclined to give
broadcasters a second license for free, if that license was go-
ing to be used for subscription services. See BRINKLEY, supra
note 12, at 321-24, 337-47. In the end, however, the political
situation could not have been more favorable to broadcast-
ers. Broadcasters made a number of public pledges to offer
HDTV, ensuring that the second licenses were given, not
sold. Yet Chairman Hundt's interest in innovative digital ser-
vices ensured that none of these promises were reduced to
an enforceable commitment. See id. at 345-47, 352-53, 359-
66.
58 See COMMITTEE ON APPLICATIONS AND TECH-
NOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY POLICY WORKING GROUP,
ADVANCED DIGITAL VIDEO AND THE NATIONAL INFOR-
MATION INFRASTRUCTURE: TECHNOLOGY POLICY
WORKING GROUP PROJECT, February 15, 1995, available
at http://nii.nist.gov/pubs/adtv/adtv.html (last modified
Mar. 8, 1995); Fourth NPRM, supra note 23, 18 n.19 (citing
an earlier version of the NIST report).
59 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
60 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
(1 47 U.S.C. 336(d) (Supp. V 1999).
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lic interest obligations would attach to ATV broad-
casting. Indeed, that broadcasters 'have an obliga-
tion to serve the public interest' is one of our rea-
sons for limiting initial eligibility for ATV chan-
nels to existing broadcasters."6 2 Pursuant to the
'96 Act, the Commission formally announced in
1997: "As we authorize digital service, however,
broadcast licensees and the public are on notice
that existing public interest requirements con-
tinue to apply to all broadcast licensees. Broad-
casters and the public are also on notice that the
Commission may adopt new public interest rules
for digital television." 63
A. Broadcast and the Public Interest
Broadcasters are said to be "public trustees:" in
return for a free, exclusive license to exploit a val-
uable public resource, the broadcaster undertakes
an obligation to serve the interests of the commu-
nity. 64 This duty to serve the public interest has
been a fundamental part of broadcast regulation
since the Hoover administration, although its log-
ical and constitutional basis has remained elu-
sive. 65 The public trustee regulatory model, cur-
rently codified at 47 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1994), is
part of the compromise Congress fashioned be-
62 Fourth NPRM, supra note 23, 33; see also id. 34
("We remain committed to enforcing our statutory mandate
to ensure that broadcasters serve the public interest.").
63 Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, 50; see also id.
48 ("In enacting [§ 336(d)], Congress clearly provided that
broadcasters have public interest obligations on the program
services they offer, regardless of whether they are offered us-
ing analog or digital technology."); id. 49 ("In the digital
television era, although many aspects of the business and
technology of broadcasting may be different, broadcasters
will remain trustees of the public's airwaves.").
64 See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389
(1967) ("Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the
government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in
favor of others whose views should be expressed on this
unique medium."); BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 1, ch. 6;
ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 115-226.
65 Regulation based on the public trustee model was one
of several Hoover Administration concepts that were found
to violate the Radio Act of 1912, which was construed by the
courts not to provide authority to regulate broadcasting be-
yond the initial license grant. See Hoover v. Intercity Radio
Co., 286 F. 1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also NBC v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-15 (1943); BENJAMIN ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 1.11. Congress subsequently codified the
public trustee model in the Radio Act of 1927. Pub. L. No.
69-632, 44 Stat. 1162. The 1927 Act was replaced by the Com-
munications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064,
which retained the public trustee model. Constitutional at-
tacks on the public trustee model are discussed infra, Part III.
tween full, private ownership of the spectrum and
a system of common carrier regulation. 66 This
compromise is credited with fostering the devel-
opment of the broadcast industry while at the
same time preserving a measure of public control
over a national resource.
67
While not affirmatively obligating broadcasters
to serve the public interest, Section 303 authorizes
the Commission to perform certain regulatory
functions "from time to time, as the public conve-
nience, interest, or necessity requires." Moreover,
under Sections 309 and 310, the grants, modifica-
tions, renewals, and transfers of licenses are sub-
ject to the FCC's determination that the "public
interest, convenience, or necessity would be
served" thereby.
Courts, commissioners, and commentators have
adopted various definitions of "public interest"
over the years. The Supreme Court has described
the public interest standard as a "comparative and
not an absolute standard when applied to broad-
casting stations."68 In NBC v. United States, 319
U.S. 190 (1943), the Court stated generally, "The
'public interest' to be served under the Communi-
cations Act is thus the interest of the listening
public in 'the larger and more effective use of ra-
dio.' , 69 At its most basic level, the obligation to
66 Congress expressly retained government ownership of
the airwaves:
It is the purpose of this chapter, among other things, to
maintain the control of the United States over all the
channels of radio transmission; and to provide for the
use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by
persons for limited periods of time, under licenses
granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall
be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, con-
ditions, and periods of the license.
47 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
Congress, however, declined to impose a common carrier
regime on broadcast. Rather than require licensees to make
their frequencies available to the public on a first-come, first-
served basis, the public trustee model relies on broadcasters'
editorial discretion in selecting content. See, e.g., Fed. Com-
munications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S.
364, 378 (1984) ("Unlike common carriers, broadcasters are
entitled tinder the First Amendment to exercise the widest
journalistic freedom consistent with their public [duties]."
(internal quotation omitted) (alteration in original)).
67 See CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCAST FUTURE: FINAL
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST OB-
LIGATIONS OF DIGITAL TELEVISION BROADCASTERS at 18-19
(1998) [hereinafter GORE REPORT].
68 FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 n.2
(1940).




serve the public interest concerns "the ability of
the licensee to render the best practicable service
to the community reached by his broadcasts.
' '7
0
To a large extent, the Court has deferred to the
judgment of the Commission, noting that the
public interest standard "is as concrete as the
complicated factors for judgment in such a field
of delegated authority permit," and "serves as a
supple instrument for the exercise of discretion
by the expert body which Congress has charged to
carry out its legislative policy."
7'
The FCC, in turn, has varied its approach to
public interest regulation over the years. 72 For a
time, the FCC mandated the methods by which
broadcasters ascertained and addressed the needs
and interests of their communities and imposed
rigid standards for decency, programming format
and advertising. 73 Over the last three decades,
however, the Commission has deferred to viewer
preferences, finding that "market incentives will
ensure the presentation of programming that re-
sponds to community needs and provide suffi-
cient incentives for licensees to become and re-
main aware of the needs and problems of their
communities. '74 The FCC believes that these in-
centives promote the public interest more effec-
tively and efficiently than traditional command-
and-control regulation.
75
The '96 Act requires the FCC to renew broad-
cast licenses-its principal source of leverage-if
70 FCC v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475
(1940), quoted in NBC, 319 U.S. at 216.
7' Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. at 138.
72 For a summary of current public interest regulations,
see MASS MEDIA BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICA-
TIONS COMMISSION, THE PUBLIC AND BROADCAST-
ING, available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass-Media/
Factsheets/pubbroad.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2002) [here-
inafter MASS MEDIA BUREAU, THE PUBLIC AND BROAD-
CASTING].
73 The Commission listed specific categories of program-
ming it believed served the public interest and required con-
sultation with community leaders. See Programming Inquiry,
44 F.C.C. Rcd 2303, 2312 (1960) (en banc); ZUCKMAN ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 171-72.
74 In its 1984 Report and Order on Television Deregula-
tion, the FCC eliminated regulations concerning local, news,
and public affairs programming, the methods by which
broadcasters ascertained the needs and interests of their
communities, record-keeping duties, and maximum com-
mercials per hour. 98 F.C.C. 2d 1076, 2 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Deregulation Report]; see also FCC v. WNCN Listeners
Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 593 (1981); BENJAMIN E'r AL., supra note
1, at 39-41; ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 119-21 (1999)
("The Commission assumed that the remote control is a bet-
ter regulator of broadcaster behavior than the govern-
ment.").
the broadcaster has served the public interest and
committed no serious or abusive violations of the
code or Commission rules.76 Current FCC regula-
tions require broadcasters to file a quarterly state-
ment describing their programming dealing with
community issues, which is evaluated by the Com-
mission during renewal proceedings.77 The Com-
mission, however, no longer considers competing
applications during renewal hearings,7 and, as
discussed above, the FCC has abandoned attempts
to quantify the public interest standard. Moreo-
ver, the Commission has shifted its focus away
from the individual licensee to the overall range
of programming available to viewers: "It appears,
therefore, that the failure of some stations to pro-
vide programming in some categories is being off-
set by the compensatory performance of other sta-
tions. In this respect, market demand is deter-
mining the appropriate mix of each licensee's
programming."
79
In addition to the broader public trustee
model, Congress has imposed specific public in-
terest obligations on broadcasters in six areas.
First, the Children's Television Act of 1990
("CTA") requires the Commission, when re-
newing licenses, to consider whether the licensee
"has served the educational and informational
needs of children through the licensee's overall
programming. '"" Second, Congress imposes a
number of obligations concerning political cam-
75 For example, studies showed that consumer demand
for local and informational programming led to airtime
levels consistently higher than those set by the FCC. See Der-
egulation Report, supra note 74, 77 10-19. Accordingly, to
the extent that programming exceeded regulatory standards,
the cost of operating the regulatory regime yielded no bene-
fit. But see Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88
CAL. L. REV. 499, 503, 514-22 (2000) (arguing that "[t]he eco-
nomic ideal of 'consumer sovereignty' is ill-suited to the com-
mtunications market") [hereinafter Sunstein].
76 See 47 U.S.C. § 309(k) (Supp. V 1999).
77 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 3526(a)(8) & (9) (2000); Cowles
Broadcasting, Inc., 86 F.C.C. 2d 993, 1 4 (1981), affd sub
nom. Cent. Florida Enter., Inc. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503, 503
(D.C.Cir.1982).
78 See 47 U.S.C. § 309(k) (4) (Supp. V 1999); see also In Re
Implementation of Sections 204(a) and 204(c) of the
Telecomm. Act of 1996 (Broad. License Renewal Proce-
dures), Order, 11 F.C.C. Rcd. 6363, 3 (1996) (abolishing
comparative hearings for renewal applicants).
79 Deregulation Report, supra note 74, 22.
8o 47 U.S.C. § 303b(a)(2) (1994). Pursuant to this au-
thority, the FCC adopted a processing guideline under which
licensees that air three hours per week of programming spe-
cifically designed to educate and inform children will be
given staff level approval of their renewal applications,
thereby avoiding the full Commission inquiry under the
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paigns, including the "equal time"' and "lowest
unit charge"8 2 rules. Third, Congress has made it
a crime to broadcast "obscene" programming
8 3
and has restricted the broadcast of "indecent"
programming to between ten o'clock at night and
six o'clock in the morning.84 Fourth, Congress
has required that television manufacturers in-
clude a "V-chip" in all new television sets larger
than thirteen inches.8 5 The V-chip allows viewers
to block out certain content by reading embed-
ded, descriptive data transmitted along with the
programming. 86 Fifth, broadcasters are subject to
a number of consumer protection and public
safety rules.8 7 Finally, Congress has sought to en-
hance television access for the hearing and visu-
ally impaired through closed captioning and
other technologies.88
To the extent that these specific obligations tar-
get market failures-or politically charged is-
sues-they have resisted the trend towards der-
egulation. In enacting the CTA, for example,
Congress found that market forces were not suffi-
CTA. See In Re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Tel-
evision Programming, Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 10660,
4-5 (1996). The CTA also requires the FCC to regulate the
amount of commercial advertising aired during children's
programming. See § 102, 104 Stat. at 996-97 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 303a (1994)).
81 See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1994) (requiring broadcasters
who give airtime to one candidate for public office to "afford
equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that of-
fice . . .").
82 See id. at § 315(b) (requiring that, for airtime during
the forty-five days preceding a primary election and the sixty
days preceding a general election, broadcaster may only
charge candidates the "lowest unit charge of the station for
the same class and amount of time for the same period").
83 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994); see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999
(2000) (enforcing 18 U.S.C. § 1464).
84 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1994); see also Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(upholding indecent programming restriction). Negative re-
strictions on speech such as limitations on the broadcast of
indecent programming are analyzed under a different First
Amendment framework than are other affirmative public in-
terest obligations. See infra note 263.
85 47 U.S.C. § 303(x) (Supp. V 1999).
86 See generallyJ.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-chip, and the
Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 45 DUKE LJ. 1131, 1131
(1996) (discussing the legal and policy implications of filter-
ing technology) [hereinafter Balkin].
87 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994) (prohibiting cigarette
advertisements); 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1994) (mandating identifi-
cation of persons paying for broadcast programming); 47
C.F.R. § 11.1 (2000) (Emergency Alert System); 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.1217 (2000) (prohibiting hoaxes). The CTA reaffirmed
the Commission's responsibility to ensure that broadcasters
do not engage in excessive or abusive advertising practices.
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(a-b), 394 (requiring that the Commis-
cient to ensure that commercial stations would
provide children's educational and information
programming. Because over-the-air commercial
broadcast stations earn their revenues from the
sale of advertising time, the FCC has reasoned
that broadcasters have little incentive to promote
children's television where audiences are rela-
tively small.89 The disincentive is even greater for
educational programs for children.90 Similarly,
Congress found that market forces may produce a
"race to the bottom" with respect to indecency
and violence.9'
Not surprisingly, broadcasters have favored der-
egulation and continue to argue that the market
is a far better judge of what the public is inter-
ested in than the FCC.9 2 As one broadcasting as-
sociation commented, "With the ever-increasing
competition in the information marketplace, sta-
tions have even more incentive to provide such
programming and locally-oriented service in the
digital era."
'93
Critics of deregulation-the self-styled advo-
sion limit the permissible amount of commercial advertising
aired during children's programming); 47 C.F.R. § 73.670
(2000) (limiting advertising on programs directed at chil-
dren age 12 and under to 10.5 minutes per hour on week-
ends and 12 minutes per hour on weekdays). See In re Public
Interest Obligations of Television Broad. Licensees, Notice of
Inquiry, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 12 (Mar. 27, 2000).
88 See 47 U.S.C. § 613 (Supp. V 1999).
89 See S. REP. No. 101-227, at 5-9 (1989), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1628, 1635; In Re Policies and Rules Concern-
ing Children's Television Programming, Report and Order, 11
F.C.C. Rcd. 10,660, 1 14-24, 29-46 (1996).
90 See id. at 7 29-31.
91 See Reed E. Hundt, The Public's Airwaves: What Does the
Public Interest Require of Television Broadcasters?, 45 DUKE L.J.
1089, 1091 (1996) [hereinafter Hundt, The Public's Airwaves].
92 See Comments of Belo, In re Public Interest Obliga-
tions of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 6-7
(Mar 27, 2000); see also Comments of CBS Corp., In Re Public
Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket
No. 99-360, at 12 (Mar. 27, 2000) (citing local news, weather
and disaster information as examples of broadcasters' com-
mitment to the public interest); Comments filed in the Com-
mission's Digital Public Interest inquiry can be accessed in
PDF format on the FCC's website at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/
cgi-bin/ws.exe/prod/ecfs/comsrch-v2.hts. Of course, the
broadcast industry likely realizes the difficulty enforcing
vague standards as opposed to specific requirements. See
Hundt, The Public's Airwaves, supra note 91, at 1095.
93 See Comments of Belo, In re Public Interest Obliga-
tions of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 3
(Mar 27, 2000); see also id. at 13 ("Thus, to compete and
thrive in the ever-changing information marketplace, broad-
casters must focus on their principle strength-the fact that




cates of the public interest-complain that the
Commission's definition of the public interest in-
cludes too much of what broadcasters provide for
profit. As former Chairman Hundt recently
wrote, "The FCC essentially dismantled the public
interest standard in the early 1980s by conflating
the 'public interest' with anything sponsors will
support."9 4 The former Chairman went further
stating:
By providing news, sports, and entertainment for free,
and by responding to market forces and providing pro-
gramming that people want to watch and advertisers
want to support, broadcasters undeniably serve the pub-
lic .... But it is clear that Congress meant to require
broadcasters to do more than what they would do any-
way in order to compete in the video marketplace for
audience and for advertising revenue. There would be
no need for the Commission to determine whether a
licensee is serving the public interest if all that means is
that the broadcaster is in business competing against
other broadcasters and other providers of video pro-
gramming, such as cable operators and operators of sat-
ellite systems. Clearly, broadcasters are subject to dis-
tinct public interest obligations not imposed on other
media.
9 5
In the Commission's Notice of Inquiry on the
subject, Commissioner Tristani reasserted the ar-
gument that the public interest must mean some-
thing more than what sponsors will support:
The public interest standard must have some substan-
tive meaning. It cannot simply be "whatever interests
the public." That is simply an attempt to deprive the
term of any real meaning. It also assumes that Congress
puts meaningless requirements in statutes. After all, if a
broadcaster's private interests always served the public
interest, Congress didn't have to say a word. Congress
does not enact meaningless or unnecessary language -
much less language that has been as scrutinized and de-
bated over the years as much as the public interest stan-
dard.9 6
Advocates of greater public interest regulation
thus insist that the Commission's market-oriented
definition of the public interest ignores a more
crucial question: whether the broadcaster has re-
ally done anything in return for the license as op-
posed to exploiting the license for financial gain.
Similarly, while the FCC's global focus on the
94 Hundt, The Public's Ainaves, supra note 92, at 1094.
95 Id. at 1090.
96 1999 NOI, supra note 2, at 1. Separate Statement of
Commissioner Gloria Tristani.
97 Comments of People for Better TV, In Re Public Inter-
est Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-
360, at 2 (Mar. 27, 2000).
98 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (Supp. V 1999). The statute also
exempts public safety radio services and noncommercial edu-
cational and public broadcast stations. See id. § 309(j) (2) (B).
99 See infra notes 118-47 and accompanying text (discuss-
overall range of programming available to viewers
may be allocatively efficient. Insofar as it seeks to
mandate no more programming than the public
wishes to watch, critics argue that it ignores the
individual obligations of each licensee as a public
trustee, as well as the substantial benefit that the
broadcaster receives in the form of a free license.
B. Digital Television and the Future of Public
Interest Regulation
The transition to digital television, along with
the advent of spectrum auctions, has reinvigo-
rated the entire debate over public interest obliga-
tions for over-the-air television broadcasters. To
some advocates of increased public interest obli-
gations, the advent of digital television presents a
milestone at which to reassess the current regula-
tory regime. These advocates matter-of-factly rea-
son, "[D] igital television broadcasting is a new ser-
vice, requiring a new look at the 'public interest,
convenience, and necessity standard' so firmly im-
bedded in broadcast policy.
9 7
To other advocates of increased obligations, the
transition to DTV provides more than a mere op-
portunity to reassess public interest regulation;
DTV is a reason to increase regulation. These ad-
vocates are driven by the popular sentiment that
the transition to digital television has resulted in a
substantial windfall for broadcasters, and that the
duty to serve the public interest should be ex-
panded as a result. On the one hand, the Bal-
anced Budget Act of 1997 provides that broadcast
licenses will be granted through auctions, but spe-
cifically exempts the digital television licenses
granted to existing television broadcasters.98 In
the eyes of critics, television broadcasters con-
tinue to use their licenses free of charge while
others are forced to pay."' On the other hand,
the versatility of DTV now allows broadcasters to
exploit a valuable national resource to generate
ing what has been called the "great giveaway"). While initial
license assignment is done through comparative hearing,
licensees are free to transfer their licenses to third parties for
consideration, thereby creating a private market for broad-
cast licenses. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(a) (1994). The Commis-
sion must approve the transfer by finding that it will serve the
public interest, but may not consider whether the public in-
terest would be better served by another transferee. See also
FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 604 (1981) (al-
lowing Commission to rely on market forces to determine
programming format).
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substantial revenues in addition to advertising on
one programming stream."10
Government policymakers have responded to
the popular sentiment that public interest obliga-
tions should be reexamined as the conversion to
DTV takes place. In 1997, President Clinton ap-
pointed an Advisory Committee to make recom-
mendations on DTV's impact on public interest
regulation. 10 1 In December 1998, the committee,
known as the "Gore Committee" because of its
duty to report to Vice President Gore, offered ten
recommendations concerning specific public in-
terest obligations that DTV broadcasters should
assume in exchange for the free use of a new digi-
tal channel:
1. Disclosure of Public Interest Activities by Broad-
casters: Digital broadcasters should be required to
make enhanced disclosures of their public interest pro-
gramming and activities on a quarterly basis, using stan-
dardized checkoff forms that reduce administrative
burdens and can be easily understood by the public.
2. Voluntary Standards of Conduct: The National As-
sociation of Broadcasters, acting as the representative
of the broadcasting industry, should draft an updated
voluntary Code of Conduct to highlight and reinforce
the public interest commitments of broadcasters.
3. Minimum Public Interest Requirements: The FCC
should adopt a set of minimum public interest require-
ments for digital television broadcasters in the areas of
community outreach, accountability, public service an-
nouncements, public affairs programming, and closed
captioning.
4. Improving Education Through Digital Broadcast-
ing: Congress should create a trust fund to ensure en-
hanced and permanent funding for public broadcast-
ing to help it fulfill its potential in the digital television
environment and remove it from the vicissitudes of the
political process.
When spectrum now used for analog broadcasting is
returned to the government, Congress should reserve
the equivalent of 6 MHz of spectrum for each viewing
community in order to establish channels devoted spe-
cifically to noncommercial educational programming.
Congress should establish an orderly process for allo-
cating the new channels as well as provide adequate
funding from appropriate revenue sources. Broadcast-
ers that choose to implement datacasting should trans-
mit information on behalf of local schools, libraries,
community-based nonprofit organizations, governmen-
tal bodies, and public safety institutions. This activity
should count toward fulfillment of a digital broad-
caster's public interest obligations.
5. Multiplexing and the Public Interest: Digital televi-
sion broadcasters who choose to multiplex, and in do-
ing so reap enhanced economic benefits, should have
the flexibility to choose between paying a fee, providing
a multicasted channel for public interest purposes, or
making an in-kind contribution. Given the uncertain-
ties of this still-hypothetical market, broadcasters
100 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
101 See GORE REPORT, supra note 67.
should have a 2-year moratorium on any fees or contri-
butions to allow for experimentation and innovation.
Small-market broadcasters should be given an opportu-
nity to appeal to the FCC for additional time. The mor-
atorium should begin after the market penetration for
digital television reaches a stipulated threshold.
6. Improving the Quality of Political Discourse: If
Congress undertakes comprehensive campaign finance
reform, broadcasters should commit firmly to do their
part to reform the role of television in campaigns. This
could include repeal of the "lowest unit rate" require-
ment in exchange for free airtime, a broadcast bank to
distribute money or vouchers for airtime, and shorter
time periods of selling political airtime, among other
changes. In addition, the television broadcasting indus-
try should voluntarily provide 5 minutes each night for
candidate-centered discourse in the 30 days before an
election. Finally, blanket bans on the sale of airtime to
all State and local political candidates should be pro-
hibited.
7. Disaster Warnings in the Digital Age: Broadcasters
should work with appropriate emergency communica-
tions specialists and manufacturers to determine the
most effective means to transmit disaster warning infor-
mation. The means chosen should be minimally intru-
sive on bandwidth and not result in undue additional
burdens or costs on broadcasters. Appropriate regula-
tory authorities should also work with manufacturers of
digital television sets to make sure that they are modi-
fied to handle these kinds of transmissions.
8. Disability Access to Digital Programming: Broad-
casters should take full advantage of new digital closed
captioning technologies to provide maximum choice
and quality for Americans with disabilities, where doing
so would not impose an undue burden on the broad-
casters. These steps should include the gradual expan-
sion of captioning on public service announcements,
public affairs programming, and political program-
ming; the allocation of sufficient audio bandwidth for
the transmission and delivery of video description; disa-
bility access to ancillary and supplementary services;
and collaboration between regulatory authorities and
set manufacturers to ensure the most efficient, inex-
pensive, and innovative capabilities for disability access.
9. Diversity in Broadcasting: Diversity is an impor-
tant value in broadcasting, whether it is in program-
ming, political discourse, hiring, promotion, or busi-
ness opportunities within the industry. The Advisory
Committee recommends that broadcasters seize the op-
portunities inherent in digital television technology to
substantially enhance the diversity available in the tele-
vision marketplace. Serving diverse interests within a
community is both good business and good public pol-
icy.
10. New Approaches to Public Interest Obligations in
the New Television Environment: Although the Advi-
sory Committee makes no consensus recommendation
about entirely new models for fulfilling public interest
obligations, it believes that the Administration, the
Congress, and the FCC should explore alternative ap-
proaches that allow for greater flexibility and efficiency
while affirmatively serving public needs and inter-
ests.
102
102 Id. at xiii-xv.
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Following its receipt of the Gore Report, the
FCC issued a Notice of Inquiry on December 20,
1999 seeking comment on the subject.' °3 Among
other things, the FCC sought comments on: (1)
whether "a licensee's public interest obligations
attach to the DTV channel as a whole, such that a
licensee has discretion to fulfill them on one of its
program streams, or to air some of its public inter-
est programming on more than one of its pro-
gram streams" or whether "the obligations attach
to each program stream offered by the licen-
see" 10 4 as well as to ancillary and supplemental
uses10 5; (2) proposals to increase the number of
required hours of children's programming or the
amount of information regarding content trans-
mitted under the voluntary ratings system; 10 6 (3)
the Gore Committee's recommendations regard-
ing ascertainment studies and programming dis-
closure obligations;'" 7 (4) proposals to increase
the amount of emergency and disaster informa-
tion broadcasters should be required to trans-
mit;108 (5) whether the FCC should impose mini-
mum public interest requirements for broadcast-
ers as opposed to voluntary industry measures;l°'-
and (6) measures to enhance access to the media
for persons with disabilities and to provide ancil-
lary services to those individuals. ''1
Arguments for expanded public interest obliga-
tions, including those made by the Gore Commis-
sion and before the FCC, contain little considera-
tion of whether and how the technology of digital
television should impact broadcasters' duty to
serve the public interest. Instead, these argu-
103 See 1999 NOI, supra note 2, at 21660.
104 Id. 1 11.
105 See id. 113.
106 See id. 12.
107 See id. 15-17.
108 See id. 11 18-19.
109 See id. 11 20-22.
l1o See id. 11 23-28. The FCC was especially interested in
hearing comment on several of the Gore Committee's pro-
posals, particularly proposals that would enhance diversity by
requiring, inter alia, that multiplexing be regulated "so that
broadcasters can create new opportunities for minority entre-
preneurship through channel-leasing arrangements, partner-
ships and other creative business arrangements," that "out of
the returned analog spectrtm one new 6MHz channel for
each viewing community be reserved for noncommercial
purposes .... ," and that "broadcasters voluntarily redou-
ble . . .hiring and promotion policies that result in signifi-
cant representation of minorities and women in the decision-
making positions in the broadcast industry." Id. 32. Fi-
nally, the FCC requested comment on the proposals-closely
tied to the campaign finance reform movement-to increase
candidate access to the media, specifically the Gore Commit-
ments perceive DTV as a milestone from which to
reexamine the entire public interest debate. Be-
sides the alleged windfall to have been bestowed
on broadcasters, however, these arguments fail to
explain why digital television requires a change in
public interest regulation.
Commissioner Tristani, for example, appeared
to simply take the Gore Committee's queue: "This
proceeding is long overdue. The public interest
standard-the bedrock obligation of those who
broadcast over the public airwaves-has fallen
into an unfortunate state of disrepair over the
years. It's time to put up the scaffolding and get
the restoration underway."' I Years earlier, Chair-
man Hundt characterized the issue as follows:
"Now, as the Commission considers various criti-
cal issues relating to the new spectrum set aside
for digital broadcast television, we have a rare op-
portunity. We have a second chance to get televi-
sion regulation right, to put real meaning into the
public interest."' 12
Conversely, broadcasters resist any change in
public interest regulation as a threat to an indus-
try in its infancy, but do not address the very real
differences in their broadcasting capabilities and
revenue-generating opportunities. Broadcasters
have taken advantage of the lack of concrete tech-
nological discussion and have rested in part on
the argument that "the agency should resist calls
to expand the public interest obligations of televi-
sion broadcast licensees simply because they will
be utilizing a new technology to provide broadcast
service to the public."'"I 3 As CBS put it:
tee's recommendation that "television broadcasters provide
five minutes each night between 5:00 p.m. and 11:35 p.m...
for 'candidate-centered discourse' thirty days before an elec-
tion." Id. 37.
111 Id., Separate Statement of Commissioner Gloria Tris-
tani.
112 Hundt, A New Paradigm, supra note 3, at 529; see also
Reed Hundt, A New Paradigm for Digital Television (Sept. 30,
1996), at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh639.txt
(last visited Jan. 27, 2002).
[T]he answer to the question of how much public inter-
est programming is enough requires, first, an estimate of
the revenues necessary to sustain the economic success
of digital TV, and second, a statement of what is missing
in our broadcast media today. Little or no debate has
occurred in Congress or in the FCC on the connection
of either of these broad and terrifically important ques-
tions to digital TV.
Id.
113 Comments of Belo, In re Public Interest Obligations
of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 3 (Mar.
27, 2000).
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Despite [broadcasters'] admirable record, some see the
transition from analog to digital television as an occa-
sion to impose... extensive and burdensome new gov-
ernment regulations. Although these proposals are ad-
vanced in the name of the "public interest," in many
cases they are little more than recycled versions of the
regulatory policies of another era, properly abandoned
by the Commission as unnecessary years ago. 14
Similarly, Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth ar-
gued that many of the recommendations "have no
discernable nexus to the transition to digital tech-
nology," and that "special interests have seized on
this opportunity to wring as many concessions as
possible out of broadcasters."'1 15 Similarly, Com-
missioner Powell questioned "why the mere use of
a digital medium rather than an analog one justi-
fies new public interest obligations."'1 16
Consequently, there is a stark disconnect be-
tween the realities of digital television and conclu-
sions on how public interest obligations should be
defined in the digital age. Simply put, the reali-
ties on which advocates rely do not always justify
the conclusions they draw. Advocates of greater
public interest obligations have generally recycled
arguments that have been made for decades, re-
framing them in terms of the alleged "great give-
away"-that DTV is a lobbying coup for broadcast-
ers. For their part, broadcasters have relied on
existing public interest programming, claiming
that existing obligations are too burdensome
while insisting that they are already voluntarily
surpassing those obligations. 1 1 7 Essentially, advo-
cates reiterate their objections to the govern-
ment's decision to subsidize over-the-air broadcast
television, and over-the-air broadcasters reiterate
their discomfort with any federal regulation at all.
While this debate will likely continue as long as
television is a part of American culture, a closer
examination of emerging digital technology
114 Comments of CBS, Corp., In re Public Interest Obli-
gations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at iii
(Mar. 27, 2000).
115 1999 NOI, supra note 2, at 21652, Separate Statement
of Commissioner Harold Furchgott-Roth, Concurring in Part
and Dissenting in Part.
116 Id., Concurring Statement of Commissioner Michael
K. Powell.
117 See, e.g., Comments of Belo, In re Public Interest Obli-
gations of TV Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at 1
(Mar. 27, 2000).
118 See Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking,
and the First Amendment, 97 COLUM. L. Rrv. 905, 938-43
(1997) (criticizing the '96 Act as a classic example of rent-
seeking by the broadcast industry) [hereinafter Hazlett].
reveals nothing about DTV itself that justifies a
change in the current public interest regime.
C. The Great Giveaway
Perhaps the most contentious point of debate
over DTV policy is whether broadcasters have
been substantially enriched at the public's ex-
pense or whether they are instead making a costly
and precarious investment in the nation's infor-
mation infrastructure.1 18 Many commentators
continue to criticize the initial policy decisions re-
garding DTV. Their objection is that Congress
and the FCC have essentially given "a national re-
source to an affluent industry in return for ab-
stract gains."" 9 They challenge the government's
failure to exact tangible public interest commit-
ments, not only as a general matter with regard to
both NTSC and DTV broadcasts, but more specifi-
cally in light of the greater ability of DTV broad-
casters to exploit ancillary uses beyond the single
required free programming service.
The public has allowed broadcasters to build a business
on rent-free public property in return for the broad-
casters' promise that they will provide a service that will
benefit the public. Now broadcasters want to build a
new and improved business on more rent-free property
while still holding their original allocation and not
committing to the date they are going to give any of it
back. This is a great deal for broadcasters. But is it a
good deal for the public who will have to reinvest bil-
lions of dollars in television receivers in order to gain
access to the new business, Advanced Television? The
public should get the best deal when deciding who gets
to use this public property, how they get to use it, and
how it should improve the service that the Commission
holds paramount: free, over-the-air broadcasting.
1 2 0
Consequently, pragmatic questions on how
public interest obligations will differ for digital
technology have been largely overshadowed by
119 BENTON FOUNDATION, THE TRANSITION TO
DIGITAL TELEVISION, at http://www.benton.org/Policy/
TV/atv.html (last modified Jan. 7, 1997).
120 Id.; accord. Comments of the Office of Communica-
tion, Inc. of the United Church of Christ et. al., In Re Public
Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No.
99-360, at 3-4 (Mar. 27, 2000); Comments of the Center for
Media Education, In re Public Interest Obligations of TV
Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at 4 (Mar. 27,
2000); Comments of Children Now, In re Public Interest Obli-
gations of TV Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at 6
(Mar. 27, 2000); Reply Comments of the Benton Foundation,
In re Public Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, MM
Docket No. 99-360, at 11 (Mar. 27, 2000).
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demand in some quarters for a reassessment of
public interest regulation of television.
1. The Decision to Give Away
As discussed above, the FCC decided as early as
1990 to pursue a dual license transition initially
restricted to existing broadcasters.' 2' Yet the mer-
its of granting an additional free license to broad-
casters were hotly debated in Congress's delibera-
tions during passage of the '96 Act. This was pri-
marily due to Congress's realization that spectrum
auctions were capable of generating billions of
dollars for the Treasury. Previously, the FCC held
a hearing to determine which user would best
serve the public and simply awarded the license to
the victor.122 However, between 1993 and 1996,
after enactment of the 1993 Balanced Budget Act,
the FCC raised over $20 billion in auction reve-
nues 123 and "auction fever" became a driving in-
fluence underlying the '96 Act.
124
Accordingly, then-Senate Majority Leader Rob-
ert J. Dole (R-Kan.) called the idea of granting
DTV licenses for free a "'giveaway' worth up to
121 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
122 See In re Implementation of Section 309(j) of the
Communications Act, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 F.C.C.
Rcd. 22363, 2 (1998).
123 See Press Release, Federal Communications Commis-
sion, FCC Hits $20 Billion Mark in Total Auction Revenues,
at http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/News-Releases/
nrwl6015.txt (last visited Jan. 28, 2002).
124 See BRINKLEY, supra note 12, at 321-24, 337-47, 352-53,
359-64.
125 Ted Hearn, Spectrum Debate Splits GOP Leaders, MUL-
TICHANNEL NEWS, Jan. 22, 1996, at 1, available at 1996 WL
8833114 [hereinafter Hearn]. Estimates of the value of DTV
spectrum have ranged from a minimum of $12.5 billion to
$70 billion. See Edmund L. Andrews, Digital TV, Dollars and
Dissent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1996, at DI [hereinafter An-
drews]; Romesh Ratnesar, A Bandwidth Bonanza: How the Net-
works Plan to Make Even More from a $ 70 Billion Handout, TIME,
Sept. 1, 1997, at 60; see also Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting
Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the Constitu-
tionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1687, 1728
(1997)(between $20 to $132 billion) [hereinafter Logan];
Paul Farhi, Broadcast Executives Say Dole Vented Anger at Them,
WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1996, at Fl, available at 1996 WL
3058482 ($40 billion) [hereinafter Farhi].
126 See Hazlett, supra note 118, at 938-40 (quoting Sena-
torsJohn Kerry (D-Mass.), Russ Feingold (D-Wisc.),John Mc-
Cain (R-Ariz.), and Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.)); Farhi, supra
note 125, at F1 (quoting Sen. Dole). Dole favored a plan
proposed by Sen. Larry Pressler (R-S.D.) to put the licenses
up for auction, see id, and held up passage of the Telecommu-
nications Act in January 1996 until an agreement was
reached not to award DTV licenses until Congress addressed
spectrum reform. Hazlett, supra note 118, at 940. The pivotal
$70 billion to TV broadcasters.' ' 2 5 Dole, along
with Senators on both sides of the aisle, labeled
the dual license plan "corporate welfare."'126 Ac-
tivists, journalists, and commentators have called
the DTV licensing regime the "lobbying coup of
the decade"' 27 and a "rip-off on a scale vaster than
dreamed of by yesteryear's robber barons."
128
Concerns that the transition to DTV would un-
justly enrich broadcasters were heightened by the
Commission's flexible policy over use of the DTV
channels. 1 29 Digital compression techniques
make it possible to broadcast multiple signals
within the 6MHz channel, but Congress and the
Commission have required only that broadcasters
provide one free SDTV service.' 30 Broadcasters
need not offer improved picture and audio and
can use the bulk of their spectrum for non-televi-
sion pay or subscription services, giving them a
significant revenue-generating resource.
Broadcasters have rejected the great giveaway
argument as a "myth."'13 1 Their principle argu-
ment is that the additional 6MHz license is a
merely a "loan" to facilitate the FCC's goal of a
seamless transition from NTSC to digital while
break for the '96 Act may very well have been Dole's decision
to run for President. Shortly thereafter, the new Senate Ma-
jority Leader Trent Lott and House Speaker Newt Gingrich
sent a letter to the FCC canceling the Dole agreement and
instructing the Commission to proceed with the issuance of
DTV licenses. See Hazlett, supra note 118, at 940; Paul Taylor,
Superhighway Robbery, NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at 20 [here-
inafter Taylor].
127 Taylor, supra note 126, at 20.
128 Neil Hickey, What's at Stake in the Spectrum War? Only
Billions of Dollars and the Future of Television, 35 COLUM. JOUR-
NALISM REV. 39, 39 (1996) [hereinafter Hickey]; Harold J.
Krent & Nicholas S. Zeppos, Monitoring Governmental Disposi-
tion of Assets: Fashioning Regulatory Substitutes for Market Con-
trols, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1703, 1739-40 (1999) (arguing that
"[t]he failure to adhere to a market paradigm for allocating
the spectrum is startling") [hereinafter Krent & Zeppos];
Taylor, supra note 126, at 20 (quoting National Association of
Broadcasters President Edward 0. Fritts as claiming that "no
one has more sway with members of Congress than the local
broadcaster).
129 See Hickey, supra note 128, at 39 ("The very real and
very tantalizing possibility suddenly surfaced that each of the
more than 1,500 television stations in the country-commer-
cial and public-could become six television stations, with
mind-boggling potential for profit."); Sean Somerville, Sin-
clair to Shun High Definition TV for Channels, BALTIMORE SUN,
Aug. 17, 1997, at ID ("Why would I do HDTV when I can
spend $30 million and become a multichannel enterprise?").
130 Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, 28; supra
note 49 and accompanying text.
131 Comments of Belo, In re Public Interest Obligations
of TV Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at 18 (Mar.
27, 2000).
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broadcasters and viewers upgrade their equip-
ment.1 32 At the end of the transition period,
broadcasters will return their NTSC channel, re-
sulting in a spectrum "wash.' 1 3 3 Moreover, under
the '96 Act the FCC requires that broadcasters pay
the government a fee of 5% of gross revenues re-
ceived from spectrum use additional to the free
programming service.1 3 4 Broadcasters argue that
without the additional DTV channel and the abil-
ity to exploit ancillary uses, penetration of DTV
receivers will be delayed and the switch to digital
will necessarily cause a more abrupt displacement
of viewers who rely on analog broadcast.
35
Broadcasters also argue that the focus on spec-
trum overlooks the "immense financial burdens
associated with transitioning to digital services."'13
6
They claim that "[m]aking broadcasters pay
'would wreak havoc on the broadcast industry'
and 'kill off digital altogether before it even has a
chance to get off the ground.' ' ' 13 7 Robert C.
Wright, the president of NBC, characterized pro-
posals to auction DTV spectrum as a "tax on
broadcasters, forcing them to pay the government
to stay in business."'
13
The financial costs of DTV broadcasting are pri-
marily the fixed costs of transmission equipment,
for which estimates range between $1 million to
$30 million per station. 1 39 High-definition pro-
gramming already exists in abundant supply-
most movies and prime-time programs were re-
132 See Hearn, supra note 125, at 1 (quoting House Com-
merce Committee chairman Rep. Thomas Bliley (R-Va.) in a
speech to Virginia broadcasters).
133 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
134 See Ancillary Use Order, supra note 52, 7 20 .
135 See Andrews, supra note 125, at DI.
136 Comments of Belo, In re Public Interest Obligations
of TV Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at iv (Mar.
27, 2000).
137 See Hearn, supra note 125, at 1 (quoting House Com-
merce Committee chairman Rep. Thomas Bliley (R-Va.) in a
speech to Virginia broadcasters).
138 See Andrews, supra note 125, at D1. Broadcasters
aired 30-second commercials showing clips of popular shows
such as "Seinfeld," 'Jeopardy," and "60 Minutes" fading to
black with an announcer saying, "Some people in Washing-
ton want to tax local TV broadcasters billions of dollars in
order to balance the budget." The commercials ended with
the announcer urging viewers to call their representatives
and tell them to vote against the "TV tax": "Call now you still
can." Hickey, supra note 128, at 39; Taylor, supra note 126, at
20.
139 See BRINKLEY, supra note 12, at 204.
140 See id. at 201.
141 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Broadcast-
ers would certainly respond to this argument by defining the
market to include all video services, as they did at the outset
corded on 35mm film, a high-definition for-
mat.' 40 Additionally, DTV is a guaranteed mar-
ket: by the end of 2006, NTSC broadcasts will
cease, and DTV will be the only broadcast for-
mat.14 1 Finally, broadcasters' estimates do not ac-
count for the revenue potential of multicasting.
Yet even the most conservative equipment esti-
mates exceed the value of some smaller sta-
tions, 14 2 and DTV has yet to meet its "killer
app"-the use that will make everyone purchase a
DTV set and create a return on broadcasters' in-
vestments. The broadcasters' concerns have been
at the heart of the FCC's proceedings on DTV
since its beginning. As discussed in Part II, the
FCC determined that a dual licensing regime ini-
tially limited to existing broadcasters would bring
about the most rapid transition to DTV and the
earliest recovery of spectrum.143 Existing broad-
casters had invested heavily in digital research and
were in the best position to begin digital broad-
cast. 1 44  Moreover, simulcasting would
"minimiz[e] broadcaster and consumer reliance
on the ATV channel as a separately programmed
service," ensuring that viewers would retain access
to broadcast television until DTV penetration had
reached comfortable levels.' 45 Broadcaster's ar-
guments are also reflected in the FCC's decision
to allow ancillary use of DTV spectrum.1 46 The
FCC's rationale was that ancillary revenues would
facilitate the transition to DTV, especially at the
of the advanced television inquiry. See supra note 11 and ac-
companying text.
142 See Comments of Belo, In re Public Interest Obliga-
tions of TV Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at 19-
21 (Mar. 27, 2000).
143 See supra notes 27, 37-41 and accompanying text.
144 See Second Report and Order, supra note 27, 7 4, 6.
The FCC decided that once allotments for existing broadcast-
ers were made, it would permit any qualified party to obtain a
DTV license if technically feasible. See id. 7.
145 See id. 59; First Report and Order, supra note 22, 1
8.
146 See supra note 49. Thus, contrary to those who argue
that non-DTV supplemental use constitutes an addition wind-
fall to broadcasters, it appears that such use has always been
considered desirable insofar as it extracts as much beneficial
use out of DTV licenses as possible. Moreover, for some time
NTSC broadcasters have been allowed to "utilize the vertical
blanking interval to distribute textual communications unre-
lated to their main programming." Tentative Decision, supra
note 12, 153 n.177; Third Report and Order, supra note 50,
77. Nevertheless, if the FCC's primary concern was simply
the provision of a free SDTV service, it could have reduced
the bandwidth allocated to broadcasters or auctioned the
spectrum to others reserving "must-carry" rights for broad-
casters. See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, 10.
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early stages when DTV penetration was low. 4 7
2. Misplaced Criticism
The windfall to broadcasters, therefore, is not
the additional 6MHz license, the initial exclusive
eligibility for that license or the ability to multicast
pay services. Instead, advocates of greater public
interest obligations are really objecting to the fun-
damental assumptions behind the DTV regulatory
regime and not the policy decisions of that re-
gime. Harold J. Krent and Nicholas S. Zeppos
captured the two salient criticisms: first, "[t]he
public interest in ensuring rapid development of
high definition television per se is elusive," and
second, "No sound reason exists to think that
broadcasters lacked the incentive to develop high
definition television if they thought it would be
profitable."' 48 It would appear that the two ratio-
nales are mutually exclusive: if there is public de-
mand for DTV, then government subsidy would
seem unnecessary. Yet, if no market incentive ex-
ists, it would seem hard to explain why digital tele-
vision is in the public interest.
The government offers three reasons why digi-
tal television is in the public interest. The first is
that the public interest would benefit from better
picture and sound quality in television. As one
broadcasting association stated: "[W] hen the DTV
transition is complete, the public will receive very
substantial benefits in the form of free over-the-air
services with greatly improved signal quality ...
and expanded programming choices .. .In other
words, the transition to DTV, in and of itself serves
the public interest."' 49 Of course, non-broadcast
video providers were already experimenting with
digital services so it is not entirely clear why broad-
cast digital television, in and of itself, is necessary
to satisfy the public interest in picture quality and
programming choices.l5 1 Furthermore, current
regulations only require that broadcasters provide
one "free digital video programming service the
resolution of which is comparable to or better
147 See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, 11 7, 33.
148 Krent & Zeppos, supra note 128, at 1740.
149 Comments of Belo, In re Public Interest Obligations
of TV Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at 19 (Mar.
27, 2000).
150 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
151 Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, 28.
152 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
15'3 See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, 31 (quot-
ing Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
than that of today's service." 15 ' That service need
not be interactive, and the remaining services of-
fered by broadcasters may only be offered on a
subscription basis or may not even be targeted to
the public at all. Therefore, even assuming that
the public interest demands better video resolu-
tion and CD-quality sound, it is terribly difficult to
reconcile DTV regulation with this premise.
Picture and audio quality were early objectives
of DTV policy. As research on advanced televi-
sion progressed, the benefit to the public was not
"pretty pictures," but the potential role that digi-
tal television would play in the nation's evolving
information infrastructure. 52 The second public
interest identified by the government, therefore,
is that digital television will facilitate the develop-
ment of new technologies and communications
services.' 53 Again, even accepting this premise, it
offers at best a tenuous explanation of current
policy. DTV regulations give broadcasters no par-
ticular incentive to direct their ancillary use to
new services. DTV broadcasters have no greater
economic incentive to innovate than if their li-
censes were auctioned; they simply avoid the sunk
cost of a license. Since non-broadcast entities
were already experimenting with digital services,
the only conceivable advantage to pursuing inno-
vation through television broadcasters is the de-
velopment of new services somehow linked to free
broadcast television.
The fundamental public interest in DTV is
therefore something intrinsic to broadcast televi-
sion. Throughout its DTV proceedings, the Com-
mission articulated a third public interest in free,
over-the-air television itself:
Unlike many other countries, the United States has a
strong and independent system of privately-owned and
operated broadcast stations that transmit local and re-
gional news, information, and entertainment as well as
national and international programs. Therefore, initiat-
ing an advanced television system within the existing
framework of local broadcasting will uniquely benefit
the public and may be necessary to preserve the bene-
fits of the existing system.
154
pmbl., 110 Stat. 56, 56).
154 Tentative Decision, supra note 12, 39.
Our objective is not to launch a new and separate video
service . . .Rather, our goal is to encourage beneficial
technical change in the existing terrestrial broadcast ser-
vice by allowing broadcasters to assimilate ATV technol-
ogy. Thus our intent is to preserve and improve the ex-
isting broadcast service and the benefits that this service
delivers to the public. In addition, given the risks inher-
ent in ATV, it appears to us that rapid development of
[Vol. 11
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The Supreme Court has recognized Congress's
policy of preserving free-over-the-air television ser-
vice in other contexts. In Turner Broadcasting Sys-
tem v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)(Turner I), the
Court had "no difficulty" concluding that the gov-
ernment's interest in free, over-the-air local
broadcast television is "important:" 155 "[T]he im-
portance of local broadcasting outlets 'can
scarcely be exaggerated, for broadcasting is de-
monstrably a principal source of information and
entertainment for a great part of the Nation's
population.' . . . The interest in maintaining the
local broadcasting structure does not evaporate
simply because cable has come upon the
scene. '156 Indeed, the public interest in free,
over-the-air local broadcast television under-
girding the Cable Act's must-carry provisions is a
driving force behind the Commission's delibera-
tions on carriage requirements for digital broad-
casters. 1
57
Accepting that broadcast digital television is in
the public interest, the government's subsequent
ATV broadcasting can be realized best by assigning suita-
ble additional spectrum to existing licensees and appli-
cants because of the considerable resources and exper-
tise that licensees already have invested in the broadcast
television system, and the possibility that additional spec-
trum could be used only by them.
Id. 136.
"At least initially it is our view that nothing in the public
interest standard of the Act requires or suggests that transi-
tion to an improved broadcast service must, or should, be
accompanied by major changes in the industry's ownership
structure." Id. 137.
155 See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 663. The Majority agreed
that the cable must-carry provisions at issue served three in-
terrelated interests: "(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-
the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the wide-
spread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of
sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market
for television programming." See id. at 662.
Turner I subjected cable must-carry requirements to the in-
termediate level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral re-
strictions that impose an incidental burden on speech. The
debate over whether the must-carry rules were "content-neu-
tral" teased out the contours of the public interest in broad-
cast television. For practical purposes, whether the rules
were content-neutral ultimately decided the case. Under
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), a content-neutral
regulation will be sustained if "it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental inter-
est is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment free-
doms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (1968). Five members of
the Turner I Court determined that the rules "distinguish be-
tween speakers in the television programming market . . .
upon the manner in which speakers transmit their messages
to viewers, and not upon the messages they carry." Turner I,
policy decisions fall into place. Krent and Zep-
pos's second criticism is that "[n]o sound reason
exists to think that broadcasters lacked the incen-
tive to develop high definition television if they
thought it would be profitable." 158 In other
words, if there is a public interest in broadcast
DTV, there should be a public demand for DTV,
and a regulated, subsidized transition is unneces-
sary.
During its proceedings, however, the FCC pur-
ported to identify several market failures that jus-
tify a forced, subsidized transition to DTV. First, a
natural shift to digital television threatens to dis-
place NTSC viewers, cutting them off from this
public necessity. The Commission therefore de-
termined that a dual licensing regime is necessary
to ensure the smoothest possible transition to
DTV.159 The Commission further reasoned that
ancillary services would draw viewers away from
NTSC before they would otherwise do so for en-
hanced picture quality alone. 160 These policy de-
512 U.S. at 645. Justice O'Connor, along with Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Ginsburg, dissented from this determination,
reasoning that "[p] references for diversity of viewpoints, for
localism, for educational programming, and for news and
public affairs all make reference to content." Id. at 677
(O'Connor,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
the three-judge District Court opinion in Turner/, Judge Wil-
liams came to the opposite conclusion: "Congress rested its
decision to promote [local broadcast] stations in part, but
quite explicitly, on a finding about their content-that they
were 'an important source of local news and public affairs
programming and other local broadcast services critical to an
informed electorate."' Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed. Communi-
cations Comm'n, 819 F. Supp. 32, 58 (D.D.C. 1993) (Wil-
liams, J., dissenting) (quoting 1992 Cable Act, § 2(a)(11)).
156 Turner , 512 U.S. at 663 (quoting United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 173-174 (1968)).
Likewise, assuring that the public has access to a multi-
plicity of information sources is a governmental purpose
of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the
First Amendment. Indeed, it has long been a basic tenet
of national communications policy that the widest possi-
ble dissemination of information from diverse and an-
tagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the pub-
lic.... Finally, the Government's interest in eliminating
restraints on fair competition is always substantial, even
when the individuals or entities subject to particular reg-
ulations are engaged in expressive activity protected by
the First Amendment.
Turner , 512 U.S. at 663-64.
1-57 See In re Carriage of Digital Television Broadcast Sig-
nals, First Report and Order, 2001 FCC LEXIS 534, 3, 113
(Jan. 18, 2001) [hereinafter Must Carry Order].
158 Krent & Zeppos, supra note 128, at 1740.
159 See supra notes 3741 and accompanying text.
160 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
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cisions were thus partly intended to prevent the
dislocation of NTSC viewers.
A second market failure identified by the FCC
is the "chicken and the egg" dilemma. Rep.
Thomas Bliley (R-Va.), defending the '96 Act's
codification of the dual licensing regime, stated:
"It's a chicken-and-the-egg problem. Consumers
won't buy advanced televisions, and manufactur-
ers won't make them, until broadcasters offer up
a digital signal. And no broadcaster will pay for
digital spectrum-not to mention make the in-
vestment in digital equipment and transmitters-
until the audience is there."'61 The Commission
resolved this dilemma when it decided early on
that DTV broadcasts would begin before viewer
demand developed:
The availability of ATV programming to the public is
likely to be a major factor driving ATV receiver penetra-
tion. Unless broadcast stations are transmitting ATV
programs, such programming is unlikely to be available
in sufficient quantity to stimulate receiver sales. We
therefore believe that broadcast transmission is likely to
be a precondition for substantial receiver penetra-
tion.' 
62
Similarly, the decision to set a deadline for
broadcasters to surrender NTSC spectrum was de-
signed to overcome the incentive to delay transi-
tion to DTV created by equipment costs, the ab-
sence of demand and uncertainty over when DTV
viewership would translate into additional adver-
tising revenue. 63 Similarly, the FCCjustified an-
cillary use partly to create market incentives, or
"first-mover advantages,"'" 4 and its decision not to
impose requirements beyond one, free digital
161 Hearn, supra note 125, at 1.
I do not deny the "chicken and egg" dilemma posed by a
new technology requiring new equipment to distribute
new programming to new receivers. Success, however
desirable, can be thwarted if each player-manufactur-
ers, programmers, distributors, and consumers-waits
for the others to go first. This is especially true if one of
those players perceives the new technology as a substan-
tial investment promising only the means to hold, not
gain, market share.
Third Report and Order, supra note 50, Separate Statement
of Commissioner Sherrie P. Marshall.
162 Second Report and Order, supra note 27, 30 (foot-
note omitted) (declining to "allow receiver penetration levels
to be a factor justifying a failure to construct an ATV station
in a timely fashion or moving us to extend generally the ap-
plication/construction time period"). The Commission
noted that "[p]enetration of color television sets, for exam-
ple, was limited until the three major networks began trans-
mitting prime time programming in color." Fifth Report and
Order, supra note 16, 55, 84 (noting that "many consum-
ers' decisions to invest in DTV receivers will depend on the
programs, enhanced features, and services that are not availa-
video service was designed to subsidize the DTV
transition. 165
While each of these rationales supports the ex-
isting DTV regime, a final market failure may be
simply that the transition is too expensive and
that a subsidy, in the form of a free license, is nec-
essary to preserve advertiser-supported, over-the-
air television from elimination by alternative digi-
tal video delivery systems. This premise, in turn,
requires an additional assumption-that broad-
casters would be unable to fund the transition to
digital themselves. 15 6 To the extent that the FCC
relies on a public interest in free, over-the-air tele-
vision, it appears to have accepted this assump-
tion. While the Commission has "long recognized
that [broadcasters] must make the switch to digi-
tal technology,"'16 7 its DTV proceedings have al-
ways hinted that a government subsidy is neces-
sary: "Unless digital television broadcasting is
available quickly, other digital services may
achieve levels of penetration that could preclude
the success of over-the-air, digital television."'
168
Perhaps the concern is simply that the FCC's tran-
sition plan may differ from what broadcasters
would have done on their own, and that allowing
free use of spectrum licenses will make up for the
accelerated schedule. But the Commission's lan-
guage suggests that what is truly at stake is "the
ability of broadcasters to compete in an increas-
ingly competitive marketplace.'
'1 69
Past predictive judgments regarding the insta-
bility of the broadcast industry have been recog-
ble on the NTSC service.").
163 See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, 82.
164 Id.; see id. 33 ("By permitting broadcasters to assem-
ble packages of services that consumers desire, we will pro-
mote the swift acceptance of DTV and the penetration of
DTV receivers and converters.").
165 See id. 42 ("Further, allowing broadcasters flexibility
as to the services they provide will allow them to offer a mix
of services that can promote increased consumer acceptance
of digital television, which, in turn, will increase broadcast-
ers' profits, which, in turn, will increase incentives to proceed
faster with the transition.").
166 To my knowledge, no argument has been made that
while broadcasters could finance the transition to DTV, a
simulcast transition period would be too costly.
1617 Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, 3; see also
Comments of Belo, In re Public Interest Obligations of TV
Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at iv (March 24,
2000) (asserting that "digital conversion is necessary for
broadcasters to remain competitive in the evolving mul-
tichannel marketplace.").
168 Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, 80.
169 Id. 119; see also id. 3, 5, 7, 29.
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nized by the Supreme Court-most notably in
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S.
180 (1997)(Turner i/).170 Turner II upheld the
must-carry provisions of the 1992 Cable Act after
determining that substantial evidence supported
Congress's forecasts regarding the ability of
broadcasters to compete with cable operators'
growing market power over local video program-
ming markets. 17 1 The Court reasoned that it must
be especially deferential to "congressional judg-
ments concerning regulatory schemes of inherent
complexity and assessments about the likely inter-
action of industries undergoing rapid economic
and technological change." 172 The need for simi-
lar must-carry rules-a subsidy by a different
name-in the digital era is the subject of an ongo-
ing proceeding on must-carry requirements for
digital broadcasters.173 The FCC has decided that
non-carriage continues to threaten the viability of
television broadcasters in the digital age and has
ordered mandatory carriage of DTV signals at the
end of the transition period.
174
Certainly, citizens and academics owe no such
"deference" to government policymakers. The
point, however, is that the great giveaway argu-
ment does not so much challenge the decision to
170 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
171 See TurnerIl, 520 U.S. at 195-213. Although the Court
in Turner Iheld that the Cable Act's desire to preserving free,
over-the-air broadcast television was an important govern-
ment interest, it did not decide whether the record sup-
ported Congress's predictive judgment that the must-carry
requirements actually furthered the government's asserted
interests. See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 665-68 (1994) (noting
"[t]he paucity of evidence indicating that broadcast televi-
sion is in jeopardy..."). On appeal from remand, Turner H
held that the nexus between the must carry provisions and
the interest in preserving broadcast television survived First
Amendment scrutiny. See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 213-24.
172 Id, at 195.
173 See Must Carry Order, supra note 157, 1. The 1992
Cable Act requires that "[e]ach cable operator shall carry, on
the cable system of that operator, the signals of local com-
mercial television stations." 47 U.S.C. § 534(a) (1994). The
Act instructed the FCC to establish any changes to this re-
quirement, commonly called "must carry," made necessary by
advanced television. See id.§ 534(b) (4) (B). The FCC has
concluded that once a television broadcaster returns its ana-
log spectrum, its digital operations must be carried by local
cable systems, and that current, digital-only broadcasters can
immediately assert their must carry rights. See Must Carry Or-
der, supra note 157, 1. The Commission has tentatively de-
termined, however, that broadcasters currently simulcasting
DTV and NTSC signals are not entitled to "dual carriage" of
both signals and has deferred the question of which signal
must be carried. See id. 3. The FCC determined that the
Cable Act neither mandates nor precludes dual carriage, See
id. 77 2, 14-16, but tentatively concluded that dual carriage
continue to allow broadcasters to use a 6MHz
channel of spectrum for free, but instead the deci-
sion that broadcast television, digital or not, is in
the public interest and deserving of government
subsidy. Once one accepts this premise, the gov-
ernment's subsequent policy decisions are en-
tirely reasonable. The great giveaway argument is
therefore little more than an attempt to refight a
legislative and regulatory battle that was lost
nearly a decade ago and is only incidentally re-
lated to digital television.
Whether one accepts that there is no objection-
able windfall to broadcasters, the question still re-
mains whether there is anything inherent in digi-
tal technology that requires adjustment of broad-
casters' duty to serve the public interest. Moreo-
ver, assuming that digital licensees should bear in-
creased public interest obligations because of
their additional subsidization begs the question of
what those obligations should be and how they
should be imposed.
The responses to these questions have been ut-
terly inadequate, particularly because the debate
has been clouded by the sentiments outlined
above. The remainder of this Part will attempt to
fill the void. It first addresses the threshold ques-
would unduly burden cable operators' First Amendment in-
terests. See id. 3. The Commission has sought further com-
ment on the issue, particularly on cable channel capacity, the
ability of retransmission consent agreements to provide a
market solution, and how carriage will influence DTV transi-
tion, as well as those raised by the Supreme Court in Turner
Broadcasting System v. FCC. See id. 7 3, 112-15.
Under the Cable Act, cable operators are required to carry
"the primary video, accompanying audio, and ... closed cap-
tion transmission of each of the local commercial television
stations carried on the cable system and, to the extent techni-
cally feasible, program-related material." 47 U.S.C.
§ 534(b) (3) (A). For a digital broadcaster, the "primary
video" that is entitled to mandatory carriage includes a single
programming stream and other program-related content. See
Must Carry Order, supra note 158, 57. The broadcaster is
entitled to choose which of its unrelated multicast signals will
be carried under the Act. See id. The FCC has defined "pro-
gram related" to include closed captioning, V-chip data, Niel-
sen ratings data, and channel mapping and tuning protocols,
and to exclude ancillary or supplementary commercial ser-
vices such as internet and e-commerce services. See id. 7 58,
61. The Commission issued a Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking to further define the scope of "program-re-
lated." See id. 122.
174 The Commission has sought further comment on
whether dual carriage during the transition period would un-
duly burden cable operators' First Amendment interests, par-
ticularly the harm to broadcasters in the absence of must-




tion of how public interest obligations will be ap-
plied to the multiple programming services that
can be transmitted by digital broadcasters. Fi-
nally, it discusses specific capabilities of digital
broadcasting that require a reassessment of the
type of public interest obligations we expect from
television broadcasters.
D. Multicasting and Public Interest Obligations
The '96 Act expressly provides that DTV broad-
casters will be subject to public interest obliga-
tions. 175 As the FCC realized early on, however,
"these public interest requirements were devel-
oped for the analog world, in which each broad-
cast licensee could do no more than send one sig-
nal over its single channel."'176 Digital television
presents two conceptual obstacles to the current
public interest regime. The first problem con-
cerns the ability of digital broadcasters to multi-
cast. Acknowledging that, at a minimum, the cur-
rent NTSC obligations discussed in Section A will
continue to apply to digital broadcasts, there is
disagreement over the extent to which those obli-
gations should attach beyond the single free, over-
the-air television stream currently required of
DTV licensees. As discussed below, this is essen-
tially a legal issue, turning on the relevant por-
tions of the '96 Act. Once these legal questions
are resolved, a second, more difficult problem re-
mains: whether or not to increase the quantitative
or qualitative programming requirements de-
signed to further the public interest.
1. Legal Multicasting Issues
There is a strong argument directly from the
175 47 U.S.C. § 336(d) ("Nothing in this section shall be
construed as relieving a television broadcasting station from
its obligation to serve the public interest, convenience, and
necessity.").
176 Fourth NPRM, supra note 23, 1 9.
177 47 U.S.C. § 336 (d) (StIpp. V 1999) (emphasis ad-
ded).
178 47 U.S.C. § 336(a) (2) (Supp. V 1999) (emphasis ad-
ded).
179 See Comments of CBS, Corp., In re Public Interest Ob-
ligations of Television Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360,
at 36-41 (Mar. 24, 2000). As a threshold matter, the Associa-
tion of American Public Television Stations argued that
§ 336(d)'s reference to "program services," by definition,
does not include "ancillary or supplementary services." Com-
ments of Association of American Public Television Stations,
In Re Public Interest Obligations of Television Broad. Licen-
'96 Act that public interest obligations should at-
tach to each stream the broadcaster offers. Sec-
tion 336(d) states: "In the Commission's review of
any application for renewal of a broadcast license
for a television station that provides ancillary or
supplementary services, the television licensee
shall establish that all of its program services on
the existing or advanced television spectrum are
in the public interest."'
' 77
The statute also requires that the Commission
"adopt regulations that allow the holders of
[DTV] licenses to offer such ancillary or supple-
mentary services on designated frequencies as may
be consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
necessity." 1
78
Despite the language "all of its program ser-
vices," broadcasters argue that obligations should
only apply to the required free television stream
because the '96 Act was intended to facilitate
broadcasters' ability to experiment with new pub-
lic services. 179 They rely on the Preamble to the
'96 Act, which indicates Congress's intent "to pro-
mote competition and reduce regulation in order
to secure lower prices and higher quality services
for American telecommunications consumers and
encourage the rapid deployment of new telecom-
munications technologies."""' Broadcasters also
cite Section 336(b) (3), which directs the Commis-
sion to "apply to any other ancillary or supple-
mentary service such of the Commission's regula-
tions as are applicable to the offering of analo-
gous services by any other person.'181 Broadcast-
ers argue that, under the statute, their ancillary
services should be subject to the same regulatory
treatment as comparable services offered by non-
television licensees and should not be competi-
tively disadvantaged by public interest obligations
sees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 19-20 (Mar. 24, 2000); Reply
Comments of Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc., In Re Public In-
terest Obligations of Television Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt
No. 99-360, at 2-3 (Mar. 24, 2000). Section 336 uses the term
"program services" only once, while "advanced television ser-
vices" is used multiple times to refer to video programming.
See 47 U.S.C. § 336(b) (2), (g)(1) (Supp. V 1999). Moreover,
the term "programming" is qualified elsewhere in the '96 Act
to distinguish between audio programming, video program-
ming and other programming services. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 271(g) (Supp. V 1999). A more plausible reading, there-
fore, is that "advanced television services" and "ancillary or
supplementary services" together comprise "program ser-
vices."
18() Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pmbl., 110 Stat. 56
(1996).
181 47 U.S.C. § 336(b) (3) (Supp. V 1999).
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designed for television. 18 2 As a legal matter there-
fore, broadcasters argue that congressional intent
precludes an interpretation of Section 336(d)
that conflicts with the broader goal of quickly roll-
ing out DTV and recovering analog spectrum, or
that inhibits experimentation with new combina-
tions of telecommunications services.
Broadcasters further argue that Congress did
not intend obligations to apply to ancillary ser-
vices because the '96 Act expressly provides for a
service fee that, "to the extent feasible, equals but
does not exceed" the lost auction value of the
spectrum.18 3 Pursuant to the statute, the FCC re-
quires that broadcasters pay the government a fee
of 5% of gross revenues received from ancillary
uses of DTV spectrum.18 4 According to broadcast-
ers, there is nothing in the statute to suggest that
Congress intended to require double payment for
the license, in the form of public interest obliga-
tions and ancillary use fees.
18 5
Each of these concerns was at the heart of the
FCC's decision to allow ancillary use in the first
place, which explicitly referenced the preamble to
the '96 Act.18 6 The FCC's rationale was that ancil-
lary revenues would facilitate the transition to
DTV, especially at the early stages when DTV pen-
etration was low.1 87 The FCC also believed that
ancillary revenues "would increase the ability of
broadcasters to compete in an increasingly com-
petitive marketplace."'
' 8 8
But while the argument against extending pub-
lic interest obligations beyond the required free
programming service may be compelling from a
policy standpoint, it is by no means legally conclu-
sive. As an initial matter, the statute is clear that
regulations concerning ancillary use, including
fees, must still "be consistent with the public inter-
est, convenience, and necessity."189  Moreover,
the analogous services provision is only one com-
182 See, e.g., Reply Comments of the National Association
of Broadcasters, In re Public Interest Obligations of Televi-
sion Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360 (Mar. 24, 2000);
Comments of the Association of Local Television Stations, In
Re Public Interest Obligations of Television Broad. Licensees,
MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 17 (Mar. 24, 2000). But see infra text
accompanying note 218 (discussing competitive advantages
of broadcasters in the broadband market).
183 47 U.S.C. § 336(e) (Supp. V 1999).
184 Ancillary Use Order, supra note 52, 1 20.
185 See Comments of CBS, Corp., In re Public Interest Ob-
ligations of Television Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360,
at 40 (Mar. 24, 2000); Reply Comments of National Ass'n of
Broadcasters, In re Public Interest Obligations of Television
Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 5 (Mar. 24, 2000)
ponent of a broader regulatory authority over an-
cillary services. That authority also includes a sep-
arate command to "prescribe such other regula-
tions as may be necessary for the protection of the
public interest, convenience, and necessity."' 90
Finally, the fact that Congress sought to recover
the auction value of DTV spectrum used for ancil-
lary services does not preclude the attachment of
public interest obligations. 191 For one, the fact
that the fee is exacted as a percentage of gross rev-
enues means that, to the extent that broadcasters
are required to direct extra spectrum away from
feeable services and towards the public, their fee
will decrease. 192 At any rate, nothing in the stat-
ute or the FCC's Ancillary Use Order suggests that
the "value" sought to be recovered was the value
of the spectrum without public interest obliga-
tions. Instead, the value recovered through ancil-
lary fees could just as well be discounted by the
separate and additional requirement that all ser-
vices on DTV spectrum serve the public interest.
The '96 Act seeks to recover "the amount that
would have been recovered had such services
been licensed pursuant to the provisions of sec-
tion 309(j) of this Act. '19 3 Section 309(j) does not
prohibit the imposition of public interest obliga-
tions on the license auctioned or the considera-
tion of the public interest in determining eligibil-
ity. 194
2. Multicasting Policy
The more difficult issues are the policy implica-
tions of extending public interest requirements,
originally designed for analog television, to digital
broadcasts. As a practical matter, it is difficult to
imagine how requirements such as the mandatory
three hours of children's programming would
translate to non-video services. The real policy
(arguing against such "double taxation").
186 See supra note 49.
187 See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, 7 7, 33.
188 Id . 19; see also id. 1 3, 5, 7, 29.
189 47 U.S.C. § 336(a) (2) (Supp. V 1999).
190 47 U.S.C. § 336(b)(5) (Supp. V 1999).
191 See Ancillary Use Order, supra note 52, 2 (describ-
ing the authority to proscribe regulations in the public inter-
est as an addition to the requirement that the Commission
set a fee and apply regulations imposed on analogous ser-
vices).
192 See id. 13.
193 47 U.S.C. § 336(e) (2) (B) (Supp. V 1999).
194 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(j)(3) (Supp. V 1999).
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questions are therefore: (1) whether current reg-
ulations will apply to additional television services
beyond the single required service; and (2)
whether public interest obligations should attach
to non-television services.
As to digital television services, the main policy
argument made by advocates of increased regula-
tion is that imposing public interest obligations
on each programming stream "would prevent
broadcasters from segregating certain program-
ming streams, e.g., local affairs, programming for
minorities, political discourse, or children's pro-
gramming, from other more economically profita-
ble ones, and placing those types of programs on
channels with less desirable features."'9 5 This rea-
soning does not really take into account the vari-
ous goals and features of different obligations.
On one hand, the purpose of captioning services,
"provid[ing] persons with hearing disabilities with
the same opportunities to share the benefits pro-
vided by television programming that is available
to others,"196 would be defeated if captions were
provided on only one of the programming
streams offered to the public. The same reason-
ing applies to video description; unless these obli-
gations are imposed on each free, over-the-air tel-
evision stream, digital television will develop to
the exclusion of those with hearing and sight disa-
bilities.
With children's television, on the other hand,
one of the main goals of advocates and recent reg-
ulation has been to require children's program-
ming during "core" viewing hours. 197 Because of
the value of these time slots, broadcasters have
195 Comments of People for Better TV, In Re Public In-
terest Obligations of Television Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt
No. 99-360, at 13 (Mar. 24, 2000).
196 In re Closed Captioning and Video Description of
Video Programming Implementation of Section 305 of the
Telecomm. Act of 1996 Video Programming Accessibility, Re-
port and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 3272, 3277, 7 (1997).
197 See In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's
Television Programming Revision of Programming Policies
for Television Broad. Stations, 11 F.C.C.R. 10660, 7 99-104
(1996).
198 See id. 77 29-32.
199 See Comments of Children Now, In re Public Interest
Obligations of Television Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-
360, at 2-3 (Mar. 24, 2000); Comments of People for Better
TV, In Re Public Interest Obligations of Television Broad.
Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 12 (Mar 27, 2000).
200 See, e.g., Comments of the Center for Media Educa-
tion et al., In re Public Interest Obligations of Television
Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 7-8 (Mar. 27, 2000)
(suggesting that it would be better to devote an entire chan-
strongly opposed restrictions on the content that
can be provided.' 98  Moreover, even children's
television advocates acknowledge that quantity of
programming rarely translates into quality.'9 9 Al-
lowing broadcasters to provide programming that
is most attractive to advertisers while simultane-
ously providing children's educational television
on another programming stream would offer the
best of both worlds, the availability of children's
educational television during prime-time as well
as the ability of broadcasters to offer program-
ming that maximizes prime-time's revenue poten-
tial. 20
0
As to non-television services, advocates of
greater public interest obligations have argued
that broadcasters who multiplex ancillary services
should be required to provide datacasting services
to local schools and libraries.201 This argument,
however, is predicated on the great giveaway as-
sumption-that ancillary use is an unjust windfall
to broadcasters, and some additional public inter-
est obligations should be imposed to compensate
for this otherwise self-interested exploitation of
spectrum. To the contrary, insofar as ancillary use
facilitates the transition to DTV, it has always been
considered to serve the public interest in and of
itself.
20 2
The appropriate policy question regarding pub-
lic interest obligations for non-television services
is whether they will interfere with the primary
purpose of ancillary use-to facilitate transition.
At this moment, it is not clear how broadcasters
will configure their services to maximize the po-
tential of their DTV licenses.20 3 Many of the af-
nel to public interest programming, or to at least air addi-
tional hours on one channel proportional to the total hours
of multicast programming, rather than impose existing obli-
gations on each stream).
201 The Gore Committee recommended that such ser-
vices could be used to "transmit course-related materials,
such as lesson plans and teacher and student guides, as part
of instructional video programming. Schools, libraries, and
other educational institutions could use datacasting as a large
"digital pipe" to deliver computer-based educational mnateri-
als during off-peak hours." GORE REPORT, supra note 67, at
53. The Commission believes that such services would likely
be relatively inexpensive.
202 See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
2o03 A survey conducted by the Harris Corporation, a pro-
vider of broadcast and radio equipment, found that as re-
cently as December 1997, 44 percent of broadcasters were
not sure exactly what they would do with DTV programming.
Some 33 percent said they planned to offer multicasting; an-
other 23 percent said they definitely would offer high-defini-
tion television. For those broadcasters who will use high-defi-
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firmative datacasting obligations demanded by
public interest advocates may turn out to be cash
cows for broadcasters, while others may serve no
public interest whatsoever. In either case, it
would be at best premature, and at worst counter-
productive, to impose such obligations on broad-
casters before DTV penetration is achieved. Be-
sides the specific opportunities addressed below,
the Commission should wait to determine, at the
end of the transition period, whether market fail-
ures exist that prevent broadcasters from offering
datacasting services that further the public inter-
est.
E. The Impact of Digital Technology on
Specific Public Interest Obligations
The second area of confusion concerning DTV
public interest regulation is whether the technol-
ogy of digital television mandates greater or lesser
obligations than have been imposed on NTSC
broadcasters. To a large degree, the Gore Report
and other calls for increased obligations appear to
regard digital television as a milestone from which
to reexamine and re-conceive our approach to
public interest regulation. As such, many of their
recommendations are normative expositions on
what broadcasters should do, rather than descrip-
tions of how digital technology will affect what
broadcasters already do.20 4 This perspective is
nition television, most plan to do so during primetime, but
not during other times of the day. Of the broadcasters who
plan to multicast, 50 percent predicted they would offer news
and regular network programming; 47 percent said they
planned to transmit information services; and 26 percent
planned to air local news and public affairs. Two of the more
significant findings of the Harris survey were that broadcast-
ers will move to local digital program origination faster than
generally anticipated and that they expect to offer more lo-
cally produced news with DTV.
See GORE REPORT, supra note 67, at 10.
204 See, e.g., Comments of the Benton Foundation, In re
Public Interest Obligations of Television Broad. Licensees,
MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 1 (Mar. 27, 2000) ("Digital technolo-
gies do not reduce the needs for public interest obligations:
to the contrary, the radical transformation of television
broadcasting made possible by digital technology makes a
NPRM outlining the public interest obligations of broadcast-
ers even more urgent."). Benton's argument for a "Viewers'
Bill of Rights," however, has nothing to do with digital tech-
nology, but is premised on its concerns that (1) broadcasters
are not providing local public affairs programming and mar-
ket incentives do not effectively encourage such program-
ming; (2) broadcasters do not provide quality local television
news; and (3) the public is unaware of broadcaster's public
interest obligations. See id. at 2-5.
205 See, e.g., Comments of the Office of Communication,
strongly influenced by the belief that broadcasters
have received more of a valuable public resource
and, therefore, should be required to return
more to the public.
20 5
For example, the Gore Committee's first rec-
ommendation, concerning disclosure require-
ments, has no basis in digital technology whatso-
ever. Insofar as it suggests that broadcasters
should compile more information about their
public interest activities and distribute that infor-
mation more widely, it questions policy decisions
the FCC made regarding ascertainment require-
ments two decades ago. 20 6 Whether these policy
decisions were correct may be a legitimate in-
quiry, but there is nothing particular about digital
technology that makes the issue more compelling.
Similarly, the Gore Committee's recommenda-
tion that public interest regulations set minimum
amounts of programming has no intrinsic rela-
tionship to digital technology. Many advocates of
greater public interest regulation argue for
clearer, more specific rules regarding broadcaster
obligations; for example, minimum hours per day
of children's television or maximum commercials
per hour.20 7 Whether public interest obligations
should be quantified or should remain amor-
phous is one of the most pervasive issues in broad-
casting regulation and exists entirely independent
of digital television.208 Indeed, by conceding that
it could not reach a consensus on what those min-
Inc. of the United Church of Christ et al., In re Public Interest
Obligations of Television Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-
360, at 3-4 (Mar 27, 2000) ("With all the capabilities and ad-
ditional sources of revenue inherent in DTV, there is only
one clear beneficiary of the transition to digital at the mo-
ment: the DTV broadcasters themselves. The Commission
must adopt public interest obligations now to insure that the
public, as well as the broadcasters, will benefit from the tran-
sition to digital television.").
206 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
207 See e.g., Hundt, The Public's Airwaves, supra note 91, at
1098-99; Comments of the Benton Foundation, In re Public
Interest Obligations of Television Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt
No. 99-360, at 12 (Mar 27, 2000).
208 See Gretchen Craft Rubin, Quid Pro Quo: What Broad-
casters Really Want, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 686, 696 (1998)
(Book Review) [hereinafter Rubin] ("Although broadcasters
readily acknowledge their obligation to serve the public in-
terest through their programming, they still balk at any at-
tempt to quantify what, exactly, it is that they should pro-
vide."). Broadcasters contradict themselves when they rely
on positive predictions that minimum standards are unneces-
sary because economic forces will voluntarily allow them to
filfill the statute's public interest requirements, thereby "pay-
ing" for the free license, while relying on negative predic-
tions that substantial requirements will threaten their eco-
nomic viability. See Comments of CBS Corp. In re Public In-
2003]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
imum standards ought to be, 20 9 the Gore Com-
mittee actually supports FCC policy that such stan-
dards are unfeasible.2"'
Other recommendations are explicitly moti-
vated by non-digital concerns or are entirely ex-
hortative. The Gore Committee recommended
that broadcasters adopt an updated voluntary
Code of Conduct to reinforce their public interest
commitments, and drafted a "Model Voluntary
Code of Conduct for Digital Television Broadcast-
ers.' 2 1 1 The only apparent link between the
model code and DTV is the Gore Committee's be-
lief that public interest objectives are "especially
important" in light of innovations in communica-
tion technology. 212 Instead, the recommendation
stems from the Gore Committee's determination
that a collective agreement would not offend anti-
trust laws that had doomed earlier industry
codes.21 3 Likewise, many of the Gore Commit-
tee's recommendations regarding political broad-
casting have far more to do with campaign fi-
nance reform than with digital television. 2
14
Yet while the Gore Report fails to reconcile
many of its suggestions with emerging digital real-
ities, other recommendations do raise uniquely
digital issues. Obviously, digital technology offers
terest Obligations of Television Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt
No. 99-360, at iv (Mar 27 2000) ("In sum, broadcasters have
made and continue to make significant contributions to the
public interest in a wide variety of ways. The most creative
and meaningful of these have had nothing to do with-and
could not have been required by-any government rule.");
Comments of Belo, In re Public Interest Obligations of Televi-
sion Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt No 99-360, at 13 (Mar 27,
2000) ("Moreover, there is not evidence to suggest that the
imposition of additional regulatory burdens will have any ap-
preciable impact on television stations' present incentives to
address viewers' news and information needs.").
209 See GORE REPORT, supra note 67, at 47-48.
210 Children's educational programming remains the
only exception to the Commission's policy against minimum
programming requirements. See supra note 80.
211 GORE REPORT, supra note 67, at 106-14.
212 See id. at 106.
213 See id. at 117-21, 123-26.
214 See also Comments of the Alliance for Better Cam-
paigns et al., In re Public Interest Obligations of Television
Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at 3-4 (Mar. 27,
2000) (arguing for the adoption of a free air time require-
ment for political candidates); Petition of Common Cause et
al., In re Public Interest Obligations of Television Broad.
Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360 (Oct. 21, 1993) (urging the
FCC to "adopt a policy requiring broadcast licenses, during a
short specified period before a general election, to devote a
reasonable amount of time during the broadcast day to ap-
pearances where the candidate uses the station facilities as an
'electronic soapbox.'"); Comments of the Radio-Television
the potential for high-resolution, interactive pub-
lic interest programming, but this observation
alone provides no useful metric by which to set
public interest obligations. This is especially so
during the transition period, where it remains to
be seen whether entertainment television will take
advantage of DTV's interactive depth and picture
quality or simply use the volume capacity to offer
more SDTV choices or ancillary services. 2 15 Ac-
cordingly, demands that existing requirements ex-
ploit DTV's possibilities or expand in proportion
to the number of video streams offered are pre-
mature in advance of any indication of how
broadcasters will configure their digital chan-
nels.
2' 6
Similarly, advocates have suggested that DTV
broadcasters provide broadband Internet access
to local schools, libraries and other public institu-
tions. 217 "Indeed, broadcasters are favored with
several inherent competitive advantages, includ-
ing currently deployed network, wireless distribu-
tion, ubiquity in the local market, cost-effective-
ness in scale and the ability to support IP multi-
casting ...."211 The Gore Committee also recom-
mended that broadcasters be encouraged to offer
datacasting services to public institutions to fulfill
News Directors Association, In re Public Interest Obligations
of Television Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 5-11
(Mar. 27, 2000) (arguing against mandatory air-time as a pur-
poseless affront to journalistic freedom).
215 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
216 See Comments of People for Better TV, In re Public
Interest Obligations of Television Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt
No. 99-360, at 11-12 (Mar 27, 2000); Comments of Children
Now, In re Public Interest Obligations of Television Broad.
Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 34-36 (Mar 27, 2000).
Should DTV simply become a multi-channel video service,
for instance, analogies to cable and DBS regulation are inevi-
table. The United Church of Christ argued that broadcasters
should be subject to rules that require cable operators to
make channels available for public, educational, and govern-
ment access, see 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1994), and lease by unaffili-
ated programmers, see 47 U.S.C § 532 (b)(1) (1994). See
Comments of the Office of Communication, Inc. of the
United Church of Christ et al., In re Public Interest Obliga-
tions of Television Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at
31 (Mar 27, 2000). Moreover, these regulations have been
upheld without applying the deferential First Amendment
standard applied to broadcast. See Time Warner Entm't Co.
v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 93 F.3d 957
(D.C.Cir.1996).
217 See Comments of the Center for Media Education et
al., In re Public Interest Obligations of Television Broad.
Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360. at 8-9 (Mar. 27, 2000).
218 Richard V. Ducey, Internet + DTV= UN-TV, at http://
www.nab.org/research/topic.asp#DIGITAL (last visited Jan
20, 2002).
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their public interest obligations.219 Of course, the
amount of spectrum available for Internet and
datacasting depends on how broadcasters allocate
their channels among different services, so the
benefit of Internet and datacasting obligations
relative to other combinations remains to be seen.
Like the potential for interactive children's televi-
sion, broadcaster's datacasting potential cannot
be overlooked and must hover in the background
as broadcasters roll out-or fail to roll out-their
DTV programming.
Instead, any immediate alterations to broadcast-
ers' public interest obligations must identify pre-
sent, salient features of digital television that
merit a change. Perhaps the most obvious exam-
ple is the potential for enhanced closed-caption-
ing. The '96 Act required the FCC to ensure that
broadcast television "is fully accessible through
the provision of closed captions. ' 220 The Act par-
ticularly commanded the Commission to study
the use of "video descriptions," verbal descrip-
tions of video content to make television available
to persons with visual impairments. 22' The ability
to provide subtitles, video descriptions, and trans-
lations improves vastly with digital technology, as
the amount of bandwidth available for such ser-
vices increases. 22
2
Digital television also presents substantial op-
portunities to further develop and implement fil-
tering technologies. The ability to provide the
219 Datacasting could transmit course-related materials,
such as lesson plans and teacher and student guides, as part
of instructional video programming. Schools, libraries, and
other educational institutions could use datacasting as a large
"digital pipe" to deliver computer-based educational materi-
als during off-peak hours. Public television stations are al-
ready developing innovative applications of datacasting for
use in conjunction with their video programming as well as
in entirely new instructional applications.See GORE REPORT,
supra note 67, at 52-54.
220 47 U.S.C. § 613(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
221 See 47 U.S.C. § 613(f) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)
222 See GORE REPORT, supra note 67, at 61-62; Comments
of the Benton Foundation, In Re Public Interest Obligations
of Television Broad. Licensees, MM. Dkt No. 99-360, at 11
(Mar. 27, 2000).
223 See Balkin, supra note 86, at 1174; see also 47 U.S.C.
§ 303(x) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (requiring the Commission
to amend its filtering rules to account for advances in video
technology).
224 See Comments of CBS Corp., In re Public Interest Ob-
ligations of Television Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360,
at 41-42 (Mar 27, 2000).
225 See Comments of the Center for Media Education et
al., In re Public Interest Obligations of Television Broad.
Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 12-18 (Mar 27, 2000) (urg-
ing the FCC to update children's advertising rules and pro-
embedded data on program content that facili-
tates filtering improves exponentially with digital
compression technology.2 23 Digital broadcasters
will be able to broadcast substantially more con-
tent information than the current, voluntary rat-
ings system; information that, in turn, can be read
by filters like the V-chip to block out certain con-
tent. Accordingly, while broadcasters generally
reject disclosure requirements as a resurrected
obligation that has nothing to do with digital tech-
nology,2 2 4 more disclosure may be especially nec-
essary in the near-digital future.
At a minimum, additional disclosure would aug-
ment current filtering technology. But the ex-
pected convergence of broadcast and the Internet
also allows for increasingly interactive advertis-
ing. 225 Furthermore, it allows for the collection,
not only of programming choices, but the success
of past advertising at generating interest.226 Digi-
tal television thus raises many of the same issues
regarding privacy, access to information, and ad-
vertising to children that were reflected in the
CTA and that are of increasing concern with the
Internet. 227 For example, in passing the CTA,
Congress determined that "special safeguards are
appropriate to protect children from over com-
mercialization on television. ' 228 As a result, the
CTA limits advertising in children's programming
to 12 minutes per hour on weekdays and 10.5
hibit links to advertising or sales on web sites or online ser-
vices that are accessible during children's programming);
Comments of the Consumer Federation of America at 4-5,
17-19, filed as Appendix C-2 to the Comments of People for
Better TV, In re Public Interest Obligations of Television
Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360 (Mar. 27, 2000).
226 See Comments of the Benton Foundation, In Re Pub-
lic Interest Obligations of Television Broad. Licensees, MM
Dkt No. 99-360, at 12 (Mar 27, 2000) ("Licensees that pro-
vide interactive services should be prohibited from collecting
personal information from children under 13 without the
prior parental consent.").
227 See supra note 80 (discussing the CTA); Children's
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06
(1994 & Supp V 1999); Leslie Millir, Children's Crusade Advo-
cates Work Behind the Scenes to Fight the "Powerful Forces" of Mar-
keters Who Target Kids' Privacy in New Media, USA TODAY,
Mar. 10, 1999, at 4D.
228 Children's Television Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. § 101
(1994); see also S. REP. No. 101-227, at 22 (1989) (discussing
"separation of programming and commercial material or
host-selling, tie-ins, and other practices which unfairly take
advantage of the inability of children to distinguish between
programming and commercial content"); Action for Chil-
dren's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1987)




minutes per hour on weekends.2 29
Similarly, the Children's Online Privacy Protec-
tion Act of 1998 ("COPPA") "prohibits unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in connection with the
collection, use, and/or disclosure of personal in-
formation from and about children on the In-
ternet."230 The COPPA requires, with certain lim-
ited exceptions, that operators of websites di-
rected to children and operators who knowingly
collect personal information from children must:
(1) provide parents notice of their information
practices; (2) obtain "verifiable parental consent"
before collecting, using, or disclosing personal in-
formation of children; (3) allow parents to review
any personal information collected from their
children and prevent the further use of that infor-
mation; (4) limit collection through online
games, prizes, or other activities to information
that is reasonably necessary for the activity; and 5)
establish and maintain reasonable procedures to
protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity
of the personal information collected.2 31 Adver-
tising and privacy, therefore, are areas where a
prophylactic rule may be necessary to prevent
identified dangers. Existing regulations applica-
ble to television and the Internet should be tem-
porarily engrafted on all services offered by DTV
broadcasters, even before it becomes clear what
services will be offered and which will be targeted
at children. 232 Moreover, the Commission should
closely observe broadcasters' marketing, sales, and
advertising practices to determine whether the
general public needs the protections currently af-
forded to children.
The Gore Committee also recommended that
broadcasters develop more effective means to
transmit disaster warning information.2 33 The
Emergency Alert System ("EAS") is currently de-
229 See 47 U.S.C. § 303a(b) (1994).
230 Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R.
§ 312.1 (2001).
231 See 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
232 See Comments of the Center for Media Education et
al., In re Public Interest Obligations of Television Broad.
Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 12-18 (Mar 27, 2000).
233 See GORE REPORT, supra note 67, at 60.
234 See 47 C.F.R. § 11.1 (2000).
235 See WORKING GROUP ON NATURAL DISASTER INFO. SYs.,
NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, EFFECTIVE DISASTER WARNINGS 6
(2000).
236 See id. at 6-7.
237 See id. at 7; Comments of the Community Technology
Policy Council at 12, MM Docket No. 99-360 (stressing the
need for multilingual emergency warning messages).
signed to relay emergency messages, typically
from the National Weather Service, through com-
mercial broadcasting AM, FM, and television sta-
tions.234 Because the EAS typically interrupts sta-
tion programming, a relatively small percentage
of severe weather warnings issued by the National
Weather Service reach citizens. 23 5 Moreover, an
effective warning delivery system needs to reach
only those people at risk, because the broadcast of
warnings to viewers to whom those warnings do
not apply causes viewers to generally ignore all
warnings. 236 Digital television allows warning in-
formation to be broadcast to select households, in
multiple languages, and without interrupting pro-
gramming for those not a risk, thereby reducing
the tendency of warnings to be ignored.
23 7
Although most of the Gore Committee's recom-
mendations regarding political broadcasting ap-
pear completely unrelated to DTV, digital tech-
nology can be used to circumvent the "equal
time" rule, which requires broadcasters who give
airtime to one candidate for public office to "af-
ford equal opportunities to all other such candi-
dates for that office. '238 Whereas with analog tele-
vision, the potential for discrimination among
candidates is generally limited to time slots;
23 9
with DTV, a broadcaster who grants access to one
programming stream might attempt to limit the
access of other candidates to different streams
with different audiences. 240 The same concerns
apply to application of 47 U.S.C. Section
312(a) (7) (1994), which gives candidates for fed-
eral office an affirmative right to purchase reason-
able amounts of broadcasting time. 24 1 In the digi-
tal era, reasonableness will have to account for the
ability of broadcasters to transmit multiple pro-
gramming streams, with varying features and tar-
get audiences.
2 42
238 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1994).
239 See Becker v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 95 F.3d
75, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
240 See Comments of the Office of Communication, Inc.
of the United Church of Christ et al., In re Public Interest
Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360,
at 34-36 (Mar. 27, 2000).
241 See CBS, Inc. v Fed. Communications Comm'n, 453
U.S. 367, 386-90 (1981). Allowing federal candidates free ac-
cess satisfies this obligation. In re Request of RobertJ. Luel-
len Concerning Equal Opportunities Pursuant to Section
315, 46 F.C.C.2d 260, 260 (1974).
242 See Comments of the Office of Communication, Inc.
of the United Church of Christ ET. AL. In re Public Interest
Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360,
at 36-37 (Mar. 27, 2000).
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A final salient feature of DTV is its potential for
noncommercial-educational television, including
public television.243 The fact that the government
stands to generate increased revenue from broad-
casters who multiplex ancillary services allows for
greater ability to fund independent public televi-
sion. Moreover, when the NTSC licenses are
turned in at the end of the transition period, sub-
stantial bandwidth will become available for addi-
tional public channels, which in turn could em-
ploy multicasting to create self-sustaining, inde-
pendent, non-advertiser based television.
The Gore Committee recommended that Con-
gress allocate many of the resources created by
DTV "to ensure enhanced and permanent fund-
ing for public broadcasting to help it fulfill its po-
tential in the digital television environment and
remove it from the vicissitudes of the political pro-
cess. '" 24 4 One specific proposal of the Gore Com-
mittee that received support from broadcasters
during the comment period is that "Congress
should reserve the equivalent of 6 MHz of spec-
trum for each viewing community in order to es-
tablish channels devoted specifically to noncom-
mercial-educational programming. '245 The Gore
Committee also recommended that Congress es-
tablish a trust fund for auction and ancillary use
receipts that would be reserved specifically for
digital public broadcasting. 246 In addition to
Congressional funding, public digital broadcast-
ers have the potential to exploit their licenses for
ancillary use, thereby subsidizing their video pro-
gramming themselves. 2
47
Moreover, the Gore Committee recommended
243 See Mass Media Bureau, The Public and Broadcasting,
supra note 72, at 2.
244 GoRE REPORT, supra note 67, at 49.
245 Id. at 49-54; see also Comments of the Association of
American Public Television Stations, In re Public Interest Ob-
ligations of TV Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at
22-24 (Mar. 27, 2000); Reply Comments of Hearst-Argyle Tel-
evision, Inc., In re Public Interest Obligations of TV Broad.
Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at 29-30 (Mar. 27, 2000).
Because the '96 Act appears to require that returned
bandwidth be auctioned, see 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (1994, Supp.
V 1999), it is not clear that the FCC currently has the author-
ity to turn it over to public broadcasters.
246 See GoRE REPORT, supra note 67, at 50.
247 See Comments of Association of America's Public Tel-
evision Stations, In Re Public Interest Obligations of TV
Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at 20-22 (Mar. 27,
2000).
248 See GoRE REPORT, supra note 67, at 52, 54-55; see also
Comments of the Center for Media Education et al., In re
Public Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, MM
that commercial broadcasters have the flexibility
to choose between paying a fee on ancillary reve-
nues as required under the '96 Act and providing
a multicasted channel for public interest purposes
or making an in-kind contribution. 248 Under the
first alternative, broadcasters would dedicate a
portion of bandwidth beyond the required SDTV
signal to public interest activities. Under the sec-
ond alternative, broadcasters would provide in-
kind contributions, such as studio time and tech-
nical assistance to organizations producing public
interest programming. Neither option would
count against the specific statutory obligations
that apply to the required free television service
and that may be applied to other services offered
by the broadcaster.2 4
9
Aside from these limited examples, there is lit-
tle about digital television technology that influ-
ences the debate over what sort of content spe-
cific public interest obligations broadcasters
should be required to fulfill. Even accepting that
digital licensees should return more to the public
to compensate for the greater value of a digital
license, digital technology itself says very little
about how that payment should be made (be-
yond, perhaps, that public interest content should
be high definition or interactive) and even less
about whether the FCC or the market should de-
fine content. Instead, arguments over public in-
terest obligations inevitably devolve into the de-
bate over whether market forces fail to effectuate
consumer preferences and whether any such fail-
ure should be remedied through regulation.
Docket No. 99-360, at 20-22 (Mar. 27, 2000) (suggesting that
broadcasters be given the option of paying a "certain, appre-
ciable percentage of their gross revenues" to local public tele-
vision stations or a fund such as the National Endowment for
Children's Programming).
249 See GoRE REPORT, supra note 67, at 55. Others have
recommended a regime that offers broadcasters the choice
whether to "play or pay"-either complying with public inter-
est requirements or paying someone else to put public inter-
est programming on the air. Sunstein, supra note 75, at 538.
If broadcasters choose either alternative, they will still be ad-
ding to the amount of DTV programming on the air. In-
stead, so the argument goes, a play or pay approach would
maximize the amount of quality public interest content on
the air, allowing broadcasters, rather than the government,
to decide on the most effective, least expensive method of
achieving the desired amount of content. Sunstein, supra
note 75, at 539. Any payment as a substitute for public inter-
est obligations would be in addition to ancillary use fees ex-





The shape of the public trustee model in the
near-digital future will bear a striking resem-
blance to the current public interest regime and
will be fundamentally different from what public
interest advocates argue for. In large part, this is
because the current debate over public interest
regulation is only nominally connected to the
transition to digital television. For the most part,
the public interest debate surrounding digital tel-
evision has simply inherited the decades-old argu-
ment over whether and how the FCC should de-
fine "the public interest, convenience, or neces-
sity," and whether and how it should regulate pro-
gramming content according to that definition.
Each side's perspective on this issue is completely
detached from emerging digital technologies. In-
stead, the arguments on both sides have simply
been recycled from the past.
The nominal connection to digital television is
the "great giveaway" debate over whether the tran-
sition to DTV is an unnecessary windfall to broad-
casters. But this debate itself is disconnected from
DTV policy. Instead, it really concerns the merits
of the government's determination that digital
television serves the public interest and not the
approach that Congress and the Commission
have chosen to implement the DTV transition.
Beyond this controversy, DTV has served
merely as a milestone from which to re-advance
policies long since rejected or abandoned.
Whether this is a debate that needs to be reheard
is beyond the scope of this article. But, as this
Part has shown, preoccupations with previously
made arguments have generated little considera-
tion of whether and how the technology of digital
television should impact broadcasters' duty to
serve the public interest. A closer examination of
these issues reveals that, aside from a handful of
salient features, a hasty decision to expand public
interest obligations will likely conflict with other
policy objectives, particularly market penetration
of DTV receivers and a smooth and timely transi-
tion to all-digital television.
Nevertheless, digital television has the capacity
to immediately affect our approach to public tele-
250 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland:
Why the Public Trustee Model of Broadcast Television Regulation
Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101, 2101 (1997) (quoting
Newton N. Minow, Address to the National Association of
Broadcasters (May 9, 1961)) [hereinafter Minow].
vision. Indeed, the debate over public interest
regulations triggered by DTV shows the general
futility of simply "demanding more" from broad-
casters. Such demands require a government
agency to make difficult qualitative judgments re-
garding programming content without providing
any metric to guide its deliberation. The fact that
advocates themselves cannot articulate the pro-
gramming content that will serve the public inter-
est raises grave doubts that the FCC ever will.
In 1961, then Chairman Newton N. Minow de-
scribed commercial television as a "vast waste-
land. '2 5 0 Addressing a conference of the National
Association of Broadcasters, he scolded the televi-
sion industry for failing to meet their obligations
as public trustees: "Gentlemen, your trust ac-
counting with your beneficiaries is overdue. Never
have so few owed so much to so many.'" 25 1 Min-
now argued that commercial television had be-
come "'a procession of game shows, violence, au-
dience participation shows, formula comedies
about totally unbelievable families, blood and
thunder, mayhem, violence, sadism, murder, west-
ern bad men, western good men, private eyes,
gangsters, more violence and cartoons,' laced
with 'commercials-many screaming, cajoling,
and offending.'
2 52
Public interest advocates are entirely correct
that little has changed. Ironically, the "vast waste-
land" of 1960s television is now considered the
golden era of broadcasting. At the same time,
public television has successfully provided pro-
gramming that consistently surpasses the public
interest standard applied to commercial broad-
casting. Accordingly, a better approach to public
interest regulation in general would be to extract
resources from commercial use of the spectrum
that can be channeled to public broadcasting.
Chairman Hundt suggested as much when he
said, "The only coherent alternative to requiring
broadcasters to live up to specific public interest
obligations would be to require them to pay for
their spectrum and to use the proceeds to fund
children's educational television and campaign
advertising. '" 253 As this Part has shown, digital tel-
evision's greatest potential to further the public
251 Id. at 2102 (quoting Minow, supra note 250).
252 Id. at 2101-2102 (quoting Minow, supra note 250).
253 Hundt, The Public's Airwaves, supra note 91, at 1096-
97.
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interest may be the new and innovative ways to re-
inforce and expand the services provided by non-
commercial-educational television.
DIGITAL PUBLIC INTEREST REGULATION
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
As the Supreme Court has noted, "the 'public
interest' standard necessarily invites reference to
First Amendment principles." 54  Rather than
streamline or clarify the contours of public inter-
est regulation, however, the First Amendment im-
poses yet another layer of complexity on broad-
cast regulation.255 Accordingly, analysis of the im-
pact of digital television on public interest regula-
tion demands an assessment of the continuing va-
lidity of constitutional doctrines erected to justify
the public interest regime.
Since the inception of the public trustee model,
the relevant statute imposing public interest obli-
gations has also prohibited the FCC from engag-
ing in censorship. 256 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court accepted early on that "the [1934] Act does
not restrict the Commission merely to supervision
of the traffic. It puts upon the Commission the
burden of determining the composition of that
traffic." 257 By adopting a licensing as opposed to
a common carriage regime, those unable to ob-
tain licenses have no rights with regard to the
spectrum beyond the statutory demand that licen-
sees serve the public interest.258 Content-specific
public interest regulation has therefore been de-
fended from First Amendment attack on the
ground of scarcity-the idea that, whether be-
cause of the physical attributes of the electromag-
netic spectrum, or the decision to employ a licens-
ing regime itself, the spectrum is incapable of sup-
porting every broadcaster who would like to use it.
[A]s far as the First Amendment is concerned those
who are licensed stand no better than those to whom
254 CBS., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
122 (1973).
255 See ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 118.
256 See 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1994).
257 Nat'l Broad. Co., v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-
16 (1943).
258 In CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., the Court ex-
plained that Congress "rejected the argument that the broad-
cast facilities should be open on a nonselective basis to all
persons wishing to talk about public issues." 412 U.S. 94,
105-08 (1973); see also Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. at 474.
In contradistinction to communication by telephone
and telegraph, which the Communications Act recog-
nizes as a common carrier activity and regulates accord-
licenses are refused. A license permits broadcasting,
but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the
one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio fre-
quency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is
nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the
Government from requiring a licensee to share his fre-
quency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy
or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and
voices which are representative of his community and
which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the
airwaves.
259
Broadcasters have argued that the emerging po-
tential for innumerable video outlets, as a result
of DTV, undermines the constitutional basis for
public interest regulation. While not affirmatively
challenging the Commission's authority to im-
pose content-based public interest regulations,
broadcasters have advised that advances in tech-
nology should "give the Commission pause as it
considers adopting an extensive new regulatory
scheme for digital television-a medium [that]
has a multichannel capacity which would make
the relevance of the scarcity doctrine to its regula-
tion all the more tenuous."260  Commissioner
Furchtgott-Roth stated at the outset of the in-
quiry:
The primary rationale for broadcasters' public interest
obligations has been the theory that broadcast spec-
trum is a peculiarly scarce resource. Absent spectrum
scarcity, however, the justification for according broad-
casters less First Amendment protection than persons
engaged in other modes of communication becomes
difficult to discern .... I believe that the Commission
must review the empirical basis of "spectrum scar-
city". Should we conclude.., that spectrum scarcity
is no longer viable as a factual matter, then the instant
effort to engage in additional regulation will be highly
problematic in constitutional terms.
26'
The remainder of this article will respond to
the constitutional arguments raised by broadcast-
ers and attempt to calm Commissioner
Furchtgott-Roth's concerns over the continuing
legitimacy of content-based, public interest regu-
lation. This Part will first discuss the scarcity doc-
ingly in analogy to the regulation of rail and other carri-
ers by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Act
recognizes that broadcasters are not common carriers
and are not to be dealt with as such.
Id.
259 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Communications
Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1967).
260 Comments of CBS Corp., In re Public Interest Obliga-
tions of TV Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at 18
(Mar. 27, 2000).
261 1999 NOI, supra note 2, Separate Statement of Com-




trine and its continued validity in the context of
digital broadcasting. It will then identify alterna-
tive constitutional foundations for imposing on
broadcasters' speech that may compensate for the
perceived shortcomings of the scarcity doctrine.
As illustrated by Congress's clear mandate that
digital broadcasters are required to serve the pub-
lic interest,262 reports of the demise of public in-
terest regulation are greatly exaggerated.
A. Scarcity
The Supreme Court has justified its distinct
First Amendment approach to the regulation of
broadcasting on the grounds that broadcast fre-
quencies (or at least broadcast licenses) are a
scarce resource. 263 Multiple signals broadcast at
the same time on the same frequency will inter-
fere with each other, preventing reception.
264
Consequently, use of the spectrum must be allo-
cated, both to specific users as well as specific
262 See 47 U.S.C. 336(d) (Supp. V 1999).
263 In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 736 (1978), the
Supreme Court provided a distinct, two-pronged rationale
for negative restrictions prohibiting the broadcast of inde-
cent speech. First, the Court relied on the "uniquely perva-
sive presence" of broadcast media. Id. at 748. "Patently offen-
sive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts
the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the
home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly
outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder." Id.
Second, the Court in Pacifica reasoned that broadcast is
"uniquely accessible to children" such that "the government's
interest in the 'well-being of its youth' and in supporting
'parents' claim to authority in their own household"' justify
restrictions on indecent programming. Id. at 749-50 (quot-
ing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-640 (1968)).
Commentators have argued that Pacifica's logic applies to vio-
lent programming as well. See Hundt, The Public's Airwaves,
supra note 91, at 1097.
Over the years, courts have tended to rely on broadcast's
accessibility to children rather than protecting adults from
unexpected program content. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 866-67 (1997); Action for Children's Television v. Fed.
Communications Comm'n, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (upholding indecent programming restriction based
on government's interests in supporting parental supervision
of children and in children's well-being, but declining to ad-
dress whether the government's interest in protecting adults'
privacy would support the restriction). Partly, this is because
the characterization of broadcast as an invasion of privacy
rests on a factual judgment regarding how likely it is that an
adult might be unexpectedly offended and how easy it is to
protect themselves.
It is not clear that Pacifica would justify imposing affirma-
tive public interest obligations on broadcasters. For one,
Pacifica dealt with language that "surely lie[s] at the periph-
ery of First Amendment concern." Pacifca, 438 U.S. at 743.
Moreover, while not relying on scarcity, Pacifica was clearly
uses.2 65 Because of these physical limitations,
there are more individuals who want to broadcast
than there are frequencies available.2 66 In Red
Lion Broadcasting Company v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969), the Supreme Court upheld a requirement
that radio and television stations give reply time to
people who were the subject of a personal attack
or political editorial aired by the station.267 The
Court stated, "Where there are substantially more
individuals who want to broadcast than there are
frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broad-
cast comparable to the right of every individual to
speak, write, or publish.
'" 268
The scarcity rationale stands in stark contrast to
First Amendment jurisprudence applied to other
media.2 69j In Miami Herald Publishing Company v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the Supreme Court
recognized that economic forces faced by newspa-
pers had "place[d] in a few hands the power to
inform the American people and shape public
predicated on the determination that "of all forms of com-
munication, it is broadcasting that has received the most lim-
ited First Amendment protection." Id. (contrasting the treat-
ment of broadcasting under Red Lion and newspapers under
Tornillo). As one commentator has noted, "Pacifica conse-
quently cannot fill the shoes of the scarcity rationale in pro-
viding a broader justification for regulating broadcast speech
tinder the First Amendment." Logan, supra note 125, at
1706.
264 Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 213 (stating that "[t]here
is a fixed natural limitation upon the number of stations that
can operate without interfering with one another").
265 See id. at 213 ("Regulation of radio was therefore as
vital to its development as traffic control was to the develop-
ment of the automobile."); BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 1, at
1.26-29, 2.1-2; see also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 376 ("Without
government control, the medium would be of little use be-
cause of the cacophony of competing voices, none of which
could be clearly and predictably heard.").
266 Red Lion., 395 U.S. at 388-89 ("It would be strange if
the First Amendment, aimed at protecting and furthering
communications, prevented the Government from making
radio communication possible by requiring licenses to broad-
cast and by limiting the number of licenses so as not to over-
crowd the spectrum."); see id. at 396-97 ("Scarcity is not en-
tirely a thing of the past. Advances in technology, such as
microwave transmission, have led to more efficient utilization
of the frequency spectrum, but uses for that spectrum have
also grown apace.").
267 See id. at 369.
"268 Id. at 388.
269 See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications,
Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
("Different communications media are treated differently for
First Amendment purposes."); Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 ("We
have long recognized that each medium of expression
presents special First Amendment problems.").
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opinion."270 Nevertheless, the Court rejected the
argument that "the claim of newspapers to be sur-
rogates for the public carries with it a concomi-
tant fiduciary obligation to account for that stew-
ardship" and struck down a statute mandating a
right of reply for those criticized by a newspaper
as an impermissible intrusion upon the pub-
lisher's editorial freedom.
271
Application of the scarcity rationale to broad-
cast regulations has received vehement criticism
since Red Lion.272 Nevertheless, the scarcity prin-
ciple continues to be good law, insofar as it has
not been overruled and continues to be cited by
the Supreme Court.273 Courts, however, have
been careful to limit the application of the scar-
city principle beyond traditional broadcast televi-
sion and have suggested on several occasions that
the rationale should be rethought entirely.
274
Digital Television therefore presents two First
Amendment questions. First, should the scarcity
principle be applied to DTV in the same way it has
been applied to traditional NTSC broadcasting?
Further, would the rationale require extension or
translation or does it simply carry over to digital
broadcast? Second, and more fundamentally, will
DTV become the straw that breaks the camel's
back and brings about the demise of the scarcity
doctrine entirely?
B. Allocational v. Numerical Scarcity and the
Application of Red Lion in the Digital Age
Application of the scarcity doctrine depends on
how one identifies the referent to the adjective
270 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 250.
271 Id. at 251. "A responsible press is an undoubtedly
desirable goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by the
Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be legis-
lated." Id. at 256; see also Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n. of the Blind, 487
U.S. 781, 791 (1988) (striking down regulations on personal
charitable solicitation and stating that "government, even
with the purest of motives, may not substitute its judgment as
to how best to speak for that of speakers and listeners; free
and robust debate cannot thrive if directed by the govern-
ment"); Turner I, 512 U.S. at 641 ("[T]he First Amendment,
subject only to narrow and well-understood exceptions, does
not countenance governmental control over the content of
messages expressed by private individuals.").
272 See infra notes 323-28 and accompanying text.
273 See id.
274 See id.
275 See In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043,
5054, enforced 867 F.2d 654, 682-84 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Starr, J.,
concurring). Allocational scarcity has also been referred to as
economic scarcity in the sense that it describes the relation-
"scarce." The FCC has noted two possible perspec-
tives from which scarcity can be measured: nu-
merical and allocational scarcity. Numerical scar-
city focuses on the number of broadcast outlets
available to the public, while allocational scarcity
focuses on the number of individuals who want to
broadcast relative to the number of available fre-
quencies.275 Adherents to the scarcity doctrine
tend to focus on allocational scarcity and the nec-
essarily finite number of broadcast speakers,
276
while opponents focus on numerical scarcity and
the growing number of video outlets, both broad-
cast and non-broadcast.
277
The Supreme Court's cases are ambiguous on
the precise definition of scarcity, appearing to
count both the number of speakers and the num-
ber of channels. Red Lion itself discussed both
perspectives. The Court seemed concerned with
speakers when it stated, "Where there are substan-
tially more individuals who want to broadcast than
there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit
an unabridgeable First Amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right of every indi-
vidual to speak, write, or publish."278 Yet, Red Lion
also focused on outlets: "It is the right of the pub-
lic to receive suitable access to social, political, es-
thetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences
which is crucial here."279
In Turner I, an eight-member majority declined
to apply Red Lion's less demanding First Amend-
ment scrutiny to cable television operators.2 °
The Court focused on the vast number of viewing
choices offered by cable:
Indeed, given the rapid advances in fiber optics and
ship between the demand for spectrum fights and the supply
of broadcast licenses. See Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitution-
ality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rrv. 990, 1016
(1989) [hereinafter Spitzer].
276 See, e.g., Reply Comments of the Benton Foundation,
In Re Public Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, MM
Docket No. 99-360, at 5 (Mar. 27, 2000).
277 See, e.g., Comments of CBS, In re Public Interest Obli-
gations of TV Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at
19-21 (Mar. 27, 2000).
278 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388.
279 Id. at 390.
280 See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 637-39 (The justification for
our distinct approach to broadcast regulation rests upon the
unique physical limitations of the broadcast medium."); see
also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74
(1983) ("Our decisions have recognized that the special in-
terest of the Federal Government in regulation of the broad-
cast media does not readily translate into a justification for
regulation of other means of communication.").
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digital compression technology, soon there may be no
practical limitation on the number of speakers who may
use the cable medium. Nor is there any danger of physi-
cal interference between two cable speakers attempting
to share the same channel. In light of these fundamen-
tal technological differences between broadcast and
cable transmission, application of the more relaxed
standard of scrutiny adopted in Red Lion and the other
broadcast cases is inapt when determining the First
Amendment validity of cable regulation.
2 8 1
In declining to extend Red Lion to cable, the
Court in Turner I stated: "The broadcast cases are
inapposite in the present context because cable
television does not suffer from the inherent limi-
tations that characterize the broadcast me-
dium."28 2 Although Turner I refers to speakers, it
clearly was counting channels, for cable is often
considered a natural monopoly such that, by its
nature, there will only be one cable service pro-
vider.
28 3
Similarly, the unique characteristics of the In-
ternet allowed Justice Stevens to refer to speakers
and outlets simultaneously in Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844 (1997), where the Court decided not to
extend Red Lion to the Internet. Justice Stevens
wrote:
[T] he Internet can hardly be considered a "scarce" ex-
pressive commodity. It provides relatively unlimited,
low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds. The
Government estimates that "as many as 40 million peo-
ple use the Internet today, and that figure is expected
to grow to 200 million by 1999 .... Through the use of
chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a
town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it
could from any soapbox. Through the use of web
pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same indi-
vidual can become a pamphleteer. As the District Court
found, "the content on the Internet is as diverse as
281 Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 639.
282 Id. at 638-39.
283 Instead, the Court appears to characterize the cable
service provider as a common carrier, available to all who
wish to broadcast their programming across the cable net-
work. See id. ("given the rapid advances in fiber optics and
digital compression technology, soon there may be no practi-
cal limitation on the number of speakers who may use the
cable medium"). But cable service providers are not corn-
mon carriers and, beyond certain statutory obligations, retain
discretion over what programming they will offer.
284 Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
285 Time Warner, 93 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1996), reh' de-
nied, 105 F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
1167 (2001).
286 See 47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(1) (1994); Time Warner, 93
F.3d at 976. "A direct broadcast satellite ('DBS') service
utilizes satellites to retransmit signals from the Earth to small,
inexpensive terminals. It operates on a specified band of the
radio frequency spectrum. The FCC prescribes the manner
in which parts of that spectrum are made available for DBS
systems." See Time Warner, 93 F.3d at 973 (citing 47 C.F.R.
human thought." We agree with its conclusion that our
cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this me-
dium.
2 8 4
The uncertainty surrounding the application of
the scarcity principle to new media is illustrated
by the D.C. Circuit's opinions in Time Warner En-
tertainment Company v. FCC, 93 F,3d 957 (D.C. Cir.
1996).2 15 Among other things, Time Warner con-
cerned a requirement that Direct Broadcast Satel-
lite ("DBS") operators reserve four to seven per-
cent of their channel capacity for noncommercial
educational and informational programming.
2 8 6
The government argued that DBS regulations
were entitled to the less demanding First Amend-
ment scrutiny applied to the broadcast me-
dium. 28 7 A three-judge panel agreed, reasoning
that "f[b]ecause the United States has only a finite
number of satellite positions available for DBS
use, the opportunity to provide such services will
necessarily be limited."2 8 8 Consequently, the set-
aside provision "should be analyzed under the
same relaxed standard of scrutiny that the court
has applied to the traditional broadcast media."
28 9
Five judges voted to re-hear the case en banc,
however, believing "there were fatal defects in the
panel's legal theory for upholding" the set aside
provisions. 29° In an opinion dissenting from the
denial of rehearing, the judges argued that Red
Lion should not be extended to DBS, because
"DBS is not subject to anything remotely ap-
proaching the 'scarcity' that the Court found in
conventional broadcast in 1969 and used to justify
a peculiarly relaxed First Amendment regime for
§ 100).
287 Interestingly, the government had not raised at trial
the argument that "that DBS systems are analogous to broad-
cast television and therefore subject to no more than height-
ened scrutiny." Time Warner, 93 F.3d. at 974-75. In fact, a
District Court for the District of Columbia had struck down
the set-aside provisions finding that, under a more rigorous
standard of First Amendment review, "[tihere is absolutely
no evidence in the record upon which the Court could con-
clude that regulation of DBS service providers is necessary to
serve any significant regulatory or market-balancing interest."
Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1, 8
(D.D.C. 1993).
288 See Time Warner, 93 F.3d at 975.
289 See id.
290 See Time Warner Entm't Co. v. Fed. Communications
Comm'n, 105 F.3d 723, 724 (1997). A motion for rehearing
will only be granted if a majority of the judges of the court in
regular active service vote in favor of rehearing. With the
D.C. Circuit split 5-5 (two judges did not participate), rehear-
ing was denied, and the three-judge panel decision was left
standing.
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such broadcast. '" 2 9 1
The original three judge panel in Time Warner
seems to have construed Turner I to require a
counting of speakers.29 2 Judge Williams, urging
the en banc court to rehear the case, insisted that
the relevant perspective was channels and argued
that "[t]he new DBS technology already offers
more channel capacity than the cable industry,
and far more than traditional broadcasting. '" 293
Judge Williams construed Turner I to distinguish
cable from broadcast on the basis of the number
of channels available in each medium, 294 stating:
Turner, to be sure, appears in part to ground its distinc-
tion between cable and broadcast on technological
characteristics independent of sheer numbers. "If two
broadcasters were to attempt to transmit over the same
frequency in the same locale, they would interfere with
one another's signals, so that neither could be heard at
all." But this can hardly be controlling. Alleviation of
interference does not necessitate government content
management; it requires, as do most problems of effi-
cient use of resources, a system for allocation and pro-
tection of exclusive property rights .... Accordingly, it
seems to me more reasonable to understand Red Lion as
limited to cases where the number of channels is genu-
inely low.
2 9 5
This problem with the scarcity rationale is
acutely visible in the torturous journey of the
FCC's fairness doctrine, which required broad-
casters "to cover vitally important controversial is-
sues of interest in their communities" and to "pro-
vide a reasonable opportunity for the presenta-
291 See id. at 724 (Williams, J., dissenting).
292 See Time Warner, 93 F.3d at 975 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Be-
cause the United States has only a finite number of satellite
positions available for DBS use, the opportunity to provide
such services will necessarily be limited.").
293 See Time Warner, 105 F.3d at 724 (Williams,J., dissent-
ing); id. at 725 ("Thus, even in its nascent state, DBS provides
a given market with four times as many channels as cable,
which (even without predicted increases in compression) of-
fers about 10 times as many channels as broadcast. Accord-
ingly, Red Lion's factual predicate-scarcity of channels-is
absent here.").
294 Williams dismissed the observation that Red Lion has
been retained despite increases in the number of broadcast
channels. See id. at 724 ("While this number of channels is
greater than those available in 1969 when Red Lion was de-
cided, it pales in comparison to cable or DBS." (citation omit-
ted)).
295 Id. at 725-26; see also supra text accompanying notes
323-28 (discussing the apparent disconnect between the con-
cept of scarcity and a regulatory regime beyond channel allo-
cation).
296 Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 1 n. 2
(1987). The FCC concluded in a 1985 inquiry that new me-
dia outlets ensured public access to a multitude of viewpoints
without federal regulation, that the fairness doctrine there-
fore unnecessarily interfered with the journalistic freedom of
broadcasters, and that the doctrine actually inhibited the
tion of contrasting viewpoints" on those issues.296
The Supreme Court upheld the fairness doctrine
in its 1969 Red Lion decision. 297 In 1987, however,
the Commission repealed the fairness doctrine on
two grounds. First, it found that "the dramatic
growth in the number of both radio stations and
television stations has in fact increased the
amount of information, as well as the diversity of
viewpoints, available to the public." 298 No longer
necessary to ensure diversity, the FCC concluded
that the doctrine's "intrusive means of interfering
with broadcasters' editorial discretion [could] no
longer be characterized as narrowly tailored to
meet a substantial government interest. '299 Sec-
ond, the Commission found that, "instead of pro-
moting access to diverse opinions on controversial
issues of public importance, the actual effect of
the doctrine was to 'overall lessen. . . the flow of
diverse viewpoints to the public."' 300
In its decision, the FCC discussed the two alter-
nate conceptions of the scarcity rationale, and
concluded that neither justified a different First
Amendment standard for the broadcast me-
dium.39 1 In addition to determining that numeri-
cal scarcity did not exist, the FCC questioned
whether numerical scarcity was ever the proper
perspective:
As stated above, we no longer believe that there is scar-
city in the number of broadcast outlets available to the
presentation of controversial issues of public importance. See
Fairness Report, 102 FCC 2d 145, 1 5 (1985). The FCC did not
immediately abrogate the doctrine, however, because of un-
certainty over whether the fairness doctrine was mandated by
the Communications Act. See id.. In 1986, the D.C. Circuit
held that the fairness doctrine was authorized by the Act's
public interest standard but not required, setting the stage
for the Commission's decision in Syracuse Peace Council. See
Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. Fed. Communications
Comm'n, 801 F.2d 501, 517-18 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
297 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 367.
298 Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 57.
299 Id. Although Red Lion did not require regulations to
be narrowly tailored to meet a substantial government inter-
est, later cases articulated this standard. See League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. at 378-79 (explaining that "[i]n Red Lion, for
example, we upheld the FCC's 'fairness doctrine' ... because
the doctrine advanced the substantial governmental interest
in ensuring balanced presentations of views in this limited
medium.").
30( Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 59 (quoting Fair-
ness Report, 102 FCC 2d at 171). In Red Lion, the Court stated
"if experience with the administration of these doctrines in-
dicates that they have the net effect of reducing rather than
enhancing the volume and quality of coverage, there will be
time enough to reconsider the constitutional implications."
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 393.
301 See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 76-80.
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public. Regardless of this conclusion, however, we fail
to see how the constitutional rights of broadcasters-
and indeed the rights of the public to receive informa-
tion unencumbered by government intrusion-can de-
pend on the number of information outlets in particu-
lar markets. Surely, a requirement of multiple media
outlets could not have formed the basis for the framers
of the First Amendment to proscribe government inter-
ference with the editorial process.
30 2
Instead, the FCC believed that allocational scar-
city was the more plausible definition. 30 3 Rather
than question the factual validity of allocational
scarcity, however, the FCC attacked the logic by
which this type of scrutiny is used to justify lesser
First Amendment protection for the broadcast
medium.30 4 The Commission reasoned that allo-
cational scarcity was nothing more than an excess
of demand for licenses over the available supply, a
characteristic of all markets:
All goods, however, are ultimately scarce, and there
must be a system through which to allocate their
use... [W]hatever the method of allocation, there is not
any logical connection between the method of alloca-
tion for a particular good and the level of constitutional
protection afforded to the uses of that good.30 '
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit upheld the Commis-
sion's decision as a matter of policy, but declined
to determine whether the fairness doctrine was
unconstitutional.
30 6
With the constitutional question left open, the
FCC reversed course in 1999, relying on alloca-
tional scarcity to justify the retention of public in-
302 Id. 74.
3 0 3 Id.
Because only a limited number of persons can utilize
broadcast frequencies at any particular point in time,
spectrum scarcity is said to be present when the number
of persons desiring to disseminate information on
broadcast frequencies exceeds the number of available
frequencies. Consequently, these frequencies, like all
scarce resources, must be allocated among those who
wish to use them.
Id. 75.
304 See id. 76.
305 Id. 78; see infra note 323 (describing this criticism of
the scarcity rationale).
306 See Syracuse Peace Council v. Fed. Communications
Comm'n, 867 F.2d 654, 659-60 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Happily
the Commission's opinion is not written in exclusively consti-
tutional terms. First, its intermediate conclusions, if ac-
cepted, compel a finding that the doctrine fails to serve the
public interest ... [T] he FCC's decision that the fairness doc-
trine no longer serves the public interest is a policy judg-
ment.").
307 Two such rules were: (1) the personal attack rule,
which guarantees a right to reply to individuals who are at-
tacked in the course of a discussion of controversial issues;
and (2) the political editorial rule, which gives political can-
didates the right to reply to editorials opposing them or
favoring their opponents. See Radio-Television News Dir.
terest rules originally adopted to effectuate the
fairness doctrine.30 7  When broadcasters de-
manded that the rules fall along with the fairness
doctrine, the FCC split 2-2 on whether to repeal
the rules.30 8 In voting to retain the rules, Com-
missioners Ness and Tristani made clear that "the
dicta in Syracuse Peace Council regarding the appro-
priate level of First Amendment scrutiny has been
rejected by Congress, this Commission, and the
courts."
30 9
The fundamental error of the Commission's decision
in the portion of Syracuse Peace Council that has been
repudiated was its confusion of the rationale underly-
ing the fairness doctrine with the basis for public inter-
est regulation of the broadcast spectrum.... The stan-
dard of Red Lion, however, was not based on the abso-
lute number of media outlets, but on the fact that the
spectrum is a public resource and there are substan-
tially more individuals who want to broadcast than
there are frequencies to allocate. As both the U.S. Su-
preme Court and the D.C. Circuit have explained, [a]
licensed broadcaster is 'granted the free and exclusive
use of a valuable part of the public domain; when he
accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable
public obligations... [T]he long-standing basis for the
regulation of broadcasting is that the radio spectrum
simply is not large enough to accommodate everybody.
Under our Nation's system for allocating spectrum,
some are granted the exclusive use of a portion of this
public domain, even though others would use it if they
could. That is why it is idle to posit an unabridgeable
First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the
right of every individual to speak, write or publish.'" 1"
Commissioners Ness and Tristiani's distinction be-
Ass'n v. Fed. Communications Comm'n (RTNDA), 184 F.3d
872, 876-77 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
308 See id. at 878. Chairman Kennard recused himself
from the proceeding, leaving four commissioners to vote on
repeal. The D.C. Circuit rejected broadcasters' argument
that "the demise of the fairness doctrine necessarily lead[s]
to the demise of the two rules." Id. at 879 ("A broad rule can
be flawed for reasons that do not affect its narrower ad-
juncts .... In short, while the challenged rules do not neces-
sarily persist after the fairness doctrine, they need not share
its fate.").
309 Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and
Political Editorial Rules, 15 F.C.C. Rcd. 19973, 17 (2000).
Although the Commission based its decision in Syracuse
Peace Council largely on its view that the standard of Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC should be abandoned, the
D.C. Circuit did not affirm on that basis. Subsequently,
in enacting the Children's Television Act of 1990 (CTA),
Congress made clear that broadcasters should be subject
to public interest obligations reviewed under the Red
Lion standard, and Congress's views on that matter are
entitled to "great weight." The Commission agreed that
Red Lion sets the appropriate standard of review, as it
made clear in its Order implementing the CTA, which
expressly repudiated the dicta from Syracuse Peace Coun-
cil.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
310 Id. 19 (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).
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tween the rationale for lesser First Amendment
scrutiny of broadcast regulation on the one hand,
and the justification for the fairness doctrine on
the other, echoes comments made by Judge Starr
in his concurring opinion in the appeal of Syra-
cuse Peace Council:
There is, to be sure, language in Red Lion with respect
to the scarcity of the broadcast spectrum and the conse-
quent tendency toward unrequited demand for fre-
quencies. Under Red Lion, however, that sort of scarcity
seems to constitute a necessary (rather than sufficient)
condition of the fairness doctrine's legitimacy. That is,
allocational scarcity accounts for the fundamental dif-
ference in First Amendment treatment of print and
broadcast media. However, spectrum scarcity, without
more, does not necessarily justify regulatory schemes
which intrude into First Amendment territory. In
short, petitioners conflate the Supreme Court's choice
of a standard for evaluating broadcast regulation with
the Court's application of its chosen standard to the in-
terests assertedly advanced by a particular regulatory re-
gime.
311
As explained by Judge Starr, the deferential stan-
dard of constitutional review premised on alloca-
tional scarcity does not give the government a free
hand to regulate the broadcast medium as it sees
fit. Proceeding on the basis of this more relaxed
First Amendment scrutiny, Red Lion specifically
upheld the fairness doctrine on the grounds that
alleviated the problem of numerical scarcity-it
furthered the public's interest in "suitable access
to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas
and experiences" by "present[ing] those views
and voices which are representative of his commu-
nity and which would otherwise, by necessity, be
barred from the airwaves."
3 12
Although Judge Starr's account is by far the
most precise distinction to be drawn by the judici-
ary, given the conflicting language discussed
above, there is no clear answer as to which formu-
lation of the scarcity rationale continues to guide
the Supreme Court. As a result, whether Red
311 Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 682-83 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (Starr, J., concurring). Unlike the majority of the
panel in Syracuse Peace Council, see supra note 306 and accom-
panying text, Judge Starr found the constitutional question
inextricably related to policy question.
312 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389-390; Syracuse Peace Council,
867 F.2d at 683-84 (Starr, J., concurring).
313 See supra notes 30-32, 37-38 and accompanying text
(discussing the dual-licensing regime). The expected con-
vergence of television with the Internet may make it techno-
logically feasible to allow everyone to use the broadcast me-
dium, thus removing DTV from the facts of Red Lion and
placing it under the facts of Reno.
314 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
315 See supra note 42; see alsoJulie Macedo, Meet the Televi-
Lion's scarcity principle will be extended to digital
television will be strongly influenced by whether
scarcity is approached from an allocational or nu-
merical perspective-whether scarcity is charac-
terized by the number of speakers using the DTV
medium or the number of video outlets added by
DTV.
From an allocational perspective, the transition
to DTV has certainly not expanded the limited
number of speakers on the airwaves. Instead,
Congress and the FCC have simply increased the
amount of spectrum already owned by the broad-
cast industry by granting existing broadcasters,
and only existing broadcasters, a second chan-
nel. 313 Digital television has therefore tempora-
rily exacerbated the condition of allocational scar-
city observed in Red Lion. Moreover, Congress's
December 31, 2006 deadline for the surrender of
NTSC spectrum can be extended by the FCC if
fewer than 85% of the station's viewers can re-
ceive the broadcaster's digital service. 314 Although
the recovery of spectrum has become a primary
concern of the Commission in the transition to
DTV, it is far from clear when this target will be
achieved.
3 1 5
In his concurring statement in the Notice of In-
quiry regarding DTV public interest obligations,
Commissioner Powell attempted to focus the de-
bate on numerical scarcity:
[A]s we undertake this inquiry we have a solemn obliga-
tion to evaluate honestly the extent to which scarcity
can still justify greater intrusion on broadcaster's First
Amendment rights. It is ironic ... that as we enter the
digital age of abundance and tout its myriad of oppor-
tunities for more information through more outlets, we
simultaneously propose greater public interest obliga-
tions that infringe upon speech, justified on the crum-
bling foundation of scarcity.
3 16
Yet even from a numerical perspective, DTV only
has the potential to increase the number of televi-
sion of Tomorrow. Don't Expect to Own It Anytime Soon, 6 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 283, 283 (1999).
316 1999 NOI, supra note 2, Concurring Statement of
Commissioner Michael K. Powell; see also In re Repeal or Mod-
ification of the Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules,
Order and Request to Update Record, 15 F.C.C. Rcd. 19,973,
19,996 (2000) (Commissioner Powell, dissenting) (making
an identical argument); Richard L. Weber, Note, Riding on a
Diamond in the Sky: The DBS Set-Aside Provisions of the 1992 Cable
Act, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1795, 1833-34 (1999) ("Both the
scarcity and free television theories underlying public inter-
est become almost entirely untenable when examining the
transition from the traditional NTSC television broadcast sig-
nal to the HDTV signal.").
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sion outlets available to the public. -' 17 Broadcast-
ers are only required to provide one "free digital
video programming service the resolution of
which is comparable to or better than that of to-
day's service."'3'1 How broadcasters use the rest of
the bandwidth on their 6MHz license remains to
be seen. A 1997 poll of broadcasters revealed that
only thirty-three percent planned to multicast and
only half of those planned to broadcast multiple
television services. 319 Accordingly, whether one
adopts an allocational or a numerical perspective
to scarcity, digital television does not alter the fac-
tual basis on which Red Lion was decided. In the
end, like the arguments of public interest advo-
cates for increased obligations, broadcasters do
not actually connect their First Amendment cri-
tique of public interest regulation with the tech-
nology of digital television but essentially argue
that DTV is a milestone from which to reexamine
the constitutional foundation of Red Lion.
C. Alternatives to Scarcity - Quid Pro Quo
Criticism aside, Red Lion's scarcity principle has
been reaffirmed in every case in which it has been
implicated.320 Congress appeared to indicate re-
cent support for Red Lion's rationale for public in-
terest regulation when it enacted the CTA.321 Red
Lion's scarcity principle therefore continues to be
good law. Yet the Court has suggested that it
317 Whether the current number of media outlets under-
mines the continuing validity of Red Lion is beyond the scope
of this article. Of course, the Court has not directly ad-
dressed the constitutional validity of public interest regula-
tion in since the prevalence of cable, DBS, and DIRECT TV.
Were it to approach Red Lion from a numerical perspective,
then, the Court may very well discard the scarcity rationale
irrespective of DTV.
318 Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, 1 28.
319 See GORE REPORT, supra note 67, at 10.
320 See Turner , 512 U.S. at 638-39; League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. at 376; CBS, 453 U.S. at 395; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748;
FCC v. Nat' Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 799-800
(1978); Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 101-02.
321 See S. REP. No. 227, 101st Cong., 10-11 (1989) (en-
acted); Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television
Programming, 11 F.C.C. Rcd. 10,660, 1 147 (1996).
322 In FCC v. League of Women Voters, the Supreme Court
appeared to invite an administrative challenge to the scarcity
doctrine:
Critics [of the scarcity doctrine] charge that with the ad-
vent of cable and satellite television technology, commu-
nities now have access to such a wide variety of stations
that the scarcity doctrine is obsolete. We are not pre-
pared, however, to reconsider our longstanding ap-
proach without some signal from Congress or the FCC
that technological developments have advanced so far
might be willing to reexamine the principle. 322
The most pervasive judicial criticism of the princi-
ple has been the disconnect between reality of al-
locational scarcity and content-specific public in-
terest regulation.
Judges and commentators have argued that
scarcity is not a unique characteristic of the spec-
trum, but an attribute of every resource.
It is certainly true that broadcast frequencies are scarce
[in the sense that demand would exceed supply if they
were being offered free] but it is unclear why that fact
justifies content regulation of broadcasting in a way
that would be intolerable if applied to the editorial pro-
cess of the print media. All economic goods are scarce,
not least the newsprint, ink, delivery trucks computers
and other resources that go into the production and
dissemination of print journalism. Not everyone who
wishes to publish a newspaper, or even a pamphlet may
do so. Since scarcity is a universal fact, it can hardly ex-
plain regulation in one context and not another. The
attempt to use a universal fact as a distinguishing prin-
ciple necessarily leads to analytical confusion.
323
More to the point, even assuming that scarcityjus-
tifies licensing broadcasters and regulating their
transmission to prevent interference, it is not
clear why scarcity justifies content-specific restric-
tions on broadcast speech. "Alleviation of inter-
ference does not necessitate government content
management; it requires, as do most problems of
efficient use of resources, a system for allocation
and protection of exclusive property rights.
'" 324
While refusing to extend Red Lion to cable, the
that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation
may be required.
468 U.S. at 376 n.l1 (1984) (citation omitted). In Syracuse
Peace Council, the FCC responded, "We believe that the 1985
Fairness Report, as reaffirmed and further elaborated on in to-
day's action, provides the Supreme Court with the signal re-
ferred to in League of Women Voters." Syracuse Peace Council, 2
F.C.C. Rcd. at 5053. As discussed above, however, the consti-
tutional questions in Syracuse Peace Council were not reached
on appeal to the D.C. Circuit. See supra note 306.
323 Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr., 801 F.2d at 508
(D.C. Cir. 1986); accord Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. at
5055.
324 Time Warner, 105 F.3d at 725-26 (Williams, J., dissent-
ing); accord Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr., 801 F.2d at 509.
Well before Red Lion, the Supreme Court recognized that
"the ['34] Act does not restrict the Commission merely to
supervision of the traffic. It puts upon the Commission the
burden of determining the composition of that traffic." NBC,
319 U.S. at 215-16. As in Red Lion, NBC apparently con-
cluded that public interest regulation is a logical and inevita-
ble extension of the statute's licensing regime. Id. at 226
("Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not
available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is
why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to govern-
mental regulation.").
Red Lion implied that viewers have a First Amendment
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eight-member majority in Turner I declined to
question the continuing validity of the scarcity
doctrine. 325 The Court, however, expressed some
discomfort with the principle when it stated, "the
rationale for applying a less rigorous standard of
First Amendment scrutiny to broadcast regula-
tion, whatever its validity in the cases elaborating it,
does not apply in the context of cable regula-
tion." 32 6 Turner I clearly recognized the discon-
nect between scarcity and public interest regula-
tion. While the Court accepted that "[t]he scar-
city of broadcast frequenqies thus required the es-
tablishment of some regulatory mechanism to di-
vide the electromagnetic spectrum and assign spe-
cific frequencies to particular broadcasters," it ap-
peared to hedge when it continued, "the inherent
physical limitation on the number of speakers
who may use the broadcast medium has been
thought to require some adjustment in traditional
First Amendment analysis to permit the Govern-
ment to place limited content restraints, and im-
pose certain affirmative obligations, on broadcast
licensees."327 More recently in Denver Area Educa-
tional Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,
right to content that serves the public interest:
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Govern-
ment is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor
of others whose views should be expressed on this
unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their
interest in free speech by radio and their collective right
to have the medium function consistently with the ends
and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcast-
ers, which is paramount .... It is the right of the public
to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial
here.
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389-90. Justice White, the author of Red
Lion, later disavowed this reading in Fed. Communications
Comm'n v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 604 (1980).
325 Turner I, 512 U.S. at 638-39 ("[W]e have declined to
question its continuing validity as support for our broadcast
jurisprudence, and see no reason to do so here. The broad-
cast cases are inapposite in the present context because cable
television does not suffer from the inherent limitations that
characterize the broadcast medium .. .).
326 Id. at 637 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
327 Id. at 637-38 (emphasis added).
328 Denver Area Educational Telecomm., 518 U.S. at 813
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
329 See, e.g., Spitzer, supra note 275 (discussing industry
structure, accessibility, and government property rationales);
see generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Comment: Into the
Woods: Broadcasters, Bureaucrats, and Children's Television Pro-
gramming, 45 DuKE L.J. 1193 (1996) (analyzing broadcast reg-
ulation as regulation of commercial speech). Interestingly,
the Gore Committee, heavily influenced by one of its mem-
518 U.S. 727, Justice Thomas, along with Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, noted that
the Court's First Amendment distinctions be-
tween media were "dubious from their in-
fancy."3
28
Criticism of this perceived logical gap in the
scarcity principle has generated a number of pro-
posed alternative rationales.32 9 One possible re-
sponse is that Red Lion never relied solely on alloca-
tional scarcity to justify regulation beyond licens-
ing, but instead implicitly recognized a separate,
intermediate step. Matthew L. Spitzer and
Charles W. Logan have explored a "quid pro quo"
argument that content-specific public interest reg-
ulation is the consideration the government re-
ceives for the exclusive use of a portion of the
electromagnetic spectrum. 330 Rather than relying
on the fact of scarcity as a justification for content
regulation, this argument relies on the govern-
ment's control of the spectrum and the Court's
forum analysis jurisprudence to justify public in-
terest regulation. Scarcity thus describes the phys-
ical condition of the electromagnetic spectrum
necessitating licensing, as well as the condition of
bers, Professor Cass Sunstein, focused on the primacy of de-
liberative democracy among the goals of the First Amend-
ment. The Gore Committee argued that public interest reg-
ulation "has sought to meet certain basic needs of American
politics and culture, over and above what the marketplace
may or may not provide. It has sought to cultivate a more
informed citizenry, greater democratic dialogue, diversity of
expression, a more educated population, and more robust,
culturally inclusive communities." GORE REPORT, supra note
67, at 21. The Committee's report gives great weight to Sun-
stein's "Madisonian" notion that the First Amendment is not
offended by regulation that seeks to "cultivate a more in-
formed citizenry, greater democratic dialogue, diversity of
expression, a more educated population, and more robust,
culturally inclusive communities." Id.; Cass R. Sunstein, Sell-
ing Children, NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 21, 1995, at 38 (reviewing
NEWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L. LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE
WASTELAND: CHILDREN, TELEVISION, AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT (1995)).
On this view of the First Amendment, there is no tension
between constitutionalism and democracy, or between
individual rights and majority rule, properly understood;
robust rights of free expression are a precondition for
both democracy and majority rule, properly understood.
In this way, private autonomy is in no tension with, but is
on the contrary inextricably intertwined with, the notion
of popular sovereignty.
Sunstein, supra note 75, at 524.
3-30 See Logan, supra note 125, at 1730-34; Spitzer, supra
note 275, at 1028-41; see also BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 1, at
6.11. But see Robert Corn-Revere, Regulation and the Social




the spectrum under the government's licensing
regime. More important is Congress's decision to
dedicate the limited spectrum available or allo-
cated to television broadcasting to the service of
an evolving notion of "the public interest, conve-
nience, and necessity." "Scarcity" merely de-
scribes the limited amount of spectrum available
and/or allocated to this purpose. The govern-
ment's ability to restrict the use of government
property reconciles public interest regulation with
the First Amendment.
Indeed, hints of this argument appear through-
out the Court's First Amendment analysis of
broadcast regulation. Red Lion itself can be read
to support a quid pro quo rationale:
A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no
constitutional right to be the one who holds the license
or to monopolize a... frequency to the exclusion of his
fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amend-
ment which prevents the Government from requiring a
licensee to share his frequency with others and to con-
duct himself as a proxy or fiduciary .... I1
The Court in Red Lion expressly characterized
public interest obligations as a condition attached
to the license.
To condition the granting or renewal of licenses on a
willingness to present representative community views
on controversial issues is consistent with the ends and
purposes of those constitutional provisions forbidding
the abridgment of freedom of speech and freedom of
the press.
332
In rejecting the argument that scarcity no
longer existed because of technological advances,
Red Lion clearly identified the broadcast license as
a substantial government subsidy:
Even where there are gaps in spectrum utilization, the
fact remains that existing broadcasters have often at-
tained their present position because of their initial
government selection in competition with others
before new technological advances opened new oppor-
331 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389.
332 Id. at 394.
333 Id. at 400.
334 CBS, 453 U.S. at 395 (1981) (quoting Office of Com-
munication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994, 1003 (1966) (opinion of Burger, C.J.)).
3_5 Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ,
359 F.2d at 1003.
1-6 See Time Warner, 105 F.3d at 726 (Williams, J., dissent-
ing).
37 See id. at 724 (Williams, J., dissenting) (citing Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)).
338 See NBC, 319 U.S. at 215-16.
339 See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the choice of a licensing regime). Commentators have
long debated the merits of administrative regulation as op-
posed to relying on traditional common law property rights.
See Ronald H. Coase, Testimony Before the FCC (en banc),
tunities for further uses. Long experience in broadcast-
ing, confirmed habits of listeners and viewers, network
affiliation, and other advantages in program procure-
ment give existing broadcasters a substantial advantage
over new entrants, even where new entry is technologi-
cally possible. These advantages are the fruit of a pre-
ferred position conferred by the Government.
333
Former Chief Justice Burger subsequently
stated in CBS, Inc. v. FCC: "A licensed broadcaster
is 'granted the free and exclusive use of a limited
and valuable part of the public domain; when he
accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforcea-
ble public obligations."' 33 4 Burger was actually
quoting an earlier opinion he had written while
on the D.C. Circuit: "[A] broadcast license is a
public trust subject to termination for breach of
duty."3
335
In his dissent from denial of rehearing in Time
Warner, Judge Williams suggested that the DBS
set-asides might be saved "as a condition legiti-
mately attached to a government grant."336 He ar-
gued that "[i]f the [set aside provisions] can be
sustained at all .... it would only be on the theory
that the government is entitled to more leeway in
setting the terms on which it supplies 'property'
to private parties for speech purposes (or for pur-
poses that include speech).."
33 7
In summary, allocational scarcity does justify a
more relaxed First Amendment standard for the
broadcast medium, albeit in three steps rather
than one. First, because the number of speakers
who can use a given frequency is limited, some
sort of regulation is required to prevent interfer-
ence. 338 Second, for various policy reasons, the
government has chosen a licensing regime as op-
posed to either a private property or common car-
rier regime as the best mechanism to allocate use
of the spectrum.3 3 9 Third, the government has
Study of Radio and T.V. Broadcasting, No. 12782, vol. 4, at
895 (1995), reprinted in BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.3;
Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the
Broadcast Spectrum, 33J. L. & ECON. 133 (1990) [hereinafter
Hazlett, Rationality]; Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A
Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEx. L. REv.
207 (1982). Indeed, several authors have argued that the
quid pro quo regime has achieved permanence precisely be-
cause it inures to the benefit of broadcasters. See Hazlett,
supra note 118, at 943 ("[P]laying the quid pro quo game
against policymakers (government and public interest) re-
mains a steal, even accounting for the potential expense of
additional public interest obligations."); Hazlett, Rationality,
supra note 339 (arguing that public interest regulation serves
to camouflage a system of broadcaster rents in the form of
entry barriers against competition and political power over a
pervasive social medium); Rubin, supra note 208, at 692.
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demanded various forms of consideration in ex-
change for the issuance of spectrum licenses, in
some cases money, in other cases a commitment
to air certain amounts of programming in the
public interest.
D. Spectrum As Government Property
The premises of the quid pro quo rationale
have been subjected to several criticisms. For
one, commentators have challenged the premise
that the spectrum is a government-owned good
with which it can bargain. The spectrum, so one
argument goes, exists only by virtue of electro-
magnetic radiation. 340 This energy, which is pro-
duced by a privately owned transmitter, is sent
through space that is not susceptible to owner-
ship. 341 As the dissenters in Time Warner noted:
There is, perhaps, good reason [to hesitate] to give
great weight to the government's property interest in
the spectrum. First, unallocated spectrum is govern-
ment property only in the special sense that it simply
has not been allocated to any real "owner" in any way.
Thus it is more like unappropriated water in the west-
ern states, which belongs, effectively, to no one. In-
deed, the common law courts had treated spectrum in
this manner before the advent of full federal regula-
tion.
34 2
To the extent that this argument undermines the
entire broadcast licensing regime, it seems un-
likely to succeed. The Court has long recognized
340 Most notable of these critics is former Commissioner
Glen Robinson See Glen 0. Robinson, Symposium, Spectrum
Property Law 101, 41 J.L. & ECON. 609 (1998) [hereinafter
Robinson, Spectrum Property Law]; accord Glen 0. Robinson,
The Electronic First Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47
DuKE L.J. 899, 911-12 (1998) [hereinafter Robinson, Electronic
First Amendment]. But while Commissioner Robinson argues
for greater recognition of the property rights of licensees, in
part on the grounds that the licensee "produces" the electro-
magnetic radiation that creates the phenomenon of spec-
trum, he fails to note that the government exercises or limits
many of the powers that he believes illustrates the licensee's
ownership of spectrum. See Robinson, Spectrum Property Law,
supra at 610 (discussing the right to exclude, transfer, and
use).
341 See, e.g., Comments of CBS Corp., In re Public Interest
Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360,
at 27-29 (Mar 27, 2000); Reply Comments of NAB, In re Pub-
lic Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Dkt
No. 99-360, at 28 (Mar 27, 2000).
.42 See Time Warner, 105 F.3d at 727 (Williams, J., dissent-
ing).
343 CBS, 453 U.S. at 395.
344 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1994); accord Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. at 173-75.
345 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176
(1979).
346 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994)
that spectrum rights are part of the "public do-
main,"343 and as such, are subject to disposition by
the government.
Indeed, Congress expressly retained govern-
ment ownership of the airwaves when it adopted a
licensing regime:
It is the purpose of this Act, among other things, to
maintain the control of the United States over all the
channels of radio transmission; and to provide for the
use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by
persons for limited periods of time, under licenses
granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall
be construed to create any right, beyond the terms,
conditions, and periods of the license.
344
Of course, the law has never known a single, inte-
grated definition of "property." Rather, it has rec-
ognized individual "sticks" in the bundle of rights
that make up property ownership. 345 The Gov-
ernment's allocation and licensing regime deter-
mines how spectrum will be used and who will be
excluded from that use, traditionally the most im-
portant stick in the bundle.3 46 Similarly, the ad-
vent of spectrum auctions makes ownership, and
consequently the quid pro quo rationale, even
more compelling. 347 Outside of the Commis-
sion's public interest inquiry, it appears beyond
argument that the government may auction fre-
quencies to the highest bidder, granting licenses
in exchange for consideration.
3 48
Perhaps the government's interest in spectrum
(describing the right to exclude others as "one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property") (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S at
176). Therefore there is no consequence in Commissioner
Robinson's argument that references to government owner-
ship of spectrum are "simply another way of articulating the
scarcity argument-the notion being that because the fre-
quencies were scarce, their use had to be licensed and the
licensing power was tantamount to public ownership."
Robinson, Electronic First Amendment, supra note 343, at 911-
12.
347 Some might respond that auctions are simply a tem-
porarily efficient method of distributing licenses, or an in-
strument of taxation, and not an exercise of "ownership"
rights. See Robinson, Spectrum Property Law, supra note 343, at
619-620.
34, To my knowledge, no individual or entity has chal-
lenged the Commission's licensing authority, through com-
parative hearings or competitive bidding, on the basis that
the government does not "own" the spectrum. Instead, cases
interpreting § 3090) proceed on the assumption that Con-
gress properly delegated this proprietary authority to the
FCC. See, e.g., Nat'l Pub. Radio, Inc. v. Fed Communications
Comm'n, 254 F.3d 226, 227-28 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Fresno Mo-
bile Radio, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 165 F.3d
965, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1999); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Fed. Communi-
cations Comm'n, 110 F.3d 816, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Mobile
Comm. Corp. of Am. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 77
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is better analogized to the power of eminent do-
main.3 49 Regardless, whether spectrum is prop-
erty that can be owned is something of a red her-
ring. Accepting the Commission's authority to
auction, the fact remains that Congress has con-
tinued to allow broadcasters to use their spectrum
for free, thereby conferring upon them a benefit.
Public interest obligations can thus be seen as an
alternative form of consideration3 511 Whether
one refers to the "quid" as property, subsidy, or
otherwise, it is a thing of value, and the corre-
sponding "quo" is currently lacking.
3 5'
E. Unconstitutional Conditions
A second criticism of the quid pro quo theory is
the argument that the government may not bar-
gain for the surrender of a constitutional right.
In Syracuse Peace Council, the FCC argued that
"there is nothing inherent in the utilization of the
licensing method of allocation that justifies the
government acting in a manner that would be
proscribed under a traditional First Amendment
analysis."3 5 2 This conclusion was based on the
premise that speech restrictions are "'unconstitu-
F.3d 1399, 1402-03 (D.C. Cir. 1996). But see Fed. Communi-
cations Comm'n v. Nextwave Personal Comm., Inc., 200 F.3d
43, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
349 See Time Warner, 105 F.3d at 727 (Williams, J., dissent-
ing); Robinson, Electronic First Amendment, supra note 343, at
912; Howard A. Shelanski and Peter W. Huber, Symposium,
Administrative Creation of Property Rights to Radio Spectrum, 41
J.L. & ECON. 581, 582 (1998).
'50 Not surprisingly, auctions have generated a policy de-
bate over whether the nation's public interest needs would
be better served by charging broadcasters the market price of
their spectrum, using the proceeds to fund public interest
programming itself. See generally HENRY GELLER & DONNA
LAMPERT, CHARGING FOR SPECTRUM USE (1989); Ronald
Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland: Why the Public Trus-
tee Model of Broadcast Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 Mic-i.
L. REV. 2101 (1997); Logan, supra note 125, at 1727.
351 Nor is the ability of the government to place condi-
tions on that benefit impaired. The government can create
limited public fora, restricting the use of tangible property as
well as more metaphysical f ora. See infra notes 375-77.
352 Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. at 5055.
353 Id.
There are those who argue that the acceptance by
broadcasters of government's ability to regulate the con-
tent of their speech is simply a fair exchange for their
ability to use the airwaves free of charge. To the extent,
however, that such an exchange allows the government
to engage in activity that would be proscribed by a tradi-
tional First Amendment analysis, we reject that argu-
ment.
Id.
Even as the FCC concluded that the fairness doctrine was
tional conditions' in that the government may not
condition the receipt of a public benefit on the
relinquishment of a constitutional right.
'353
In contexts other than broadcasting, for exam-
ple, the courts have indicated that where licensing
is permissible, the First Amendment prohibits the
government from regulating the content of fully
protected speech.354 Analogizing to the newspa-
per industry, Judge Bork argued that content reg-
ulation of broadcasting could not be premised on
the government's licensing function:
Neither is content regulation explained by the fact that
broadcasters face the problem of interference, so that
the government must define usable frequencies and
protect those frequencies from encroachment. This
governmental definition of frequencies is another in-
stance of a universal fact that does not offer an explana-
tory principle for differing treatment. A publisher can
deliver his newspapers only because government pro-
vides streets and regulates traffic on the streets by allo-
cating rights of way. Yet no one would contend that the
necessity for these governmental functions, which are
certainly analogous to the government's function in al-
locating broadcast frequencies, would justify regulation
of the content of a newspaper to ensure that it serves
the needs of the citizens.
355
The analogy is not entirely accurate as a matter
of fact. While government provides a number of
an unconstitutional condition in Syracuse Peace Council, it
maintained that the public interest standard in general was a
permissible condition imposed on broadcast licenses: "The
Commission may still impose certain conditions on licensees
in furtherance of this public interest obligation. Nothing in
this decision, therefore, is intended to call into question the
validity of the public interest standard under the Communi-
cations Act." Id. Moreover, the FCC's recent move away from
Syracuse Peace Council suggests that at least two Commissioners
view content-specific public interest obligations as permissi-
ble conditions: "As both the U.S. Supreme Court and the
D.C. Circuit have explained, [a] licensed broadcaster is
'granted the free and exclusive use of a valuable part of the
public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened
by enforceable public obligations." Repeal or Modification
of the Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules, 15 F.C.C.
Rcd. 19973, 18 (2000) (internal quotations and footnotes
omitted).
354 See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576
(1941); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-17
(1972); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. at 293-95; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)
("It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion
and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing
of conditions upon a benefit or privilege."). One of the most
definitive statements in this area was made in Perry v. Sinder-
man, 408 U.S. 592 (1972): Although no one has a constitu-
tional right to receive a government benefit, government
"may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes
his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his inter-
est in freedom of speech." Pery, 408 U.S. at 597.
355 Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr., 801 F.2d at 509.
[Vol. 11
Public Interest Regulation in the Digital Age
benefits enjoyed by all speakers, from public com-
mons and rights of way to the enforcement of
property rights, broadcasters enjoy a unique,
enormously valuable subsidy that is not provided
to the general public-the "fruit of a preferred
position conferred by the Government." 35 6 More-
over, as a legal matter, the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine is far from absolute; to some de-
gree it has always competed with doctrines justify-
ing various "strings" attached to ubiquitous gov-
ernment affiliations and benefits. 357 The Court
has upheld speech restrictions imposed as condi-
tions on government benefits where the state can
provide "appropriate reasons.
'3 58
One particular justification for speech-restric-
tive conditions is where the government opens
public property for expressive use by certain
groups, or for discussion of certain subjects, with-
out being opened for all expressive activity. The
Supreme Court has applied a categorical analysis
to speech restrictions on government property,
which can be seen as specific application of the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.35 9 In
each category, the government may impose con-
tent-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions
that are "narrowly tailored to achieve a significant
state interest and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication.."360  The level of
scrutiny applied to content-based restrictions var-
ies with each category, but the basic inquiry is
356 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400 (1967). Although broad-
casters argue that a functioning market for licenses exists by
virtue of the transferability of the license, see supra note 99;
Comments of CBS, Inc., In re Public Interest Obligations of
TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 24 (Mar 27,
2000) (citing Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. at 5055).
This argument completely ignores the absence of an initial
payment to the public for the use of spectrum. Given cur-
rent estimates of what this value might be, see supra note 125,
it is far from clear that any initial auction price would simply
represent a sunk cost or would otherwise not affect the
aftermarket for licenses.
357 See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREE-
DOM OF SPEECH 7-2 to 7-11 (2000) [hereinafter SMOLLA].
358 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 361-63 (1976); See Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 (1976) (per curiam).
359 See SMOLLA, supra note 357, at 7-2 to 7-3, 8-2; Logan,
supra note 125, at 1734-35. Early cases treated the govern-
ment like any other property owner and allowed it the right
to exclude whomever it wished. See Davis v. Massachusetts,
167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897). Subsequent opinions backed away
from this approach, although the Court continues to recog-
nize that "the government need not permit all forms of
speech on property that it owns and controls." Int'l Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., v. Lee ("ISKC"), 505 U.S. 672,
678 (1992).
360 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
"whether the manner of expression is basically
compatible with the normal activity of a particular
place at a particular time."36
1
The first two categories of government property
are the traditional public forum and the desig-
nated public forum. The traditional public forum
is one that has "immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, commu-
nicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions. ' 362 Designated public fora con-
sist of property that the government "has opened
for use by the public as a place for expressive ac-
tivity." 3 6 3 Traditional and designated public fora
are distinguished only by their history of expres-
sive use, and speech restrictions in both fora are
"subject to the highest scrutiny" and "survive only
if they are narrowly drawn to achieve a compel-
ling state interest."364 The government may thus
not prohibit speech outright in these fora, and
content-based restrictions must withstand strict
scrutiny.
The third category encompasses all other pub-
lic propertyi 6 5 This category includes property
that is not a forum at all, i.e., property that has not
been opened for expressive activity.36 6 Speech re-
strictions in nonpublic fora "need only be reason-
able, as long as the regulation is not an effort to
suppress the speaker's activity due to disagree-
U.S. 37, 45 (1983). The Court has said that time, place, or
manner regulations "'must be narrowly tailored to serve the
government's legitimate, content-neutral interests, but...
need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of
doing so." Instead, the regulation will survive if "the means
chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to
achieve the government's interest." Ward v. Rock Against Ra-
cism, 491 U.S. 781, 798, 800 (1989).
361 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116.
362 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515
(1939). Although Roberts's opinion did not gain a majority
of the Court, it has been endorsed in several opinions. See,
e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988). A traditional
public forum is property that has as "a principal purpose ...
the free exchange of ideas." ISKC, 505 U.S. at 679 (quoting
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
363 Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
364 ISKC, 505 U.S. at 678; Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-
46 ("Although a State is not required to indefinitely retain
the open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is
bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public
forum."); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 555 (1975).
365 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523




ment with the speaker's view.13 67 More impor-
tantly, the government can open a nonpublic fo-
rum for expressive use by certain groups, or for
discussion of certain subjects, without creating a
designated public forum. 368 The Court has re-
ferred to these fora as "limited" public fora, but
has distinguished them from designated public
fora.3 6
9
The question is one of government intent: "To
create a [designated public forum], the govern-
ment must intend to make the property 'generally
available,' to a class of speakers .... A designated
public forum is not created when the government
allows selective access for individual speakers rather
than general access for a class of speakers."3 70 When it
opens a limited forum, government "must respect
the lawful boundaries it has itself set," and "may
not exclude speech where its distinction is not
"reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum." 37' Moreover, the government may not
"discriminate against speech on the basis of its
viewpoint."
3 72
Thus, in determining whether the State is acting to pre-
serve the limits of the forum it has created so that the
exclusion of a class of speech is legitimate, we have ob-
367 ISKC, 505 U.S. at 679.
368 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S.
at 45; see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); City of
Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Pub. Employment Rela-
tions Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976); SMOLLA, supra note 357,
at 8.
369 The Court has also used the term "limited" public
fora to refer to a subset of designated public fora that is enti-
tled to higher scrutiny. See ISKC, 505 U.S. at 678-79; SMOLLA,
supra note 357, at 8. This statement may simply recognize
that a designated public forum may be limited to a specific
class of speakers but must be made generally available to
speakers within the class. See Arkansas Educ. Television
Comm'n, 523 U.S. at 679.
370 Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 523 U.S. at 679.
(emphasis added). "Designated public fora ... are created
by purposeful governmental action. 'The government does
not create a [designated] public forum by inaction or by per-
mitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a
nontraditional public forum for public discourse."' Id. at
677.
371 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (quoting Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 804-06).
372 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829; See Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-
93 (1993).
371 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30; See Perry Educ. Ass'n,
460 U.S. at 46. Of course, content-discrimination necessarily
discriminates against the viewpoint that the restricted con-
tent is unobjectionable. Cf Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830-31
("As we have noted, discrimination against one set of views or
ideas is but a subset or particular instance of the more gen-
eral phenomenon of content discrimination. And, it must be
served a distinction between, on the one hand, content
discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves
the purposes of that limited forum, and, on the other
hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed im-
permissible when directed against speech otherwise
within the forum's limitations.
373
Commentators have argued that forum analysis
offers a more precise framework within which to
view broadcast regulation. 374 The Court has rec-
ognized that forums often exist "more in a meta-
physical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but
the same principles are applicable. '" 375 Specifi-
cally, the Court has extended its forum analysis to
cases involving government subsidies as opposed
to the use of government property. In Legal Ser-
vices Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001), the
Court reasoned, "When the government creates a
limited forum for speech, certain restrictions may
be necessary to define the limits and purposes of
the program. The same is true when the govern-
ment establishes a subsidy for specified ends."
376
Notably, Justice Stevens recently described Red
Lion for the proposition that "reasonable re-
straints may be placed on access to certain well-
regulated fora.
' 377
acknowledged, the distinction is not a precise one.").
374 See, e.g., Reed Hundt & Karen Kornbluh, Renewing the
Deal Between Broadcasters and the Public: Requiring Clear Rules for
Children's Educational Television, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 11, 21
(1996) (arguing that "government may impose reasonable,
viewpoint-neutral restrictions on a private party's use of pub-
lic resources" such as broadcast spectrum); Logan, supra note
125, at 1709-16; Spitzer, supra note 275, at 1007-20. But see
Robert M. O'Neil, Broadcasting as a Public Forum, in RATIO-
NALES & RATIONALIZATIONS: REGULATING THE ELECTRONIC ME-
DIA (Robert Corn-Revere ed. 1997). In Arkansas Educational
Television Commission, the Court warned, "Having first arisen
in the context of streets and parks, the public forum doctrine
should not be extended in a mechanical way to the very dif-
ferent context of public television broadcasting." 523 U.S. at
672-73 (1998). The Court in that case was concerned, not
with whether Congress had created a public forum in licens-
ing broadcasters, but whether an Arkansas public television
station had created a public forum by hosting a presidential
debate. See id. at 673 ("Congress has rejected the argument
that 'broadcast facilities should be open on a nonselective ba-
sis to all persons wishing to talk about public issues."' (quot-
ing Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 105). Consequently,
the Court's cases rejecting a general right of access to a licen-
see's channel are only tangentially relevant to the proposi-
tion that the spectrum allocated to television can be analyzed
inder forum analysis.
'175 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (student activities fund);
accord Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 790 (Combined Federal Cam-
paign charity fundraiser).
37( Legal Services Corp., 531 U.S. at 543-544.
377 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., 518 U.S.
at 771 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing Red Lion in a
parenthetical as "approving access requirement limited to
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The broadcast medium is arguably a limited
public forum. The decision to adopt a licensing
regime over common carrier regulation or a sys-
tem of private property rights precludes the
broadcast medium from being characterized as a
designated public forum; a finite number of
speakers are given the exclusive right to speak on
particular frequencies .3 7  Because the govern-
ment has provided for "selective access for indi-
vidual speakers rather than general access for a
class of speakers," broadcast spectrum cannot
fairly be characterized as a designated public fo-
rum.3 79  The government has done "no more
,matters of great public concern'"); Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. at 194-95 (Brennan,J. Dissenting):
Here, of course, there can be no doubt that the broad-
cast frequencies allotted to the various radio and televi-
sion licensees constitute appropriate "forums" for the
discussion of controversial issues of public importance.
Indeed, unlike the streets, parks, public libraries, and
other "forums" that we have held to be appropriate for
the exercise of First Amendment rights, the broadcast
media are dedicated specifically to communication.
And, since the expression of ideas-whether political,
commercial, musical, or otherwise-is the exclusive pur-
pose of the broadcast spectrum, it seems clear that the
adoption of a limited scheme of editorial advertising
would in no sense divert that spectrum from its intended
use.
378 See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text; Free
Speech v. Reno, 200 F.3d 63, 64 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam)
(finding that the radio spectrum is not a public forum the
regulation of which warrants strict scrutiny and holding that
the broadcast licensing scheme embodied in the Communi-
cations Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-339, is not unconstitu-
tional). The trial court in Free Speech, in an unpublished deci-
sion, found that even if radio spectrum were subject to public
forum analysis, the spectrum would constitute a nonpublic
forum in which regulation is reviewed for reasonableness so
long as it is viewpoint neutral and determined that the broad-
cast licensing scheme is in fact both viewpoint neutral and
reasonable. Id.
379 Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 523 U.S. at 679.
"Designated public fora, in contrast, are created by pur-
poseful governmental action. 'The government does not cre-
ate a [designated] public forum by inaction or by permitting
limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a non-
traditional public forum for public discourse."' Id. at 677. But
See ISKC, 505 U.S. at 678 ("Where the government is acting as
a proprietor, managing its internal operations, rather than
acting as lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its
action will not be subjected to the heightened review to
which its actions as a lawmaker may be subject.").
380 Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 523 U.S. at 679-80
(quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804).
381 Judge Williams, in his dissent from denial of rehear-
ing en banc in Time Warner, suggested that the Supreme
Court's opinion in Rust v. Sullivan might support govern-
ment authority to impose conditions on broadcast licenses.
See Time Warner, 105 F.3d at 724 (Williams,J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Rust, 500 U.S. at 193). Rust, however, suggests an even
more deferential approach to speech restrictions than those
than reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a
particular class of speakers, whose members must
then, as individuals, 'obtain permission,' [through
an application for a license and subsequent re-
newal] to use it."380
Consequently, the broadcast medium may be
regulated on the basis of content if the regulation
reasonably preserves the purposes of the limited
forum, but regulations based on viewpoint are
presumed impermissible when directed against
speech otherwise within the forum's limita-
tions. 38 1 A speech restriction in a limited public
forum "need only be reasonable; it need not be
applicable to non-public fora. In Rust, the Supreme Court
upheld a statute that prohibited funds under Title X of the
Public Health Service Act from being spent on programs
where abortion is a method of family planning, as well as fed-
eral regulations that prohibited Title X projects from engag-
ing in abortion counseling, referral, and activities advocating
abortion as a method of family planning. See Rust, 500 U.S.
at 178-81.
The government can, without violating the Constitution,
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities
it believes to be in the public interest, without at the
same time funding an alternative program which seeks
to deal with the problem in another way. In so doing,
the Government has not discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to
the exclusion of the other.
Id. at 193.
Rust distinguished Peny "because here the Government is
not denying a benefit to anyone, but is instead simply insist-
ing that public funds be spent for the purposes for which
they were authorized." ld. at 196.
The essential characteristic of Rust, however, is that it dealt
with the government as a speaker-as a participant in the
marketplace of ideas-and the restrictions at issue in that
case were upheld because they were designed to preserve the
government's message from dilution by the private parties
used to transmit it. See Legal Services Corp., 531 U.S. at 540-43,
547-548; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. The Court later insisted
that "It does not follow... that viewpoint-based restrictions
are proper when the [government] does not itself speak or
subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead ex-
pends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers." Id. at 834.
Unlike the subsidy in Rust, broadcast licenses are "de-
signed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a govern-
mental message." Legal Services Corp., 531 U.S. at 542. The
public trustee model is premised on the editorial discretion
of broadcasters and has always forbidden the government to
engage in censorship. See, e.g., Arkansas Educ. Television
Comm'n, 523 U.S. at 673-74; Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
130-31 (1973); cf Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834-35. In Legal Ser-
vices Corp., the Court noted that a strong indicator that gov-
ernment is involved in regulating private speech as opposed
to its own message is when it "seeks to use an existing me-
dium of expression and to control it, in a class of cases, in
ways which distort its usual functioning." Legal Services Corp.,
531 U.S. at 543. The Court, in that case, specifically referred
to the accepted usage of broadcast frequencies for private
speech when it noted that government could not use that "fo-
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the most reasonable or the only reasonable limita-
tion."382 Here, the Supreme Court's First Amend-
ment jurisprudence regarding the broadcast me-
dium falls into place. Application of the First
Amendment to the broadcast medium has jeal-
ously guarded against viewpoint discrimination to
secure the "public's interest in receiving a wide va-
riety of ideas and views through the medium of
broadcasting."3 8 3 The Court has ensured that
broadcasters are "entitled under the First Amend-
ment to exercise 'the widest journalistic freedom
consistent with their public [duties].'"384
Instead, the Court has implicitly recognized
that public interest regulation reasonably pre-
serves the purpose Congress has assigned to this
property-an evolving notion of "the public inter-
est, convenience, or necessity." The cases uphold-
ing public interest regulation based on the scar-
rum in an unconventional way to suppress speech inherent
in the nature of the medium." Id. (citing League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. at 296-97 and Arkansas Educ. Television
Comm'n, 523 U.S. at 676).
Moreover, Rust's distinction between conditions on a grant
and conditions on a grantee make an analogy to broadcast
tenuous. Rust emphasized that "[t] he regulations govern the
scope of the Title X project's activities, and leave the grantee
unfettered in its other activities." Rust, 500 U.S. at 196-97.
The Court expressly distinguished "unconstitutional condi-
tions" cases such as League of Women Voters, which struck down
a ban on editorializing that applied to any station receiving
money from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB).
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 366. Under the law at is-
sue in League of Woman Voters:
[a] noncommercial educational station that receives
only 1% of its overall income from CPB grants is barred
absolutely from all editorializing. . .The station has no
way of limiting the use of its federal funds to all
noneditorializing activities, and, more importantly, it is
barred from using even wholly private funds to finance
its editorial activity.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400.
Accordingly, League of Woman Voters concerned "a condi-
tion on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular
program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient
from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of
the federally funded program," Rust, 500 U.S. at 196-97,
whereas in Rust, neither the law nor the regulations
"force[d] the Title X grantee to give up abortion-related
speech; they merely require that the grantee keep such activi-
ties separate and distinct from Title X activities." Id. at 196;
see also Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washing-
ton, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (upholding a law granting tax
deductions for contributions made to veterans' groups en-
gaged in lobbying, while denying that favorable status to
other charities which pursued lobbying efforts, in part on the
basis that the other organizations could segregate their lob-
bying activities by creating a separate, non-exempt affiliate to
pursue its lobbying efforts). Unlike the ability to provide
abortion counseling or to engage in lobbying activities, the
ability to speak over the airwaves exists solely by virtue of the
city doctrine necessarily affirmed the nexus be-
tween public interest requirements and the "inter-
est of the listening public in 'the larger and more
effective use of radio. '"' 38 5 This nexus is more
than the reasonableness demanded of speech re-
striction in limited public fora; the Court has re-
quired that content-based broadcast regulations
be "narrowly tailored to serve a substantial govern-
ment interest."386 The basic licensing require-
ment, "the ability of the licensee to render the
best practicable service to the community reached
by his broadcasts," is the primary element of the
public interest.3 87 Specific obligations are also
reasonably related to the purpose of broadcast.
Closed captioning, political access, and children's
television requirements increase public access to
television that meets the informational and educa-
tional needs of society. Restrictions on indecent
broadcast license. Thus, any restriction on the license is nec-
essarily a restriction on the speaker. But see ZUCKMAN ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 101 (noting that the distinction between con-
dition and recipient may be "more semantic than real," be-
cause the Title X funded programs had to be both physically
and financially separate from abortion related activities, re-
sulting in the situation, identical to League of Woman Voters,
where the recipient could not use its facilities to engage in
private speech that clashed with the government restriction).
That the reasoning in Rust cannot be extended to broad-
cast is not for want of trying. Then-Justice Rehnquist, the au-
thor of Rust, dissented from League of Woman Voters because
he believed that "Congress has rationally concluded that the
bulk of taxpayers . . . would prefer not to see the manage-
ment of local educational stations promulgate its own private
views on the air at taxpayer expense. Accordingly Congress
simply has decided not to subsidize stations which engage in
that activity." League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 405 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); see also Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("The reason that denial of participation in a tax exemption
or other subsidy scheme does not necessarily 'infringe' a fun-
damental right is that-unlike direct restriction or prohibi-
tion-such a denial does not, as a general rule have any sig-
nificant coercive effect.").
382 ISKC, 505 U.S. at 683.
383 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 382.
394 Id. at 378 (CBS, 453 U.S. at 395 ) (quoting Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 110).
385 NBC, 319 U.S. at 216; accord League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. at 378-80 (discussing the relationship between re-
strictions upheld by the court and the public interest); see also
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., 518 U.S. at 771
n.I (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing Red Lion in a paren-
thetical as "approving access requirement limited to 'matters
of great public concern"'); Logan, supra note 125, at 1739
(noting that this relationship comports with the concept of
"germaneness" in the Court's unconstitutional conditions
cases).
'86 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 380.
387 NBC, 319 U.S. at 216 (quoting Sanders Radio Station,
309 U.S. at 475).
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broadcasting and advertisements, as well as re-
quirements that broadcasters implement filtering
technology, are reasonably designed to prevent
the broadcast forum from use beyond Congres-
sional intent. Finally-and most importantly-
the existence of numerous alternative video out-
lets such as cable and DBS, rather than undermin-
ing the constitutional basis of broadcast regula-
tion, militate in favor of its reasonableness by leav-
ing open a number of other forums in which a
speaker may exercise his or her First Amendment
rights.
3 88
Characterizing the broadcast medium as a lim-
ited public forum bridges the apparent gap be-
tween allocational scarcity and content-specific
public interest regulation. Rather than justifying
regulation in and of itself, allocational scarcity
simply describes a unique and valuable resource
at the government's disposal. The government,
in turn, has dedicated a portion of that resource
to the provision of mass media services to the na-
tion. The public trustee model defines the outer
boundaries of the licensee's invitation to enter
the broadcast forum and fulfill Congress's objec-
tives. Access to the forum is predicated on the li-
censee's promise to serve the "public interest,
convenience, or necessity."3 89
F. Summary
Contrary to the concerns of broadcasters and
Commissioners Powell and Furchtgott-Roth, pub-
lic interest regulation is not in constitutional jeop-
ardy as a result of digital technology. Broadcast
licenses remain scarce, and the scarcity doctrine
remains good law. Instead, Congress and the FCC
have simply increased the amount of spectrum al-
ready owned by the broadcast industry. Moreo-
ver, even from a numerical perspective, DTV only
has the potential to increase the number of televi-
sion outlets available to the public. Whether
broadcasters provide more than the one required
video service remains to be seen. Accordingly,
whether one adopts an allocational or a numeri-
cal perspective of the scarcity doctrine, digital tel-
evision does not alter the factual basis upon which
Red Lion was decided.
388 See ISKC, 505 U.S. at 684-85 (noting that a regulation
prohibiting solicitation inside an airport terminal did not
prohibit solicitation on the sidewalks outside the terminals:
"In turn we think it would be odd to conclude that the Port
Even if the Court were to disavow the scarcity
doctrine, its public forum jurisprudence will pro-
vide an adequate foundation on which to sustain
the existing public interest regulatory regime as a
"quid pro quo" for the grant of a broadcast li-
cense. Moreover, given language supporting a
quid pro quo rationale, and to the extent that
scarcity alone never really justified regulation be-
yond the allocation of broadcast frequencies, the
Court could comfortably argue that the "quid pro
quo" model has been an implicit element of the
scarcity doctrine since its inception.
CONCLUSION
Despite the impassioned arguments of public
interest advocates and broadcasters, public inter-
est regulation in the near-digital future will bear
striking resemblance to the regulatory regime de-
veloped for analog television. This is because the
current debate over public interest regulation is
only nominally connected to the transition to dig-
ital television. For the most part, the controversy
surrounding the public interest standard in a
DTV-world has simply inherited the decades-old
arguments over (1) whether public interest obli-
gations infringe on broadcasters' First Amend-
ment rights, (2) how the FCC should define "the
public interest, convenience, or necessity," and
(3) whether and how the Commission should reg-
ulate programming content according to that def-
inition. Each side's perspective on these issues is
completely detached from emerging digital tech-
nologies. Instead, the arguments on both sides
have simply been recycled from past public inter-
est controversies.
For advocates of increased public interest obli-
gations, the nominal connection to digital televi-
sion is the "great giveaway" debate over whether
the transition to DTV is an unnecessary windfall
to broadcasters. But this debate itself is discon-
nected from DTV policy. Instead, it really con-
cerns the merits of the government's determina-
tion that digital television serves the public inter-
est and not the approach that Congress and the
Commission have chosen to implement the DTV
transition.
Authority's terminal regulation is unreasonable despite the
Port Authority having otherwise assured access to an area
universally traveled.").
389 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1994).
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For opponents of governmental definitions of
the "public interest, convenience, and necessity,"
the nominal connection to digital television is the
undermining of the scarcity principle on which
the constitutionality of public interest regulation
rests. Yet broadcast licenses remain scarce-in-
deed, they have been further consolidated under
the broadcast industry's control-and the scarcity
doctrine remains good law. Instead, whether Red
Lion should be reconsidered is a question that
goes to the logic of that decision in the first place
and is entirely distinct from digital television.
Whether these are debates that need to be
reheard is beyond the scope of this article. But, as
this article has shown, that debate has little to do
with DTV and has generated little consideration
of whether and how the technology of digital televi-
sion should impact broadcasters' duty to serve the
public interest. A closer examination of these is-
sues reveals that the constitutional foundation of
public interest regulation remains as sure (or as
shaky) as it ever was, but that aside from a handful
of salient features, a hasty decision to expand pub-
lic interest obligations will likely conflict with
other policy objectives, particularly market pene-
tration of DTV receivers and a smooth and timely
transition to all-digital television.
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